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PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MYTHOLOGY*

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I. INTRODUCTORY

In recent years particular interest in myths and mythmaking has been aroused by Anthropology, Social Psychology, as well

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as by the Freudian school. Boas and Ehrenreich have paid special attention to the problem. Wundt has devoted a great deal of energy and time to expound the *Völker-Psychologie*. And the Freudian school has busied itself with a certain phase of the problem. Everybody seems to have begun to look at primitive man and his culture in a quite different way from what was formerly the custom. All this has caused modern man to consider his ancestors more sympathetically and regard primitive man with all his faults and defects really human. This paper is a preliminary study and purposes to treat the mental products of primitive man, and "near" primitive man, from a psychological point of view, in order to discover what mental processes were involved in the formation of the myth as well as folklore in general.

1. *Definition of Myths.*

First of all let us ask: What is a myth? Gennep (26) says that it is a legend localized in time and space outside human reach but within that of divine personages. A legend he defines as being a story in which "the place is indicated with precision and the personages some determined individuals whose acts have a foundation which seems historic and heroic." And "one can understand by myth a legend in relation to the supernatural world and explain it indeed from the rites." In this respect he differs radically from Brinton (11) who maintains that no myth ever rose from the rite, but that the rite always arose from the myth, whether we are able to explain it or not; the old myth which gave rise to the rite, may be lost. Boas (9) on the other hand believes "that the tale as such is older than its mythological significance."

John Fiske (23) undoubtedly tries to bring in and apply the generic or evolutionary idea into mythology for he defines a myth as

"in its origin an explanation, by the uncivilized mind, of some natural phenomena, not an allegory, not an esoteric symbol,—for the ingenuity is wasted which strives to detect in myths the remnants of a refined primeval science,—but an explanation."

Tylor (79) maintains that

"myth is sham history, the fictitious narrative of events that never happened."

Ruskin (67a) remarks:

"A myth, in its simplest definition, is a story with a meaning attached to it other than that which it seems to have at first, and the fact that it has such a meaning is generally marked by some of its circumstances being extraordinary."

Ruskin seems to be radically at variance with John Fiske who maintained that a myth *was* an explanation and he that it *needs* one.

Max Müller (54) holds that

"mythology which was the bane of the ancient world, is, in truth, a disease of language." "The origin of mythological phraseology is always the same; it is language forgetting herself." "It is in fact the dark shadow which language throws on thought and which never disappears till language becomes commensurate with thought which it never will." "Mythology in the highest sense is the power exerted by language upon thought in every possible sphere of mental activity, and I do not hesitate to call the whole history of philosophy, from Thales down to Hegel, an uninterrupted battle against mythology, a constant protest of thought against language."

I have given this rather lengthy quotation from Max Müller to show his trend of thought. He has had perhaps more to do with the "Sacred Books of the East" than any other Westerner and thus has had a good opportunity to form his opinion about their subject-matter. But it is strange how mind can lose itself in the narrow paths of thought unguided by any psychological insight.

Forlong (24) regards myths as

"history which we have not yet been able to read." "Zeuses and Ios, Europas and Helenas, Titans and Toths and gods are all history in the process of incubation; we must unravel the skein and see the real actors, their acts, principles and faiths."

Abraham (1) says that

"myth is a piece of overcome infantile mental life of a people. It contains (in a curtailed form) the infantile wish of a people."

In regard to the origin of the myths Wundt (88) writes that "the last source of all myth formation, of all religious feelings and ideas is the individual fantasy-activity; even those structures which have been developed under the condition of communal life possess entirely the character of a creation of fancy. In myth the folk-fantasy connects the event with reality. In religion it creates from the contents of these events its ideas concerning the cause and purpose of the human existence."

Definitions could be multiplied but the above cited may be

enough to show what divergence of opinions exists among those who have studied this subject. Interesting to be sure they are, for they show what other persons have thought about the myths and also reflect the special interest by which they were guided. In Max Müller's definition the philologist appears plainly, in John Fiske's the historian and so on.

The Greek word *mythos*, which has been transplanted into almost every language, means simply "a word" or "a saying," and the definitions that make myths history which we are not yet able to read coincide fairly well with this. Myth is then a word, a saying, an expression by primitive man of his thoughts and ideas about himself and the world in which he lives. As John Fiske (23) says: "They are the earliest recorded utterances of men concerning the visible phenomena of the world into which they were born." Myth is thus history, obscured to be sure by the many transformations which everything human has to go through from time to time, but history, nevertheless, recording what primitive man thought and felt in the first stages of his existence as man, be it either as a race or as an individual.

2. *Myth and Language*

Max Müller's degeneration theory, as Wundt (88) calls it, could never be wholly true, if at all. Bacon's theory, later taken up by Gladstone and others, that the myths are glimpses of an old civilization, is not worth considering except in so far as it has any bearing on Max Müller's. But to build up a system entirely on the remnants of the names of the gods by tracing them back from one language to another is not far from nonsense. Who knows whether the original language, if such there be, is still in existence, dead or alive, for language can exist though dead? The further back one goes the greater do the gapes become in the mythological ideas which finally disappear completely. Moreover, it can not be concluded from this procedure that the ideas are simpler and purer the further back one goes, nor that conformity of names means the same thing in different languages and at different periods, since the mythological ideas as well as all other ideas are dependent upon both subjective and objective conditions which constantly change as well as being subject to changes themselves.

But even if languages were stable, fixed, *i. e.*, did not change in any respect during endless times; even if words spelled the same way everywhere and always and had the same meaning among all nations at all times; and even if the ideas conveyed by the words and the sentences all the time and everywhere were the same, we should nevertheless have myths to explain and mythological ideas to expound and elucidate, because, as Schleiermacher (39) said, there is a deeper common principle underlying it all which must be taken into consideration, and that we must always reason from what the religious consciousness *says* to what it *means*. And if this is true of the religious consciousness, it is also true of consciousness in general.

But now since language is not stable, either, but undergoes changes together with the human race, so that a word may utterly lose its original meaning and take on a wholly different one even in the same language, not to speak of the meaning of the same word in different languages, the case is even more complicated. Thus, in order to find the right meaning of the words and be able to read the history of primitive man and see what he thought, believed, worshipped and feared, and at the same time find out his mental ability and procedure, it is not only necessary to inversely unfold the changes which the languages have gone through in their development but also to unravel the mysteries of the soul and see what he really thought and felt. By these means a fair accuracy may be reached.

That words will change meaning when passing from one language to another is too well known to be reiterated, but an illustration of Max Müller's procedure and conclusion may be given by referring to his and his followers' explanation of Zeus and the Trojan war, remembering, however, that some of the etymologies have been seriously attacked by Mahaffy (52). In the Greek a large number of names, especially of the gods and heroes, have no meaning, but if traced back to Sanskrit a meaning may be found in them. Thus Zeus or Jupiter is Dyaus pitar and means in the Veda "sky" and Hermes or Sarameias "the breeze of the summer morning." Athene or Ahana means "the light of daybreak," which causes John Fiske to write: "Thus we are enabled to understand why the Greeks described her as sprung from the forehead of Zeus." Helena or Sarama

means "the fickle twilight," whom the Panis, or nightdemons, the prototype of the Hellenic Paris, strive to seduce from her allegiance to the solar monarch. In Greek all these meanings were lost and their origin completely forgotten. In the Vedas the Trojan war was carried on in the sky between the bright deities and the nightdemons, but in Greek it was located on the shores of the Hellespont, perhaps on account of some historical event that might have happened there. A later development of the Trojan war is to be sure plain from the great difference in the characters of those taking part.

Kuhn (49) and after him Abraham (1) have tried to show the very same thing in regard to the Prometheus myth, tracing it back to the Hindu Pramantha which has a wholly different meaning from the Greek derivative Prometheus. When the origin of the word was lost, the original meaning was also lost and a new attached to the new word, to fit the new environment and the new thought. But this changing of words and with them a new meaning and a new explanation must have been a slow process and taken place unconsciously, especially if Boas is right, who maintains that language arose unconsciously and was unconsciously applied to the objects in which the people had special interest.

3. Divisions of Myths

The theory that myth is an explanation by primitive man of the objects, events and happenings around him does not contain the whole truth. This theory applies directly only to the so-called nature myths which treat of the natural objects and phenomena surrounding man in his primeval habitat. These myths which apparently are the oldest and to be understood simply as explanations, ought to be divided into two groups: those that deal with the natural objects proper, and those that deal with the natural phenomena. To be sure these are not clearly divided and often overlap one another. There is no symbolism in them, at least not at first. The sun was the sun and nothing else, a living being, either the greatest god, a god among the gods, a messenger of the god, or an attribute of a god, carried over the heavens. The same is true of most if not all the natural objects and phenomena.

In course of time there grew up another kind of myths which has been more troublesome than the nature myths: the so-called

Hero myths or, as they ought to be designated, Social myths or Culture myths. These originated in a wholly different way and for a wholly different purpose, although they contain a sort of explanation, too, but not in the same sense as the nature myths. The social myths are the outgrowth of man's feelings and emotions stored away down in the deep recesses of the human psyche and for whose expression a totally different mental procedure must be resorted to. The nature myths have primitive science that is reasoning as their foundation; the social myths have feelings and emotions as their foundation. They have therefore taken wholly different paths in their further development. The nature myths have developed into sciences of all kinds and descriptions, while the social myths have developed into poetry, art, religion, ethics, aesthetics, etc. Both of them blend and overlap here and there, because it is impossible to keep two streams of thought that originate in the same or identical psyche and led by the same human hands entirely free from intermixture, even if one be purer than the other, and the natural sciences contain less of feelings and emotions than the normative and literary, and the normative and literary sciences contain less of cold reason and scientific accuracy than the natural. But both are generically human.

Symbolism is closely connected with myths. One kind of it arose when the gods began to be separated from the natural objects, hewn out of them, so to speak, and the Greeks got their Zeus, and the Scandinavians their Odin, etc., with all the gods and goddesses who no longer dwelt among them but had to be represented in some way. Another kind arose when some affections were to be presented and could not be so in their real nature, owing to the fact that society had fixed a certain custom which prescribed the procedure approved of in a given instance. These two, a mental and a social phenomena, are responsible for all symbolism that has later developed.

Thus, when the significance or right meaning of an object or a phenomenon begins to become conscious, it begins also to lose its anthropomorphic character, and in the transitory stage which begins symbolism appears and takes the place of anthropomorphization of the inorganic world. Animals and other objects become symbols of the powers in nature and worshipped and revered as representatives of these powers. But as man

rises in his mental ability and activity, for function precedes, his gods become more and more abstract until there is hardly anything more left than the mere thought in Bostrom's sense. The symbols continue to be used even in this period, and it is a question whether they will ever be wholly discarded.

4. *Myth and Poetry*

The relationship between myth and poetry and literary fiction is in reality very close, closer even than one at first is ready to admit. But that their general features are more alike than different is seen at a hasty glance. Indeed, the poet still lives, moves, and has his being in the myth-making age. Says Tylor (79) :

"Poetry has so far kept alive in our minds the old animative theory of nature, that it is no great effort to us to fancy the water-spout a huge giant or a sea-monster, and to depict in what we call appropriate metaphor its march across the fields of ocean."

And Quantz (62) maintains that

"the poets have never lost sight of the thought that man is only an essential part of the great unity of nature, and to them the trees, the flowers, and the streams have ever been living things of thought and feeling, desire and will."

Zeller (89) places poetry, mythology and religion on the same level and holds that we get them all from such sources as the feelings which arise in our consciousness when we in the spring morning take a walk in the country, by the sea, under the stars, from such instinctive needs as we feel in the thunderstorms, floods, battles, famines, or sickness and from the experience of common family and social life, and that they interpret these needs and feelings and preserve a faithful record of the wishes, fears and hopes of the prehistoric people; indeed the poets are the old theologians. And Wundt (88) says that

"the myth-forming and the poetic imaginations do not differ in their inner essence but only from their external and internal conditions to which they are subjected at a given time and within a given community."

Poetry is not a voluntary invention and myth an involuntary or unconscious product of the soul but both are the result of the same mental activities and belong to the same sphere. So fundamental factors of mental life as will and consciousness can not possibly be lacking in mythological thought and present in poetry. They are either lacking in both or present in both.

To be sure poetry may be on a higher level than many of the loosely connected myths, but even these have a purpose and an association of ideas, since they connect external phenomena with the wishes, hopes, and fears of the people. The teleological factor is not originally contained in poetry as is seen by the impossibility to distinguish between poetry and myth in many cases.

What we generally call poetry has more of a personal character than the myths, but this difference disappears gradually the more one approaches the real poetry and is entirely lost in the epics or folk-poetry which have perhaps been built up during long ages. The folksoul has here asserted itself, expressed itself, and taken possession of the material through some individuals who are totally lost to the world, perhaps because they so skillfully pluck the strings of the human soul-harp that the tunes became so melodious and intense that they themselves were forgotten. The same is the case in myth; there is indeed no difference between the folk-poetry and the myth. "It is myth," says Wundt. The individual character that may linger with some of them is of a secondary sort; the folk-soul that is laid down in them is the primary. This union between myth, folklore, and folk-soul must have deep psychic roots, penetrating down into the recesses of the soul and from there afford an outlet for the hidden psychic powers and emotions that rule supreme in the human being, otherwise they could not have so much in common, as they really have. If this were not the case, they could not exert such a tremendous influence upon mankind as now is the case. There really seems to have been and still is a psychic need or call for this kind of literary production, a hunger so strong that ages of reflection have not been able to obliterate or even satisfy it.

Furthermore, that the psychic factors which produce poetry also produce myth is seen in the fact that poetry never changes the general feature of the myth, and yet it often takes its raw material and clothes it in a rich and beautiful garb and presents it to the world thus transformed. Indeed poetry begins here. The many versions of the various folk-tales depend upon the environmental conditions and upon the personal equation of the several authors. In substance and in purpose they are all the same. The poetic working over of the raw material

makes the myths richer and fuller in content. One completes the other. Thus the poetic expression and form of the Eddas, the Niebelungen Lied, the Kalevala, not to speak of the Iliad and the Odyssey, makes them much more attractive and immortal than were the bare mythological records which underlie these beautiful and aesthetic poems alone presented.

Association of ideas and general experience play a great rôle in the formation and development of myths, but says Wundt (88)

"as long as the association of mythological ideas remains connected with the phenomena which form their substrate the mythformation keeps the character of pure myth, not yet essentially changed by individual, poetic additions, even if they are interwoven with many associations."

To be sure the individual imagination sometimes individualizes the mythic pictures and transforms them from being general into individual, concrete experiences taken place at a certain time and place. The old general ideation, clothed in a poetic garb, becomes very concrete and individual. The characters of Niebelungen Lied are very corporeal and realistic, almost human in their behavior, and perform their deeds at definite places in a generically human way. But when the individual poetic addition becomes too prominent, then the myth loses its special character and the formation becomes poetry pure and simple, but having lost its character of folk-poetry it is soon lost for the world and generations to come will not know very much about it.

II. PRIMITIVE MAN AND HIS MIND

1. *Development of Man*

Wachter (84) remarks: "Der Mensch ist geworden und nicht erschaffen" and even if DeVries' theory of mutation be true, and man sprang into existence as man with a sudden leap, this "geworden" must of necessity have been a very slow process and ages passed through before he found himself and awoke consciously as man. It makes quite a difference in regard to his mental attitude toward and grasp of the external world whether his becoming man was a slow process or happened with a sudden leap, for in the former case he was gradually being acquainted with and accustomed to the world around him while in the latter he was placed in his position unexpectedly

and so rather unaccustomed to it. His relation to the world behind him would also be quite different if he suddenly became man, for in this respect he would be more cut off from the ancestral world and his inheritance of what had passed before him be diminished if not altogether nullified. Therefore in order to save man from being disinherited we must assume that his becoming was a slow process with perhaps small sudden leaps here and there in his mental and physical makeup as the flicker of a burning light that has just been lighted until it reaches its full capacity. In this case his mentality would be stored up during ages that passed before him layer by layer for him to use in his new position.

A sudden leap into prominence, so to speak, would also have produced in him a wholly different reaction and mental attitude toward the world around him. The effect of this might have been lasting and detrimental to his further development, for when an impression or idea enters mind they leave traces after them. This is true the more so the lower man stands on the upward plane of mental evolution, because the lower he stands the less there is in his mind and experience to counterbalance the impressions and ideas that force themselves upon him. Just as in early life impressions received remain fixed in the mind and may cause great disturbances in the mental activity, while impressions received later on, when there is a better orientation and a more perfect understanding, may not have any disturbing effect at all, although they may not be entirely lost.

Thus man's becoming man might not have been so very sudden after all, and his orientation might have been somewhat gradual. In this case the magnificence of the phenomena around him slowly became conscious to him, *i. e.*, had some meaning to him. Then, he strengthened the external impressions by inward meditation and thought, warmed by the wonder and grandeur of a distant spectacle, such as a thunderstorm, a calm evening after sunset, when the streaks of lightning illuminated the dark firmament as they passed from one cloud to another.

Primitive man must necessarily have been strongly emotional, because there was very little in his experience to counterbalance and keep in check, when stirred up, the feelings and emotions which are at the bottom of every human soul, although, judging from primitive people of to-day, he could very well control

them if occasion demanded it. And the ability to repress the feelings and emotions must have been an important factor in evolution, for only those who could master themselves in strange and trying circumstances would have any chance of survival in the struggle for existence which has always been waged.

2. The One-pair Origin Theory.

The question of the unity of the human races as they exist to-day may be looked at from two different points of view: The unity of descent and the unity of development. The former has to do with the single pair origin of mankind and the second with the developments along similar lines and according to similar laws. These are two quite different problems and must be settled in quite different ways, and still they amount to the very same thing.

Boas (9) maintains that this question was settled by the thoroughgoing inquiries made into this subject by Waitz (85) who asserts

"that the question of the unity of the species and the nature of man especially belongs to those branches of knowledge which treat of the intellect,"

so that whether there are any physical differences or not does not belong to the subject. The notion that there must be a dominant white race which shall be served by all others and which may treat them as it sees fit he repudiates strongly. Agassiz (85) maintained that there were as many original types of man as there are typically different peoples on earth. He based his conclusions on analogies drawn from bees and other social animals and wanted to show that the descent from one pair was highly improbable; but it is difficult to see how this analogy could be carried out in all cases.

The attempt that has been made to show that descent from one pair is preferable, since it is not advisable to multiply causes and one miracle is more acceptable than many, Waitz meets by the assertion that

"it is clear that a multiplication of agents is something different from a great complication of acting causes and that as regards miracles science can not concern itself about the degree of admissibility but about the suspension of the natural laws which are in conflict with science, for a miracle as such has no degree."

He also maintained that the "probably unsolvable problem of descent from one pair or several pairs" is of minor importance. To be sure, the positive proofs of descent from one pair are very scanty and the theory is very improbable, since nature would not in this case perhaps more than in any other hang the existence and preservation of a species on so slender a thread as a single pair. Nature works always toward an end and it knows of no parsimony in obtaining it. The developmental factors which caused one pair to spring into existence must have been the same everywhere, if the environment and circumstances were the same, and these could not have changed so quickly and so radically in the same place so as to preclude the production of any more pairs, and if they did, this pair, just produced, would not have been able to survive or produce offspring that would have been able to survive. Thus, it is difficult to see why just one pair should have been developed in one place and no more. It is, however, easy to see that environment might have been, and in all probability was, more favorable in one region than in another. But, according to Weismann, environment does not play any great rôle in bringing about changes, either in the individual or in the species. If we thus have to rule out environment, too, the problem becomes even more difficult, because environment has always been the dumping ground for our ignorance, for we have there deposited what we have been unable to explain otherwise. DeVries' theory of mutation would possibly help us some, but the conclusion would necessarily be that, when nature had produced one pair of *homo sapiens*, it could do no more, for it took all its human-making strength and energy to produce this one pair.

The objection might be raised that, if there were more than one pair, how can the human race be one, but this objection may be met simply by saying that in producing man nature produced a certain species according to well established laws and nothing could get into this hierarchy or be recognised as belonging to it which had not the essential qualifications. It is thus not necessary to assume, as Agassiz did, as many original types of man as there are typically different peoples to-day, even if we assume that more than one pair sprang into existence at one or several places, because the intermixture that

takes place between races will ultimately change the original types that interchange and produce a new type perhaps wholly different from either of the original, depending upon the dominant characteristics and the circumstances under which the intermixture takes place.

Thus, whether we assume the origin of one single pair or several the result will be the same. In either case we must also assume a considerable degree of mutability of the type as well as intermixture, although we do not know whether intermixture has taken place at all in some cases and how far it has progressed in others.

Consequently, whether man has developed slowly or come into existence with a sudden leap; whether he is monogenous or polygenous does not make so much difference, for the moment he was pronounced *man*, he was forever separated from his progenitors as far as the type is concerned and endowed with all the mental and physical attributes and possessions which belong to him as man. He may change physically and mentally and develop along somewhat different lines according to the circumstances under which he lives, but he will always remain fundamentally the same as long as he remains man.

3. The Oneness of Human Mind

That no two races are exactly alike in physical or mental development and characteristics is a too well-known fact to be reiterated. If all were alike we should not have different races. And still the assertion is made and maintained that man is fundamentally one, and that this unity depends more on intellectual ability than physical development. To be sure one race may be foremost in one kind of human activity and another in another, but seldom is anyone behind in all. And Boas (9) says: "The weight of evidence is on the whole in favor of an essential similarity of mental development in the different races with the probability of variations in the type of mental characteristics." Heredity and environment may of course cause different people to react differently to the same stimuli, but where these are the same and the stimuli not strongly different the same reaction will take place from similar stimuli. These two factors, heredity and environment, or the personal experi-

ence, play a great rôle in the development of mind, especially how and in what direction it shall develop. They present also two different problems. Says Boas:

"It may be that the minds of different races show differences of organization; that is to say, the laws of mental activity may not be the same for all minds. But it may also be that the organization of mind is practically identical among all races of men, but that its manifestations depend upon the character of the individual experience that is subjected to the action of these laws."

Thus a man may run away when he hears a dog bark, because he has been bitten by a dog, or he may rejoice, because he is lost and now expects to find someone, or else he may take it as the first greeting from his home which he is nearing. The differences in these mental manifestations surely depend upon the individual experience and not upon the mental organization as such.

Experimental psychology has taught us that man is thinking and acting according to definite laws and that these laws are frightfully rigid. Mind seems to work like a machine: Given the same material and it will infallibly grind out the same result, all things being equal. Post (10) was so struck by this fact that he said: "We do not think; thinking merely goes on within us." Maybe it is not so simple as that but there is nevertheless some truth in it. Psychology has also taught us that ideas originate from impressions on the sensory nerves by association according to definite laws.

Brinton (10) calls this the most startling discovery in recent times.

But if man's mind developed in practically the same way and according to the same laws everywhere, and if consequently the organization of mind is the same in all races, the differences, which exist between the races, in mental development are of degree and not of kind. The question remains open, however, according to Boas (9) which "characteristics of primitive man are causes of his low culture and which are caused by it." Abstract thought *e. g.* occurs only in a comparatively high stage of mental development and is said certainly not to exist in children and primitive men. These are bound down to concrete objects and handle them as if they were flesh of their flesh and bones of their bones, endowed with the same characteristics and

properties as they are themselves. The external world is a part of themselves or at least made up of the same elements as they are and as such they treat it. The dividing line between the animate and inanimate world is not clear, and the distinction between animals and man is not sharply drawn. The abstractness, the condition, and the attribute of the object are not comprehended and therefore must be expressed in concrete forms. Sickness and health are regarded as independent realities which can be taken out and put into the body as the case might require. The child has still to go through the same stage of development and the adult is not quite free from it. But whether this condition is a necessary one or brought about by circumstances are two different questions. That there was a time when abstract thought was impossible may be quite certain but whether this can be prolonged by environment is another thing. It certainly seems so, for Boas found that the Indians were capable of abstract thought whenever there was any occasion for it and could very readily learn to use it, but that it was needless in that kind of society in which they live. This is quite natural for when grammatical constructions began to develop and have some meaning, abstract thought began also to develop and enable man to carry on his reasoning and form his concepts about the world in which he is a member.

Concepts and distinct types of association must have originated unconsciously, as it oftentimes still does, in the customs and habits which primitive man was gradually forming during his early existence. If these were ever to become conscious it must happen by incidentally or accidentally breaking them off, which occurs as soon and as often as a new factor enters into experience and demands recognition. When this takes place he wakes up to the fact that there is a large content in his mind for which he can give no adequate account except that it is there. Man has always acted more or less customarily and not always for any conscious motive, but primitive man seldom stopped there but proceeded to explain his own acts or desires. But

"the desire to understand one's own actions (as soon as they become conscious) and to get a clear insight into the secrets of the world, manifests itself at a very early time and it is therefore not surprising that

man in all stages of culture begins to speculate on the motives of his own actions,"

says Boas. And again, this

"secondary explanation has nothing to do with the historical origin, but is based upon the general knowledge possessed by the people."

Therefore, the explanation of the same phenomena may be quite different among different peoples depending upon the knowledge of those that make the explanation. Thus when he was confronted by a particular cosmic event or phenomenon he ransacked his whole mental storehouse to find something that fitted the occasion and gave an explanation of the same satisfactory to his mind. He applied his individual and social life as he saw it to the natural and cosmic events and interpreted them in this way. Thus did the nature myths arise.

The existence of the same myth, or at least of a similar myth, in various parts of the world presents another phase of this problem. The general theory has been and is still held in certain quarters that these myths had a central origin and then spread to or were borrowed by the different peoples who now possess them. Bastian (5) held that they were due to elementary ideas and so inexplicable. Others (Weule, Graebner) believed that they have their origin in the time when mankind was still one before any dispersion had taken place. And still others (Ritter, Guyot, Ratzel) thought that they were caused by the influence of geographical environment upon the life of man. Let us give one example of these myths, the legend of Wilhelm Tell. Fiske (23) has shown that it existed not only in Switzerland where it has been especially immortalized but also in Denmark, Norway, England, Iceland, Finland, Russia, Persia, and supposedly also in India. Dasent (17) observes that it is common to the Turks and Mongolians,

"and a legend of the wild Samojeds, who never heard of Tell or saw a book in their lives, relates it, chapter and verse, of one of their marks-men."

And John Fiske remarks:

"In all these stories names and motives of course differ; but all contain the same essential incident. It is always an unerring archer who, at the capricious command of a tyrant, shoots from the head of some one dear to him a small object, be it an apple, a nut, or a piece of coin. The

archer always provides himself with a second arrow and, when questioned as to the use he intended to make of this extra weapon, the invariable reply is: To kill thee, tyrant, had I slain my son."

Dasent thinks

"that the story of this bold mastershot was primeval among many tribes and races and that it only crystallized itself around the great name of Tell by that process of attraction which invariably leads a grateful people to throw such mythic wreaths, such garlands of bold deeds of precious memory around the brow of its darling champion."

And John Fiske thinks

"that when a marvelous occurrence is said to have happened everywhere, we may feel sure that it never happened anywhere. Popular fancies propagate themselves indefinitely, but historical events, especially the striking and dramatic ones, are rarely repeated. The facts here collected lead inevitably to the conclusion that the Tell myth was known, in its general features, to our Aryan ancestors, before they ever left their primitive dwelling-place in central Asia."

Stories like that of Tell may be multiplied many times and all show that they existed in places simultaneously with such differences as were absolutely necessary in order to fit the particular place and people. But whether they all originated among one people and then spread to others, or grew up independently in various places is not so easily settled. The philologists and historical mythologists as well as some anthropologists favor necessarily a central origin. It can certainly not be denied that there exists a large amount of material that seems to favor such a theory, as for instance the foreign words in the story and the possibility of tracing them back to their origin. But in that case all Aryan languages can be traced back to their supposed mother tongue, more or less. To be sure some of the stories themselves can be traced back to other people and races, from whom they have thus been transmitted as a whole or in part.

But with the Asiatic cradle of the Aryan race still more disputed to-day than it ever was, as is shown by Taylor (78), Much (53), Richards (66) and others, it seems foolish to try to seek the origin of all our myths in Asia. Some of them may have originated there, for, as Petrie (59) has shown, the civilization and culture of southern and southeastern Asia seem undoubtedly to have developed earlier than those of any other region and so presuppose an earlier development of the people

living there, owing to more favorable circumstances. But this does not mean that all our myths originated there. Leaving, therefore, John Fiske to "shed tears profusely" over the grave of Gellert while he is busy tracing out his Sanskrit origin we will proceed to call attention to another theory, according to which at any rate some of the myths and legends may have originated independently at different places and among different peoples.

As has been shown before, the natural laws engaged in mental development are the same everywhere and make the mind react in the same way when furnished with the same stimuli. It reacts correspondingly even if the stimulus-object is somewhat different and so one may take the place of another. For instance in the Tell myth at one place it is an apple, at another a nut, and at still another a coin that is shot off from the head of a dear person who in one case is a son, in another a servant, and in still another a relative. But in all cases the bow and arrow are used. Now, could not this myth have originated independently in places where archery was a well-known art and much time spent in perfecting it? Or take the case of Gellert. The dog has been man's faithful companion from time immemorial. He has watched over him diligently night and day, and man has learned to appreciate and even love him. Would it be necessary under such circumstances to trace the origin of this myth to Sanskrit in order to find an explanation for it? Would it not be just as feasible to assume that it originated independently among different peoples who had much to do with this faithful companion? It seems that if mind works according to definite laws in the same way everywhere, the myths could easily arise everywhere there the conditions and environment allowed it. But where the external conditions and circumstances did not favor it, or where the mental level was not adequate for such a response the result was not obtained. That is to say where the stimulus could not be given or where it could not be responded to for lack of appreciation on the mental side, the myth could not arise. That this is true in other mental fields is a well-known fact and there is no adequate reason why it could not be true in the formation of myths also.

The objection may be raised that this theory excludes the possibility of transmitting traditions and folklore from one

people to another by means of intercommunication and contact, and that it necessarily separates one race from another, while it can be shown that races have had intercommunication and taken over mental products from one another to a greater or lesser degree. This may be granted, but contact and intercourse themselves are no guarantee for the transmission of traditions, because those who should adopt the mental products of another people, must have all the paraphernalia necessary for such a transaction *e. g.* their mental and physical conditions must be favorable. They must have what Herbart calls the apperceptive mass, otherwise the adoption would be impossible. But with this granted there is only one step to the independent development, namely, that the right kind of stimulus be given, just as there is only one step in the transmission, namely, that the material be presented for adoption, although this step may be somewhat shorter and easier to take. Therefore, an outright borrowing is not considered very ingenious by students of mythology to-day. Says Brinton (10) :

"I have already referred to the strange similarity in the myths of savage nations far asunder in space and kinship. The explanation of this is not to be found in borrowing or in recollection from a common, remote unity; but in the laws of human mind. The same myths are found all over the world, with the same symbolism and imagery, woven into cycles dealing with the same great question of human thought. This is because they arise from identical psychic sources, and find expressions under obligatory forms, depending on the relation of man to his environment, and on the unity of the mental processes throughout the race."

And John Fiske (23) writes, although he seems to favor the theory of central origin:

"The religious myths of antiquity and the fireside legends of ancient and modern times have their common root in the mental habits of primeval humanity. They are the earliest recorded utterances of men concerning the visible phenomena of the world into which they are born" . . . "In primitive society the consideration of the same phenomena leads to a number of typical associations which differ from our own, but which occur with remarkable regularity among tribes living in the remotest parts of the world."

These typical associations differ from our own, because the amount of knowledge which underlies them is not the same in both cases, but their regularity assures us that if the same stimulus be given and if the mental development be along

similar lines the result will be the same. Therefore wherever the bow and arrow were known, and wherever the dog associated with man there was a possibility for the Tell myth and the Gellert myth to arise, if the mental development was adequate for such a response.

That two so widely separated peoples as the Brahmans and the Mexicans should have borrowed from one another the story of the fish-god that sows the seed of man, seems incredible. Furthermore, primitive people did not migrate as much as they are supposed to have done, for, as Brinton (11) says:

"It is proved by the distribution of the oldest stone implements that primitive tribes were not generally migratory and had little intercourse with their neighbours."

III. NATURE MYTHS, THEIR ORIGIN AND IMPORT

As soon as man began to reflect upon what happened around him, he began also to form his own explanation and opinion of these phenomena, as he saw them. That he did not come to the same conclusion as modern man may well be expected. Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton had not yet expounded the revolutions of the heavenly orbs and formulated the laws of nature; Linneus, Harvey, and Darwin had not yet classified, described, and explained the natural world; philosophy had not yet begun to raise any doubts, and man was left undisturbed to ponder upon the problems that demanded solution around him. Consequently he gave his own explanation of the natural objects and the natural phenomena as he saw them.

A. *Natural Objects*

1. *The Tree.* Among those objects which early attracted man's attention the tree seems to have occupied a very prominent place. This would be quite natural, for, if the Simian ancestors took to the trees after having emerged from the primeval ocean, these played a great rôle in the sustenance and further development of the species. Seemingly from the support which the trees gave man in his early existence, even if he never lived in trees, as seems to be the present tendency to believe, he developed elaborate theories about life-trees and world-trees of which the Scandinavian world-ash Yggdrasil is the most prominent and minutely worked out. This world-ash

has three roots, all in the underworld. Near the fountain of Mimer lay the germ of Yggdrasil. From here it grew up and sent out its roots, one towards the North, to the fountain of Hwergelmir in Nifelhel, the second towards the South, to the fountain of Urd, and the third to the fountain of Mimer in the middle of Ginnungagap. From these fountains the tree received nourishment and strength, and it grew to an enormous height and spread its branches far and wide. Upon the network woven of the fine threads from the three roots, lay the foundation of the underworld; in the first cluster of branches was Midgard, the home of man, located, and in the second Asgard, the home of the gods. The top of Yggdrasil overshadowed Odin's hall, while the branches towered far and wide over all the worlds. The tree was ever green, its leaves never withered, and it supplied gods and men with many useful and indispensable things.

But all good things have their enemies, and so Yggdrasil. Close by the wondrous tree, near the fountain of Hwergelmir, there lived a dragon, Nidhug, which ceaselessly gnawed the roots, assisted by countless worms. They knew that when the tree died, the downfall of the gods was at hand. But the Norns or Fates who are the servants of the gods, sprinkle daily the tree with holy water from the Urdar fountain and thus maintain its healthy condition.

The tree is a creation of the gods who endowed it with many characteristics. It contains the elements of all past, present and future generations; the primordial elements of each individual man budding and maturing upon its branches are carried away by the storks which are Lodi's birds to those who yearn for a new being.

The Babylonians developed a somewhat similar idea of a world-tree which, according to Sayce (69), was at first the cedar but subsequently the palm. This tree rested on the earth with its roots far down into the abysmal deep, where Ea, the god of wisdom, presided, and nourished the earth with the springs and streams which forced their way upwards from the roots to the surface of the ground. Zikum, the primordial heaven, rested, as it were, upon the overshadowing branches of the mighty stem. Within it was the holy house of Davkina, the great mother, and of Tammuz, her son, "a temple too sacred

and far hidden in the recesses of the earth for mortal man to enter."

Thus, the poets of the Eddas and the Eridu portray the same mythological fancies and draw pictures which in many cases resemble one another. But the sacred tree of the Babylonians was more than a world-tree. It was also employed, says Sayce

"in incantations and magic rites which were intended to restore strength and life to the human frame. It was thus essentially a tree of life and the prototype and original of those conventional trees of life with which the walls of the Assyrian palaces were adorned."

In the religion of Zarathustra the tree of life is called Horn and grows, according to Zend-Avesta, by a spring upon a mountain. It is king of all trees. Ferverdin, who is the door-keeper of paradise, like Riswan in the Moslem saga, and his followers guard it against the attack of Ahriman who wants to possess it. This tree assures resurrection to those who die in faith and has the power to reveal thieves and murderers before they do any harm.

Kalevala, the Finnish national poem, tells of a mighty oak which sprang from an acorn planted by Wainamoinen and which

"raised itself above the stormclouds dimming the sunlight, hiding the moonbeams and causing the stars to die in the sky until a hero alarmed at its growth appealed to the mother, the windspirit, who sent forth a dwarf grown into a giant whose strength overcomes the oak. It falls and its power to bestow good is only then discovered."

Unlike Yggdrasil this world-tree is overcome by its enemies, but this is for the good of mankind. Like the Babylonian cedar or palm it is used in incantations and magic rites to bestow power and happiness.

That man originated from trees was the belief not only of the ancient Scandinavians where Ask and Embla were turned into human beings by the gods and where the elements of each individual buds upon the branches of Yggdrasil, but also of many other people. Hesiod (42) tells us that Zeus made a brazen race of ash trees and Virgil (82) writes:

"These woods were first the seat of sylvan powers
Of nymphs and fauns and savage man who took
Their birth from trunks of trees and stubborn oaks."

Ormuzd gave soul to a plant which had first grown up single but afterwards divided into two, Moschia and Moschiana, who became the parents of the race. And the Mexicans believed that their ancestors had come from the seeds of the sacred *Mariche* palm.

Closely related to the world-tree is the belief in the possibility of climbing to heaven in a tree. If the heaven, the land of the gods, were located in the upper branches of that tree upon whose lower ones the earth had its place, why was it not possible to climb to that place of happiness and bliss in a tree? Many races far separated in time, space and culture said it was, and their answer has reached the nursery tales of our own times.

That trees were alive, have spirit, sensations, and feelings, was the belief of almost all ancient peoples. Frazer (25) has shown that many tribes even to this day believe that to cut down a tree is to dispossess a soul and commit matricide. The Fiji Islanders will never eat a cocoanut without asking: "May I eat thee, my chief?" And the young among the Thompson Indians of British Columbia prayed to the sunflower root before eating it.

Prayers of all kinds were offered to the trees. Their worship ranges from the mere adoration till an intimate life-connection with them like that of the Dryads of Greek and Roman mythology and the Druids of Celtic who would suffer even unto death, if their trees were cut down.

Almost every nation seems to have developed a special cult around a special tree aside from regarding all trees more or less sacred. This singling out of a particular tree is, however, of a much later date than the general belief in the spirituality of all trees which is more generic.

2. *The Sun, Moon, and Stars.* The important place which the sun, moon and the stars have occupied in man's life from the very earliest time, is seen in the early development of astronomy and astrology. The sun has dominated the day, the moon the night, and every being has had his star which directed his life from the cradle to the grave; and the Magi followed such a star from the far East to the manger at Bethlehem to pay homage to the new-born babe. The temples from gray

antiquity, in Egypt, Babylonia, Greece, and Rome, down to the cathedrals in the Middle Ages were built according to astronomical considerations, and the very word orientation is derived from the custom of looking at the sun-rise.

The relation between the sun and the moon has always been regarded very close but not by any means fixed all over the world. Primitive man's idea of sexualizing everything was carried out here, too, but not uniformly, for among one people the sun is regarded as masculine and the moon as feminine, while among others the opposite holds true. Max Müller (54), loyal to his language idea of mythology, traces the word moon back to Sanskrit and finds that *Mas* is masculine, and Harley (41) concludes that "the very word moon is masculine and like Wordsworth's child father of the man." For our purpose it matters not whether the word sun or moon is masculine or feminine as such, for the gender of a word will often change in the same language. It is the idea that underlies the conception that is of psychic importance, and this idea is fundamentally the same whether the word moon or sun is masculine in one and feminine in another language, for they are never of the same gender in the same language.

"In early philosophy throughout the world," says Tylor (79), "the sun and moon are alive and as it were human in their nature." The Egyptian Osiris and Isis were brother and sister but also husband and wife and identified with the sun and moon. In the Northern mythology the sun and moon are two beings, daughter and son of Lodur and Mimer's daughter Natt (Night) and chosen by the gods to drive the golden chars which the artisans of the underworld had made to light the world. The ancient Mexicans believed that when the old sun burnt out and left the world in darkness a hero sprang into a huge fire, descended into the shades below and arose deified and glorious in the East as the sun (Tonatiuh). After him another hero sprang into the fire but it had now grown dim and he arose only in milder radiance as the moon (Metztli).

When the Greek philosophers and astronomers maintained that the sun was only a hot ball swinging around in the sky, they caused great outcry and disturbance in the minds of both the aristocracy and the populace. And Tacitus (77) tells of

a German chief who, when the Romans prepared to drive the people from the land, turned to the sun and invoked it to look upon the vacant soil.

The native races of the Americas give more or less veneration to the sun, bring their sacrifice and smoke their pipes in its honor. The Delawares regarded it as second in rank to the twelve great Manitius. The Sioux Indians regarded it in appearance the maker and preserver of all things. The Natchez of Louisiana had a complete sun-worship in accordance with which the whole state was modelled. The priest was the chief called the sun or the sun's brother. The sun was both the ancestor and the founder of the dynasty of the Incas of Peru who reigned as its representatives and almost in its person. They took wives from the virgins of the sun's convent and their descendants were the solar race and the ruling aristocracy.

Although the sun occupies a very prominent place in the minds of primitive man, its worship is by no means universal, as some authors want us to believe. It seems to be somewhat restricted to the regions where its beneficial influence was mostly felt and where the changes occurring in nature with its departure and arrival were most manifest. The feelings of the Massogetae of Tartary who sacrificed their horses to the sun that freed them from the dreadful miseries of the long winter must have been quite different from those of the people of central Africa who dreaded the rise of the morning sun. The ancient Scandinavians did not include the sun and moon as such among their deities and their worship is quite unknown. But where the sun was less worshipped the moon seems to have had a greater place in the people's mind. The savages of Brazil regulated their time and their festivals and drew their omens by the moon. The tribes of the south central part of Africa watch for the new moon, hail it and hold their festival day. The Congo people fell on their knees at the first glimpse of it and exclaimed: "So may I renew my life, as thou art renewed." And the Hottentots used to dance and sing all night at the new and full moon addressing all their desires for prosperity to it.

As the ruler of night when the influence of gloom and quietness, aided by leisure and emotional events, could exert itself to the utmost, the moon may well be expected to have had a greater effect upon man's ideas than the sun. The moon could

be looked at, meditated upon in special way and observed in all its changes. In Greece it fell in love as Selene with a beautiful youth, Endymion, who was taken up with it and afterwards became the man in the moon for the Greeks. Here we have the prototype of that mysterious face which has caused so much speculation and which is met with in all parts of the world, in some form or other. Baring-Gould (6) thinks that the "Jack and Jill" jingle owes its origin to the old Norse tale of two children who carried a bucket of water on a pole and who were taken up by the moon. The same idea goes through the old German story of the man who gathered wood on Sunday and as penalty was transferred to the moon where he stands as a fair warning. Similar legends are found in many other places and are plainly of Jewish or Christian origin.

But there are not only human beings in that heavenly orb. Some people have seen other things there. In India the story runs that a hare in a famine offered to give up his flesh to a Brahman who in return for his willingness immortalized him by drawing his face in the moon. A similar legend is found in China, and a modified form of it among the Hottentots where the moon sent a hare to tell the people on earth that just as it wanes and waxes so the people shall die but rise again. But the messenger forgot the last and most important clause for which the moon got very angry and tried to kill the hare with a hatchet. It missed him but split his lip and in return got its face scratched by the hare.

The stars are not only personified but personal action is ascribed to them. They are even declared to have lived on earth. The aborigines of Australia consider the Orion as young men dancing corroboree and believe that an ancient race was transplanted to heaven before the present race came upon earth. The Eskimo held that all stars were in olden time men and animals transplanted into the sky. The Pleiades was called the dancers and the morning star the day-bringer with more than a superficial meaning. An Iowan told of a man who gazed at a star until it came down, talked to him and directed him to a place where there was much game.

The belief in the influence of the heavenly orbs upon man's life is as strong as it is universal. The stars guide his destinies and the moon affects his mental and physical make-up from the

cradle to the grave. But not only man is affected. The moon corrupts the flesh, destroys the wood, grain and vegetables, causes the changes in the weather and influences the crops.

B. *Natural Phenomena*

1. *Eclipses.* Eclipses had a terrifying effect upon the mind of primitive man and caused many to us peculiar stories to be invented as an explanation of the dreadful phenomenon. Thus the Chiquitas thought that the moon was hunted across the sky by a huge dog, caught and torn until the blood dyed its face red. In order to drive away the monster the people used to raise a frightful howl and lamentation and shoot across the sky. The Caribs thought that Maboya, hater of all light, sought to devour the sun and the moon and therefore danced and howled in concert all day or all night to drive him away. And the Peruvians imagined an evil spirit in form of a beast eating the moon and therefore raised a frightful din and beat the dogs to join in the concert.

The same idea is also found on the South Sea Islands where the sun and the moon are supposed to be swallowed by an offended deity but who was induced by offerings to eject them again. In Sumatra the one eats the other but the inhabitants are able to prevent it by a tremendous noise. In Hindu mythology two demons Rahn and Ketu devour the sun and the moon respectively. These are also described in conformity with the phenomena: Rahn is black and Ketu is red, and the usual din is raised to drive them off. But as they are only heads, their prey slips out as soon as swallowed. Another version of the myth says that Indra pursuing Rahn with his thunderbolt, rips open his abdomen so that the heavenly body gets out again. Ancient Mongols and Chinese make the same kind of clamor of rough music, gongs, and bells to drive off the monster. And the Siamese said in regard to the Europeans' ability to predict the time and extent of an eclipse that they knew the monster's mealtimes and could tell how hungry he would be.

The Romans flung firebrands into the air, blew trumpets and clanged brazen pots and pans in order to save the moon. And when the soldiers made a mutiny against Tiberius, their plans were frustrated by the moon which suddenly languished in the sky. In vain did they try to rescue it for clouds came up and

hid it and the mutineers saw that the gods had turned away from their plot.

But not only external influences or causes were considered as effecting an eclipse. Internal causes or changes in the sun or moon themselves were also believed to bring about this phenomenon. The Caribs thought that the moon was sick, hungry, or dying. The Peruvians imagined the sun angry and so hid her face in total darkness to bring the world to an end. The Hurons fancied the moon sick and arranged a rather boisterous concert in which men and dogs participated in order to bring about its recovery. In Cumana it was believed that the sun and the moon married but because they had a will of their own they began to quarrel and fight with the result that one of them was wounded. In such a quarrel the Ojibwa endeavored to distract their attention from one another by a tumultuous noise and so stop the quarrel and fight.

The changes of day and night, summer and winter, spring and fall—light and darkness, heat and cold are very closely connected with the eclipse-belief. The one is overcome by the other only to return with renewed strength to conquer the oppressor and to free and gladden the heart of trembling humanity, once more asserting the power of light, truth, righteousness, and life.

2. *Winds.* The winds that break the forest, shake the rocks, and penetrate man have also caused much wonder and speculation. Æolus of old held the winds imprisoned in his dungeon cave and tuned his harp after them, and when the winds rustled among the leaves of the trees, people heard Æolus play his harp. The Mani of New Zealand ride upon the winds and imprison them in their caves, but the West wind is too strong and too cunning, for he escapes, hides himself in his own cave and dies away. In India the Maruts, the storm-gods, assume after their wont the form of newborn babes and perform the mythic feats of the child of Hermes, tossing the clouds over the surging sea. Boreas, born of Astraios and Eos, causes the people to tremble with chills and hurry to their shelter. He chases the birds from their summer haunts to other regions and ties in asbestine bonds the soil and the waters.

The Polynesian believed that the wind-gods lived near the great rock which serves as a foundation for the world. They

held within themselves hurricanes, tempests, and all destructive winds and employed them to punish such persons as neglected their worship, wherefore in stormy weather large offerings and liberal presents were brought them by penitent devotees who were either in danger themselves or had friends in danger. The four winds caused a great mythic development among the natives of America in which they are personified as four brothers, or mythic ancestors, or divine parents of mankind.

3. *Thunder and Lightning.* The strong effect of thunder and lightning upon the mind of primitive man is seen in the myths all over the world. Rig-Veda sings Indra's glory and ascribes to him the "feats of the thunderbolt." He is also called Indra of the thunderbolt. He smote Ahi and poured forth water upon the earth. When he hurls his thunderbolt men believe in the brilliant god and pay him homage. Twashtar made his glorious bolt. The North American Indians had much to tell about the thunder-bird, as had the ancient Greeks of the eagle of Zeus and the Scandinavians of the hammer of Thor. The Assiniboins have seen this wondrous bird and the Dakotas could show his footprints, the thunder tracks, twenty-five miles apart, near the source of St. Peter's river. The Ahcts of Vancouver talked about the mighty bird Tootooch dwelling far off in the sky, the flap of whose wings caused thunder and whose forked tongue is seen in the lightning. The Mandans heard in the thunder and saw in the lightning the flapping wings and flashing eyes of that awful bird which belongs to or even is Manitu, the Great, himself. The Ahcts say that there were originally four of these great birds but Quawteah, the great deity, entered a whale on which they fed and enticed one after the other to swoop down when he seized them and plunging into the sea drowned them. The last of them was, however, too strong so he spread his wings and flew to a distant height where he still remains, though he sometimes visits the earth. The Dakotas spoke about an old, large bird which begins the thunder and whose velocity is great. He is wise and kind and never does any harm. But the thunder is imitated and carried on by smaller, young birds which cause the rumbling noise and the duration of the peals. These are mischievous and will not listen to good counsel and therefore do some harm sometimes but as a rule the Indians are not afraid of them.

This explanation of the thunder and lightning which is so prominent among the Indians, especially of North America, is found also in other places. Thunder and lightning may be the messenger of the god who lives far on high and so needs a messenger, or else the god itself as in the Finnish poetry where he speaks through the clouds and shoots his fiery darts. When it is dark in his lofty abode he strikes fire and we hear the noise and call it thunder and see the sparks and call them lightning. The Hindu Indra hurls the thunderbolt with his bow, the rainbow, just as Uko in the Finnish saga and both smite their enemies with these arrows.

Closely connected with the thunder and lightning is the rainbow, as we might expect. It constitutes, as we have seen, the bow of Uko and Indra. The Israelites called it the bow of Jahwe, the Hindus the bow of Rama, and the Lapps the bow of Tiermas, the thunderer, who slays with it the sorcerers that hunt for men. Zeus stretched it down from heaven as a sign of war and tempest, or it was Iris, the messenger between gods and men, that came down. In Scandinavia it was a bridge for the gods to travel upon and in Germany the souls of the just go over it to paradise.

4. *Creation, Vegetation, Reproduction.* A beginning of things has probably not been conceived of by all races in their primitive state. But quite many have had at least some conception of it, and these seem to have keenly appreciated the dilemma of postulating an absolute creation. The law of causality exerted early its power upon mind and primitive man solved the problem in his way.

Among those elements which man postulated as primeval was water the most prominent and universal. The primeval ocean with its boundless extension and its necessity for the maintenance of all life appealed early and powerfully to man's power of imagination. In the water all possibilities were present. But this boundless extension was sterile, until a creative power acted upon it and fructified it. In Genesis the spirit of Elohim brooded over the face of the waters. In Kalevala the eagle floated over the water and hatched land. And in the Eddas the fountain of creative Wisdom mingled its contents with the streams of the two other primeval fountains and produced the primordial elements.

Some Athapascans held that a mighty bird descended to the ocean and instantly the earth arose and remained on the surface of the waters. The same bird called forth all animals and man. The Quiches believed that there was in the beginning nothing but water, quiet water, in which the mothers and the fathers slept until Hurikan, the mighty wind, passed over it and called forth the earth. And the Zunis supposed that the great All-father impregnated the water and from this union everything came into existence.

The Hebrews postulated a god who existed and in the beginning created heaven and earth, and all things with them by the power of his word. So easily could not the ancient Scandinavians dispose of the problem. For them there was in the beginning Ginnunga-gap, a yawning gulf whose depth no eye could fathom and three elements or powers, the cold, the warmth, and the creative wisdom. This Ginnunga-gap or chaos is the empty space in which the world was created. Hindu, Greek, and Teutonic mythology agree in making this the first postulate. They also agree in making water the primordial element. The cold waves from the North, the world of mist and darkness, flowed into this chaos and formed the primeval ocean out of which the world has arisen. The life-giving principle which was necessary for the production of this world was the warmth and came from the South. This met the cold waves in the chaos and partly melted their icy element and formed thereby the vital drops out of which the world was made, the seed of Yggdrasil, the world-ash, and the like. The creative wisdom shaped and guided this first formation as well as the following. The three fountains, Hwergelmir, Urd, and Mimer, contain the vital sap necessary for the world-tree to grow and develop.

When the cold and the warmth met in the chaos there originated, also, from this fusion the primeval cow, in Teutonic mythology called Audumla. By her actions she brought forth, also from the watery element, the world-giant, Ymer, and the progenitor of gods and men, Buri (Gayomant), who seems to be the personification of the wind, the father of all the other storm gods. Of Ymer's body is the visible world made.

The idea in Greek mythology is somewhat similar. In the fathomless chaos Erebus, mist, water, and Night, darkness, and

Earth were produced. Earth gives birth to Uranus, heaven, which envelops her and gives birth to Oceanus, the Titans, etc.

In Hindu mythology a later version makes the Brahma lay the mundane egg in the bottomless chaos, hatch it himself and then come from the very same egg himself and of its contents make the visible world. In the Upanishads (80) Sat (=that which is) is made the source of all things. Sat produces progressively heat, (heat leads to) water, (water leads to) earth, and by a mixture of these everything else is produced. There is an intimation that Brahma is identical with Sat as well as with Atman.

Whatever may have been the primitive notion of the Hindus their thoughts soon centered around a trinity, Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, but these are in modern Hinduism only three forms or characters of the same deity. Brahma is the creator, Vishnu the preserver, and Siva the destroyer. They are sometimes represented singly with their special emblems, sometimes jointly in one body with three heads. Their origin is rather nebulous. In some Parunas they are represented as sprung from a female source Adi-Sakti (the original powers). In other that Adi-Sakti produced a seed from which Siva was born and he became the father of Vishnu, and in still other that a flower of the Tamarosa plant (water lily) sprung from the navel of Vishnu gave birth to Brahma who laid the mundane egg mentioned above.

There seems to be both in Hindu, Teutonic, and other mythologies a dim conception of an all-father who was uncreated and by whose influence the world was created, but this conception was so vague that more tangible means was resorted to for an explanation of the visible world.

The god or the creator is often referred to as the father more or less literary of all things and as such associated with one or more feminine beings. Exceptions to this occur, however, and the god brings forth offspring without the help of a mate, as for instance the Satapatha Brahmana's story of Mani, the Phoenician ancestor of the race, and the first Zoroastrian being, split up later by Ahura Mazda.

All primitive creation myths abound in sexualities. Uranus and Gaea had marital relations which Cronus, their son, once prevented and by his awful deed caused the birth of the beau-

tiful Afrodite. Cronus married his sister Rhea and swallowed all his children except Zeus who punished his father for his crime. Zeus indulged in so many love-affairs with goddesses and mortal maidens that his reputation has become quite bad. Hera's jealousy caused him to conduct his courtships often secretly and in disguise.

The same loose family idea goes through the Teutonic mythology. The gods and goddesses intermarry not once only but many times and produce a large number of offspring. And the Hindu deities are still worse as far as their morals are concerned. Brahma seduced Parvati, the wife of Siva who avenged himself by striking off one of his heads. He married his own daughter, Sarasvati, but not daring to satisfy his incestuous passion under human forms, he changed himself to a stag and her to a hind. Again, as Prajapati, he offers violence to his own child.

In Teutonic mythology Odin, Vile, and Ve participated in creating man by transforming two trees Ask and Embla into human beings. The trees grew up from seeds which Yggdrasil had dropped into the earth. What took place at the creation of the first man takes place at the creation of every man. The fundamental part of every being buds, blossoms, and ripens into fruit on the branches of the world-overshadowing ash whence it is carried to women who want to be caressed by children. Vile, the lord of the fire-drill and the inflamer, places it in the bosom of the mothers.

One of the most remarkable creations of mythic fancy is the world-mill Grotti which the primeval artisans built in the underworld. The upper mill-stone is turned around by nine giantesses who walk along the edge of the earth and push a monstrous beam. With the mill-stone the firmament is also moved around.

By the friction of the mill-stone the holy fire was originated and with it the god Heimdal who thus is the holy fire impersonated. He was born in the image of a child by the nine giantesses who turn the world-mill by pushing the beam which is thus the first fire-drill. Vile, the inflamer and the supervisor of the world-mill, gives the same fire-drill to man after his creation.

C. Notes on Nature Myths

With this cursory perusal of the objects and phenomena of nature which interested primitive man and which irresistibly attracted his attention and called for some kind of explanation we may have gained a background on which to base an interpretation and conclusion as to his procedure and method in dealing with the external world. Let it not be understood, however, that the foregoing includes all the objects of interest and wonder to primitive man, nor that it arranges them in order of importance, because that is not so, since everything under the sun has, at some time or other, been the cause of speculation and interest. But those things enumerated may serve as examples of what busied his mind and therefore represent the trend of thought he usually followed in dealing with the world around him. That the explanations which he made do not concur with those given in modern time or that he did not follow the same kind of procedure in reaching his conclusions, ought not to cause any surprise or make us reject them, because the different conditions can not be compared. To deny originality and power of invention to primitive man would be to give ourselves away completely, for if anybody was original and inventive he was. But it is very difficult for modern man to divest himself of the preconceived idea of superiority and very easy for him to look down upon preceding ages as inferior. Inferior they may be but only relatively not absolutely; for if we judge each period or age in the light of the one just preceding, as we must do in order to be just and fair to all concerned, the conclusion to which we come, may be quite different, and the age of primitive man stand forth as the most remarkable and progressive of all. The historical setting must never be overlooked in judging the merits of a certain age. To compare twentieth century B. C. with twentieth century A. D. and then exult over the enlightenment of the latter at the expense of the former would be exceedingly unfair. Neither can we compare the people of each period with one another without taking the social standing as well as the personal character into consideration. A university president and a woodland farmer of to-day belong both to the twentieth century but to two different classes of people both in regard to social stand-

ing and mental development; but both are men and both may be Aryan.

That the influence of natural phenomena upon the mind of primitive man was great is certain, but still we might overestimate this influence or emphasize one at the expense of another, perhaps equally important, in our attempts to unearth the different opinions that have come down to us, presumably from gray antiquity. No doubt many of the interpretations imposed upon our remote ancestors and ascribed to them are wrong and products of the imagination of comparatively modern times. Have we not in our endeavor to grasp the meaning of the records of primitive man's thought made them more intricate, complex, and too one-sided than they really are? There was a time and that time has hardly passed yet when almost every myth was considered a solar myth and almost every hero a solar hero just as if nothing but the sun existed for primitive man. Why all other phenomena and objects, and many of them concerned man more closely than the sun, were left unnoticed nobody seems to offer an explanation for, and still Mahaffy (52) remarks:

"I do not suppose that any ancient Aryan possessed with good digestive powers and endowed with sound common-sense ever lay awake half of the night wondering whether the sun would come back again."

And when Sir George Gray (quoted by Tylor, 79) told some of the Australian natives about countries where the sun never sets during part of the year

"their astonishment knew no bounds, and an old man said 'Ah that must be another sun, not the same as the one we see here,' and in spite of all my argument to the contrary the other adopted this opinion."

According to this theory Tell is a solar hero; Oedipus is the sun himself who slays his father Laios, the Night-demon, and in the evening is united to Jokasta, the Dawn, who gave birth to him in the morning, just as the Vedic Indra, the sun, born of Dahana (Daphne), the Dawn, whom he afterwards marries. To this Vedic story the Greeks, says Cox (14), added the rest "in order to satisfy a moral feeling." Thus Oedipus is exposed like Paris upon Ida, the earth which in this case is Caetheron,

"because the sunlight in the morning lies upon the hillside. The Sphinx is the storm-demon who sits on the cloud-rock and imprisons the rain.

. . . The omniscient sun comprehends the sense of her dark utterings and destroys her, as Indra slays Vitra bringing rain upon the parched earth."

The Erinyes are the personification of daylight

"which reveals the evil deeds done under the shadows of night. The grove of the Erinyes is the fairy net-work of clouds which are the first to receive and the last to lose the light of the sun in the mornings and evenings; hence although Oedipus dies in a thunderstorm yet the Eumenides are kind to him and his last hour is one of deep peace and tranquillity."

With all due respect for the sun and its influence upon the mind of primitive man, as well as for all curious interpretations of primitive legends that have come down to us, this solar interpretation seems nevertheless too narrow to be accepted. It leaves too many other phenomena out of account, although they may have been just as striking and mysterious to man in his early habitat as the sun. We have shown in the foregoing that the moon, although perhaps lesser in glory, has had a greater influence upon man's mind and career than the sun. The moon-lore is more prominent than the sun-lore in all parts of the world.

The tree seems to have been a very interesting object for primitive man, for all over the world we find temple groves, sacred groves, trees actually worshipped, world trees, sacred trees, life trees, etc., beside a great tree lore. Quantz (62) makes an attempt to correlate all this with the theory that man or man's progenitors once upon a time lived in trees which therefore play such a great rôle in his life. Whether this is so or not the fact remains that the tree has occupied a very prominent place in man's thought from the earliest time.

If it is permissible to judge from present day data to past experiences the returns to President Hall's (38) Questionnaire on Fear show a very interesting fact. The objects most feared at present time are the lightning and, next in order, the serpents. Why lightning and serpents should be feared so out of proportion to their real danger is a very interesting question and President Hall suggests, and Quantz takes up the suggestion, that this may be atavistic and due to the arboreal condition of primitive man, because in that kind of life he was more liable to injury both by lightning and snakes, since light-

ning strikes more often the trees than the open ground and serpents were among the few enemies that could follow him up into his primitive habitat. This may be only theories and attempts at an explanation and as such have little value, but the fact remains that lightning and thunder have exerted a tremendous influence upon man's mind during all times. The peculiar rôle that the serpent plays in man's life from primitive time to to-day is intelligible only as a relic of preceding animal or early human stages. Chamberlain maintains (48) that "man's attention to him is a reflex of the great pre-human struggle between mammals and reptiles, in which the ancestors of our human races won their lasting victory."

Then, take water, that magic fluid which made the dry ground fruitful and which quenched the thirst after the long journey and refreshed the wearied had a wonderful power over primitive mind. Almost all primitive races derived everything from water long before Thales began to philosophize upon the origin of all things. The creation myths show that in the beginning there was water as one of the most important elements if not the only one. Rivers of life and living waters are found all over the world. But neither Thales nor anybody else in ancient time conceived of water as the medium in which everything originated in the same sense as does modern science. When we say that, or try to read modern evolution and scientific thought into their systems, we simply impose ourselves upon them and make them say what they never meant to say or even imply in their sayings. That modern discoveries have corroborated some of their thoughts is purely accidental as far as their explanation of the phenomena is concerned. The fact that this happened to be right has put them in a place where they will be remembered and praised for their ingenuity and foresight, while things which were perhaps just as ingenious have been forgotten or mentioned as fancies and follies of primitive time.

Let us once for all strongly emphasize that every myth is human in its origin and import whatever may have been its development and application in later times. Man, as the generic human being, is the basis of all myths, he who in himself is a microcosmos not only of speculative thought from the Greek thinkers to modern time but of primitive man as well. He was the basis of his deductions, for deduction was the kind of logic

he used long before Aristotle formulated his; he was the key to the universe with which all the mysteries could be opened and explained. Thus long before Protagoras formulated his maxim *πάντων χραμάτων μέτρον ἄνδραπος* and made that the cornerstone of the Sophistic philosophy primitive man had applied the same principle to the world around him. His own make-up in body and mind with all the physical and psychical attributes and properties which belonged to him served as a measure which he unhesitatingly applied to everything around him. And what else could he do? His mind cried for an explanation, an answer to the questions which forcibly presented themselves. He was himself nearest, and nothing was more natural than to reason from analogy to himself. The same procedure has been followed during all ages and is prevalent to-day. Quantz's assertion: "We *must* judge others by ourselves; there is no other way," has a wide application and was utilized by primitive man to the utmost. The physical and mental properties which he knows to be his own he applies to the rest of the world and makes everything like himself in this respect. If he errs in his application and hence in his interpretation it is not the fault of his desire to understand, nor of his standard of measurement, but of his knowledge. The Sophists made the same mistake when they assumed that man individually was the measure of all things. The same fallacy is committed by all people of all ages who judge everything and everybody by themselves without taking the individual or racial differences into consideration. Man, as man, the generic being, no doubt is the measure of all things but in a quite different way from what both Protagoras, the Sophists, and primitive man understood. His endowment, his attainment, his position makes him as man worthy of that distinguished rank but not as an individual.

When a phenomenon first became conscious to primitive man, he, as Boas so aptly says, "ransacked all his store of knowledge to find something that would fit the peculiar situation" and explain it satisfactorily to his mind. He might have seen the same phenomenon before but it never occurred to him to explain it. He was unconscious of the significance and bearing it had upon his own life and in what relation it stood to him and therefore did not see it. In this way both the thing

explained and the thing explaining are older than their new interrelation, their mythological significance.

But as soon as he became conscious of the fact that something grew just as he did he drew the conclusion that it must have life as he had, or be as he was, with the same sensations and feelings as he had; when he became conscious of the fact that something moved he inferred that it must have the same power of locomotion as he had; and when he consciously saw that something acted in the same way as he, purposely, he concluded that volition and purpose guided the action as it did his own. Primitive man did not need to have more than these three factors growth, motion, and purposive action, in order to explain the whole universe after his fashion. From those cases in which these were manifest he inferred that everything else must be in the same way endowed with the same properties with which he and other objects were endowed. Therefore, when a tree grew, a river flowed, and an animal acted, they were prompted by the same powers that made him grow, move, and act. Says Hewitt (43): "By primitive man all motions and all activities were interpreted as manifestations of life and will." That some things did neither grow, nor move, nor make any other sign of life did not cause him to doubt his own interpretation. For, says Hewitt, "things animate and things inanimate were comprised in one heterogeneous class, sharing a common nature." He, as Baldwin (4) says of the child, projected himself into the external world and strictly interpreted it in terms of himself. For this reason he understood the winds as either personifications of some individuals nearly related as in the myths of some of the Indians, but more often they were the breath of a mighty being who was sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile, as among the Australians. The noise which the birds make when they rise from the ground resembles somewhat a distant thunder, especially if they are large, and primitive man seized the opportunity and said that the thunder was the flapping of the wings of a large thunder-bird. Thus he explains one phenomenon with the help of another.

In this way the natural objects were personified or endowed with the same powers and attributes as man. Behind the natural phenomena were placed powerful beings who acted in them. Sometimes the natural objects were handled by powerful

individuals as the sun and the moon in the Norse mythology. All natural phenomena were at some time or other attributed to somebody, although this does not appear plainly in all cases, and all natural objects were sometime endowed with human faculties. Or, as Klaatsch (48) maintains, the mental process was the other way around and persons were elementarised, instead of the elements being personified. In this way there is a difference between the natural objects and the natural phenomena.

Everything had thus a soul of its own or perhaps better shared in the soul common to all and was prompted by the same motives. Everything was subject to the same feelings and emotions. Friendship and hostility existed among the different entities or beings that bepeopled the universe. The sun pursued the moon and the moon the sun, somewhere in a pleasant, somewhere in an unpleasant mood. Everything was subject to the same weaknesses and could be helped by concerted action. When adversities or accidents happened to man in his business, when something went wrong or contrary to his plans, the cause was always sought in the hostile feelings of some beings who had to be warded off either by friendly action or by force of arms. The antagonists must either be placated or conquered in some way. For this reason sacrifices were offered, tricks were played, and the best results obtained in the best way possible.

Thus we see that the interpretations which man made of the phenomena around him were derived from his own life. Activities which he was engaged in were attributed to things around him, the heavenly bodies above him, and, later on, to the more specific gods. What he did others must do, as he felt others must feel, and in the same circumstances he lived others must also live. So completely analogous was his reasoning, so completely deductive was his logic that it took him a long time to think of anything different from himself. Says Hewitt (43):

"All things, therefore, were thought to have life and to exercise will, whose behests were accomplished through orenda—that is through magic power, reputed to be inherent in all things. Thus all phenomena, all changes, and all activities were interpreted as result of magic power directed by some controlling mind."

This mind was considered the ultimate source of all things

and consequently inhabited all things and made them powerful agencies for good and for evil. We find the same tendency in the child of to-day. The stone that breaks the doll, the door that hits the head, or the chair that tumbles over are all living agencies, conscious of what they are doing, and a certain satisfaction is felt in seeing them punished. But whether this is a remnant of primitive thought or caused by the surroundings is a question difficult to settle.

The idea that this supersensuous agent, the soul, was a separate entity which could leave the body and journey to lands far off and return with wonderful tidings originated in all probability in the dreams. In these dream-excursions the soul met other souls, conversed with them and came back to tell the story. That this phenomenon had a remarkable effect upon the plastic mind of primitive man is certain. To it may be traced not only the belief in a soul as a separate entity, but also the belief in spirits with whom man could communicate and who could inspire and influence him as well as reveal the unknown.

The idea of immortality may also have got a strong impetus from the same source but it may have grown out of the struggle for existence unconsciously. The mysterious is always a great notion-producer and when reality is not known most everything is mysterious.

These facts given there is but one step to the formation of gods who were also made by primitive man in his own image, with attributes and characteristics like himself. This step was taken when man felt his inability to cope with a given situation and perceived stronger and more mysterious powers than his own. That the gods were or became greater than he was a necessary result of his inability to master a given situation, and of the feeling of dependence which man got during his long infancy and which Schleiermacher (39) defines as religion, as well as from the idea of co-operation developed later in life. It was necessary to anthropomorphize the gods in order to understand them, and this tendency is clearly illustrated in all ancient as well as in the more modern religions. And we are not yet able to divest our gods of the human attributes which our ancestors gave them. Perhaps it is impossible, for we may not be able to conceive of any gods except in anthropomorphic terms.

Therefore, the personal is the most important part in primitive religion and without this there could be no religion, and the relation between man and his gods was purely personal. Fear which has played and still does such a large rôle in the explanation of the origin of religion and the creation of the gods, is surely only a secondary factor and at best only one among several. Fear of the gods could not have created the gods, as Brinton (10) rightly says, but conscious volition and purposive acting is the foundation upon which the gods are reared. They could not have been feared before they had been conceived of even if the Lange-James theory of emotions be applied to them. We must not confuse the origin of religion with the origin or first conception of the gods. It might therefore very well be a strong factor in the origin of religion but have nothing to do with the origin of the gods. And as Klaatsch says, "the fear of the influence of a powerful dead man, especially a shaman, is the embryonal stage of fear of god present in the highest religious system." There is thus the personal element present in the beginnings of all religions and in the first conception of the gods. And Robertson Smith (72) has shown that fear did not enter into the primitive religions to any great extent. This is a comparatively modern idea and belongs especially to Christianity. The idea of sin was not clearly developed in primitive times, and punishment could consequently not be conceived of. The gods were feared mostly for their own sake because they were capable of both good and evil. With the endowment of conscious volition given, fear certainly entered in as a factor in the development of religion as well as of worship.

There is still another factor which played a great rôle in the origin of the gods and their worship, namely *desire*, purely selfish and generically human. This desire was manifest in man's wanting to get away from an enemy, to reach safety and to satisfy his own wants and pleasures. For instance, when he was down on the ground and an enemy appeared, is it too much to assume that he manifested a distinct desire to get back to the tree where he felt more at home and where he could ward off the enemies more easily? This is not purely conjecture either for in the primitive religions the tree occupies so large a place which is difficult to explain without recourse

to some such theory as this. Even if man's progenitors took to the ground before he became man, he might nevertheless have resorted to the tree in times of danger habitually and thus begin to worship it first of all objects that afterwards entered into his religious consciousness and became a part thereof. This desire was of course not limited to the idea of reaching the tree but extended to other fields and activities as well. It prompted man to obedience and submission and gave him a powerful stimulus to try to obtain whatever his desire led him to.

But when primitive man had his gods ready, they felt as he did, but in a greater measure; the same motives that prompted him, prompted also them; and the same desire that stimulated him, stimulated them. Nothing that man felt, did, or was, or was stimulated by, was too low or too high for the gods. Furthermore, man's social organisations and institutions were also ascribed to them. As he was born into this world, so were they. Each god had his father and his mother, just as man, although there was some difficulty in accounting for all of them, because they were so many and their pedigrees somewhat uncertain. How the first one came into existence was a difficult problem to solve. The Hebrews assumed that they were eternal; the Scandinavians that the creating principle was eternal and that the gods sprung from that in due course of time. Almost invariably man was created by his gods in some way or other. The gods were married, had families, and were led by sexual desire to commit horrible things which we must not call crimes, because they were committed by the gods. That all these conceptions were derived from man's own domain is certain. Such as he was, such were also his gods, and as he lived, so did they also live. They were a mere copy on a large scale of himself. They were real and entirely human but belonged to the realm of the unknown and consequently gave room for the play of the human imagination.

If man was mortal, his gods were mortal and doomed to die, if nothing intervened. But to prevent their growing old and subsequent death a remedy was discovered. Thus the Scandinavian gods ate of Iduna's apples, the Hindu gods drank the immortal Soma, and the Greek gods partook of the divine nectar to gain this prerogative. When this elixir was denied them they grew old and feeble. But in the long run this elixir

was not strong enough to maintain them. They died, anyway, died a natural death, not only Pan, the great, whose death was publicly announced and greatly lamented, but the rest of them, Zeus, Odin, Hera, Freya, and those left are in the process of dying. This terrible catastrophe could not take place at once but was brought about by a slow process which kept pace somewhat with the development of man's thinking and reasoning power, for when man begins to think and reason the gods tremble in the jaws of death.

In this process we may distinguish three or four different stages more or less clearly marked out. In the first conception of the gods the object was the god and the god was the object. Later on the gods were imminent in the object or phenomenon which thus came to represent them. Still later the gods disappeared entirely from the object and took up their abodes far off in the cloudy heavens or on the lofty mountains from where they still visited man now and then and still acted in the phenomena. At this stage most of the more carefully worked out theogonies were shaped and preserved. But what brought about this change? Simply the fact that man began to doubt his first inference and became more conscious of the significance and right meaning of the objects and phenomena. And since the god-idea was so strongly associated with his own self that he could not get rid of it, the only thing to do was to remove the gods to a place where his present knowledge could not reach them. As a result of this removal of the gods they became dimmer, and again as a result of this symbolism arose, since man could not live without some visible or tangible representation of his gods. An object of some kind was chosen to represent the gods or symbolize them. Thus animals, trees, stones, etc., were chosen as symbols of the gods and worshipped and revered as such.

That this change was slow, slower in some people than in other, is certain. But the human mind which always yearns for more light but reluctantly accepts it when it comes, was set agoing and could not be stopped in its onward march. Fetichism, the gods of the individual as contrasted with the gods of the race, had to give away for the gods of the community or race as soon as the individual became subordinate to the society and his actions permissible only in so far as they

served the common good, although both may have originated from the same idea. In the struggle for existence which not even the gods escape, the weaker gods had to give away for the stronger, that is to say for those of the stronger society, and in themselves absorbed the characteristics of the weaker which were closely related to theirs. In this way they became a condensation of characteristics and a differentiation of these as well as of functions. A particular field of action was assigned to each one. This process continued till the monotheistic stage was reached in the human culture and the evil gods degraded to demons or evil spirits.

The unity of the godhead, says Jevons (44), was logically implied from the beginning in the conception of personal power, greater and higher than man. This may be so, but it may also be regarded as a natural development in the struggle for existence, or as Nietzsche has more aptly expressed it: "The Will to Power," which is a far better expression for the same idea. This includes not only a mere existence with which no normal being is content; not only a will to live in Schopenhauer's sense, but to live abundantly, to power. And as soon as and in the same degree as this will to power becomes conscious in the human race the downfall of the gods is certain. One by one they are eliminated and the remaining become an abstraction too far away for the human being to reach.

IV. HERO MYTHS, OR CULTURE MYTHS

As has been said before no clear line of demarcation can be drawn between the nature myths and the culture myths because they overlap somewhat, as for instance in the Mexican theory of the present sun. But there is a large number of distinct culture myths, and it is to these that the Freudian method of psycho-analysis has been especially applied. Thus Freud himself has analyzed the Oedipus myth and given the clue to the Prometheus and Hamlet myths later worked out by Abraham (1) and Jones, respectively. Rank (63) has analyzed a large number of hero-myths and gives a "Durchschnittssage" of all the hero-myths as follows:

"The hero is the child of prominent parents, mostly the son of a king. Difficulties precede his birth as abstinence or long infertility or secret intercourse of the parents in consequence of prohibition or obstacles.

During the pregnancy or even before comes a prediction (dream, oracle) which warns for his birth and threatens mostly the father with injury. As a result of this it is decided to expose the new-born child mostly upon the request of the father or a person who represents him. As a rule he is given over to the water in a small casket. Then he is rescued either by animals or poor people (shepherds) and nourished by a female animal or a simple woman. Grown up he finds his prominent parents in a very circumscribed way, avenges himself on his father, is recognized and becomes great and famous."

Not all hero-myths correspond to this description in all particulars but in general the fundamental traits in all of them conform to this. This universality of general features has led to the assumption that they must spring from a general source and develop in a certain way, and that the same psychic forces are at work in all of them.

But not only have the culture myths as such been invaded by the Freudians. The same process has been applied to literature in general and to poetry in special, as well as fine and plastic arts. Thus Freud has analyzed Jensen's *Gradiva* (33) and Leonardo da Vinci (34); Graf has analyzed Wagner's *Der Fliegende Holländer* (35); Rank, the *Lohengrin* saga (64); Abraham, Giovani Segantini (2); Phister, Ludwig von Zinzen-dorf (60) and so forth, so that this kind of literature is steadily increasing.

It would perhaps be well to give the outlines of the analysis of the Oedipus myth as given by Freud (28) as an example of both the subject matter of the sagas and the factors at work in the formation of them, according to the Freudian psycho-analysis. To be sure not all culture myths seem to correspond to this one in particulars but that depends mostly upon the fact that certain parts of the myths may in some cases be better concealed than in others and therefore not so easily seen.

"Oedipus, son of Laios, king of Thebes, and of Jocasta, is exposed as infant, because an oracle had told the father that the still unborn child should be his murderer. But he is rescued and grows up as son of the king of another country (Corinth). Being uncertain as to his parents he asked the oracle and received the answer to shun his home, because he was destined to murder his father and marry his mother. On the way from his supposed home he met king Laios and killed him in a pre-cipitated strife. He came then to Thebes where he solved the riddle of the Sphinx who blocked the way and as a reward was elected king by the Thebans and given Jocasta as wife. He ruled a long time with peace and dignity and had with his wife two sons and two daughters.

But a plague broke out which caused the Thebans to resort to the oracle again and received the answer that the plague would cease when the murderer of Laios was banished from the country."

"The treatment of the case consists now in an unfolding step by step—comparable of the work of a psycho-analysis—that Oedipus himself is the murderer of Laios and son of the murdered and Jocasta. Grieved by his act, unknowingly committed, he blinds himself and leaves his country."

Judging from the fascinating influence which this tragedy and others similar to it has exerted upon the human mind during all ages Freud concludes that they must contain something which calls up a related feeling in all of us. This he finds in the sexual emotions which he judges from their universality and strength to exert the strongest influence and to take often unassumed directions. Moreover, he concludes that "it was decreed for all of us perhaps to direct our first sexual emotions to the mother and the first hatred and violent wish to the father." And Abraham (1) remarks that "the tragedy contains the realization of two intimately connected childhood- or dream-fancies: the fancy of the death of the father and of the love relationship to the mother." Abraham leaves out one very important component of this constellation which is very closely related to it, namely, the wish to become great which is manifest in all culture myths. The sagas contain thus a wish-fulfilment, as Riklin (67) has so amply shown, acted out in fancy. This wish may persist into adult life and animate all endeavors to acquire new positions and make new expansions, and take expression in dreams and reveries. That neither the Oedipus myth nor anyone else of the culture myths are actual occurrences, nobody will contend, I presume. But, if they are not real in reality, they are nevertheless real in the fancy which has constructed them, and as such they portray the innermost feelings and emotions of the soul.

As is seen from the above and from other myths analyzed by the Freudians as well as from the culture myths in general, this kind of myths is a comparatively late upshoot in the human history. In the following we will trace their origin and development in the individual and society. That all culture myths are strongly emotional is a self-evident fact. They must therefore originate in strong emotions which take expressions in them. To my mind it does not make so much difference of

what kind these emotions are, only they fill the requirements and are adequate to the purpose. They thrive to be sure best in neurotic persons because they are more emotional.

1. *Sexual Emotions: the Child vs. the Parents*

If we go back far enough on the phyletic scale we come to a time when there were only two motive powers in the world: Nutrition and Reproduction, and to these all other activities owe their origin. Of these two factors hunger may be said to be the most primitive, because it appeared first on the phyletic scale. But as soon as there was nutrition there must also be reproduction of some kind or other and thus sex in the wider sense is almost if not quite as old as nutrition. As to the relative strength of these primordial impulses there can be no question. The sexual impulse as exemplified in life is by far the strongest. Among the animals where the impulses have a greater freedom to exert their influence than in man we have many illustrious examples of this fact. The male spider which carefully watches for hours every move the female makes in order to catch the most opportune moment seldom survives the successful execution of his intentions and if he does escape minus a leg or something else he is just as eager and daring the next time. Other animals will watch without food even at the point of starvation, prompted by their sexual impulses, for an opportune moment to enjoy their gratification often at the expense of life. In man the sexual emotions are so checked that they no longer exert their real strength but even there they sometimes take on tremendous proportions. Says Ribot (65):

"Sexual instinct remains the center around which everything evolves, nothing exists but through it. Character, imagination, vanity, imitation, fashion, time, place, and many other individual circumstances or social influences give to love—as emotion or passion—an unlimited plasticity."

And again:

"The sexual impulse is fatal, blind, not acquired, anterior to all experience,"

and Spencer remarks (74):

"This passion which unites the sexes . . . is habitually spoken of as though it were a simple feeling whereas it is the most compound and therefore the most powerful of all feelings."

The age of puberty is the natural time for these impulses. At this time new ideas are formed and new associations of previously existing ideas are brought about. The individual self begins more than before to exert its rights and demand recognition. The opposition between the individual self and the social self becomes more marked and it is apparent that a great revolution is going on. The importance of this period is recognized by different races in the very elaborate tribal initiations into manhood and womanhood, that take place at this time. A conscious awakening of the self is taking place. But says Ribot:

"observation seems to show that, at a much earlier age, in the fifth and sixth year there are apt to occur (quoting Dallemande) 'unconscious genital impulses provoking association of ideas which frequently serve, in later years, as a *substratum* to our sentiments and volitions.' "

Bell (7) goes further than this and shows that what he calls sex love exists between boys and girls of three years of age and upwards. And Freud (29) maintains that

"a newborn child brings with it the germs of sexual feelings which continue to develop for some time and then succumb to progressive suppression which in turn is broken through by the proper advance of the sexual development and which can be checked by individual idiosyncrasies. Nothing is known about the lawfulness and periodicity of this oscillating course of development. It seems, however, that the sexual life of the child mostly manifests itself in the third or fourth year in some form accessible to observation."

This period comes out prominently in der kleine Hans who at the age of three developed a strong sexual interest which manifested itself in various ways. Jung (46) has also given some illustrations of this, especially the Anna case.

The objects of the emotions of tenderness and love are in the first place the parents themselves. Then it may branch out to other persons, especially brothers and sisters or playmates. It is a striking fact that the sexual feeling or love is generally directed to the opposite sex, although there can be no conscious appreciation of the anatomical differences between the sexes. Bell has shown this very plainly and Freud strongly maintains that the first object of our love was the parent of the opposite sex. Der kleine Hans showed a strong predisposition for his mother just as Elizabeth von R. and Anna did for their fathers. The same thing is seen in mythology. A male

child mutilates his father when he is going to embrace his mother, as for instance Cronus and Zeus. Schidlof found that the aborigines of Australia believed the child to be jealous of the father if not placed in a certain position with the mother (70).

This predisposition can not, of course, consciously materialize itself owing to several circumstances. In the first place the cause of attraction is unknown; and in the second place it goes against other feelings which manifest themselves and demand recognition. To postulate any moral consciousness at this age would be absurd. The children have their own moral standard as far as they have any at all and can therefore not be judged by the social code.

But this feeling of aversion toward the same and attraction toward opposite sex takes nevertheless some definite form in the child's mind. It may be clothed in symbols and concealed in words but shown in acts with a distinct meaning. The meaning of the symbols which are often very striking, may be vague, forgotten, or perhaps unknown and must be suggested in order to be recognized and remembered, but if this is done produce a feeling of certainty which reality alone can produce.

This phenomenon is perfectly normal, says Freud. It may take on abnormal development in neurotic and mentally weak children but in normal children there is no danger. It is an expression of the great psychic forces which are formed and transformed in the soul. After a while these forces subside, in a word are suppressed, and another period in the child's life begins. This period which Freud calls the "latency period" is of prime importance for the child's mental development. The sexual life and emotions are as it were latent, hence its name, but

"it is during this period of total or at least partial latency that the psychic forces develop which later act as inhibition on the sexual life and narrow its directions like dams. These psychic forces are loathing, shame, and moral and aesthetic ideation masses. . . . Surely education contributes much to it. In reality, however, this development is organically determined and can occasionally be produced without the help of education."

"These constructions so significant for later personal culture and normality are apparently brought about at the cost of the infantile

sexual emotions themselves, whose influx has not ceased even in the latency period, but whose energy, wholly or partly, has been switched off from sexual utilization and applied for other purposes."

This process is called sublimation and furnishes powerful components for all cultural accomplishments. The mechanism of this sublimation is built up by the fact that

"the sexual feelings of these infantile years were on the one hand not utilized, since the functions of procreation are postponed, which is the chief character of the latency period, and on the other hand they were in themselves perverse, i.e., emanated from erogenous zones and born of impulses which could only call forth sensations of unpleasantness in the course of the development of the individual. They call therefore up psychic forces which counteract them and which build up the above mentioned psychic dams: Loathing, Shame, and Morality, in order to suppress effectively the feelings of unpleasantness."

Binet (29) was the first to point out that the persistent influence of a sexual impression mostly received in early childhood often shows itself in selection of a fetish which may be of very diverse kind. And Freud points out that the sexual symbolism which uses the hand, foot, mouth, etc., as sexual objects "seems often to depend upon sexual experiences in childhood." These symbols were used in the same sense in ancient times.

The sexual impulses have played a great rôle in man's life from the very earliest times, as is seen in the myths of various peoples. A hasty reference to the religious life and ideas of primitive man, and even highly civilized peoples, will suffice to show this fact. Even if no pure phallic worship ever existed, which is doubtful, the part sex played in primitive religions is so prominent that it can not be overlooked.

Having thus shown the prevalence, strength, and direction of the sexual emotions in the child and primitive peoples and touched upon the forces which work for morality in the individual, the next step will be to show the forces at work in the suppression of these impulses and the result thereof.

2. *Development of Moral Ideas: The Individual vs. the Society*

Waitz (85) has very properly said:

"Whosoever would arrive at a just conception of man must not consider him exclusively as an individual being, for man is, as was well observed by Aristotle, a social being; as an individual he cannot be fully understood."

And Storfer (75) says:

"The individual—if we can at all imagine the splendid isolation of such a fictitious presocial being—creates no ethics and for him is no ethics created. He has, however, in the experience of pleasantness and unpleasantness, within certain limits, a more or less reliable leader for his behavior, a damper on his impulses, but first the living together creates the values good and bad."

Thus, as soon as two or more individuals began to live together the freedom of each was necessarily restricted by the rights of the other which must be respected and honored if the communion was going to be of mutual benefit. For this reason there was established some rules of conduct, perhaps unconsciously at first, which later developed into the written and unwritten codes which constitute the standard of behavior in a given community. What the society as such has come to regard as right or wrong the individuals have had to submit to and their behavior has been judged accordingly.

There has, however, always been certain individuals or classes of individuals who have been as it were immune and who have had privileges, either on account of their position or on account of their profession, which have not been accorded other individuals, for instance the dancing girls and temple prostitutes connected with religious observance whose business has always been regarded as proper by the society in which it has flourished.

In the evolution of ethical ideas pleasantness and unpleasantness, modesty and shame have played a great rôle, indeed are their very roots. We find them even in the animal world where the female coyness must be regarded as a kind of modesty which however is overcome when the sexual emotions prevail. This shows that modesty and sexual emotions are very closely related and that the former is the offspring of the latter which arise simultaneously with consciousness of true sexual life. The facts certainly point this way at least in the human being. The child has no modesty except in so far as he has been taught by his elder associates, until the time of puberty when the sexual emotions with their accompaniments begin to assert themselves. Perez (57) has shown that modesty may appear very early if the sexual desire appears early. And Hall and Allin (40) think that

"it is hard to find all the causes of modesty and shame, but it is certain that very much of what is best in religion, art, and life owes its charm to the progressively widening irradiation of the sexual feelings."

It seems therefore fair to assume that modesty began to arise when consciousness of sex began to develop an awareness of that anatomical and physiological difference between the individuals which is necessary for the propagation of the species and the complete happiness of the individuals.

The idea maintained by Sergi (71) and others that the feeling of modesty and shame is the result of clothing, does not differentiate between the physiological and the anatomical modesty, the former of which is by far the earlier, and is not substantiated by the facts, for people like the Guanches, Puris, South Sea Islanders, etc., go about absolutely naked or nearly so and still possess a highly developed sense of modesty. And Waitz relates that "some Indians on the Orinoco where both men and women go about naked, were at first ashamed to wear clothes as it seemed to them indecent to appear before strangers unpainted."

That clothing has an intimate relation to the feeling of sex is beyond question. The dress is often regarded as a strong sexual stimulant. Westermarck (86) has emphasized this side of the concealment idea and regards modesty as the result rather than the cause of clothing, which was adopted, he thinks, to give prominence to the sexual organs, not primarily to conceal them, for "savage men and women in various ways endeavoured to make themselves attractive to the opposite sex:—by ornamenting, mutilating, painting and tattooing themselves," and the time especially chosen for this purpose is the age of puberty.

The custom to clothe or conceal any part of the body and especially the primary and secondary sexual characteristics had in all probability a psychic origin in the sexual emotions. It must be remembered that physiological modesty precedes anatomical and that its primary factors existed and were discovered long before any ornamentation and clothing were invented. Furthermore, the clothing of primitive peoples in most instances does not fulfil the idea of concealment and consequently can not serve as a factor averting shame. It is probable that this, like ornaments which indeed it is, had only a sexual signifi-

cance in the first place and served as an attraction and thus came to be propagated as a powerful factor in the attainment of a specific end. Then when and where other circumstances as environment and climate as well as social conditions made clothing necessary and its adoption to the full extent imperative, this feeling of modesty was transferred to and suffused with clothing, which although a secondary development has played an important rôle in the evolution of moral ideas, a rôle which must not be underestimated, only recognized as secondary.

The place which sympathy has taken in the development of moral instincts has been emphasized by Sutherland (76) who maintains that parental care is the well-spring of the same from which they have risen with all "accompanying accessories, the sense of duty, the feeling of self-respect, the enthusiasm of both the tender and the manly ideal of ethic beauty." Ferenczi (22) has pointed out the psychic components of sympathy when he says

"that an unconscious sexual disposition constitutes the foundation of every sympathetic feeling and that when two persons meet (either of the same or opposite sex) the unconscious makes always the attempt of transference. If the unconscious succeeds in making this transference pleasant to the conscious either in purely sexual (erotic) or in sublimated, concealed form (respect, gratitude, friendship, esthetic satisfaction), then sympathy arises between the two. If the foreconscious replies with a negative to the always positive unconscious pleasure there originates antipathy which is, in relation to the strength of the two factors, of different degrees up to disgust."

Freud's (31) Dora case is a typical example of this but no exception.

Some emphasis has been laid upon the feeling of disgust as a powerful factor in the development of modesty, shame and moral ideas. Richet (19) came to the conclusion that disgust arose from the sense that something was useless and dangerous. And Crawley (15) has shown that eating in public came to be looked upon by primitive man with the same kind of feeling, and consequently was forbidden among certain tribes. This prohibition "occurs at puberty" which "serve to bring into relief the idea that danger from the other sex is apprehended at this period." Havelock Ellis (19) maintains also that "the fear of

arousing disgust is the ultimate and most fundamental element in modesty."

The moral concepts which are based on the emotions of approval of the good and disapproval of the bad or wrong, pleasantness and unpleasantness, have developed according to natural selection and are states of mind useful, as a rule, to the organism which accepts them. Wrong implies pain and good assures pleasure and benefit to the same organism. Consequently what furthered and helped him along in the struggle for existence came to be looked upon as good and had the approval of this same organism while that which caused him pain or was a hindrance in his development was looked upon as bad and wrong and disapproved of. The feeling of pleasantness and unpleasantness, of help and hindrance, lies thus at the bottom of all moral concepts which could not, however, arise before the individual with his pleasantness and unpleasantness became subordinate to that of the group or society.

Those who regard the intellect as the source of moral concepts, hold that moral emotions arise only in consequence of moral judgment and that the character of the emotion is determined by the predicate of the judgment. To this Westermarck replies: "moral emotions cannot be ascribed as resentment or retributive kindliness called forth by moral judgments" and "moral judgments could never have been pronounced unless there had been moral emotions antecedent to them." The moral judgment does not involve any self-interest, at least not openly, which shows that it is a characteristic of moral concepts as such, from which we may conclude that the emotions are felt disinterestedly. But the moral judgments are only apparently impartial, not fundamentally so, because we have greater obligations to some people than to others. They aim, however, at impartiality as well as at generality at least within a given group of people or a tribe, but they can never lay claim on universality, because one group may have developed along wholly different lines from another and therefore have wholly different moral concepts.

In early society as well as in smaller societies of to-day there is practical unanimity in regard to what is good and what is bad, what is right and what is wrong. For this reason such a solidarity has come about that each member considers all others

like himself and regards any harm or good done them as done to himself. The pleasantness and unpleasantness is the same for the individual and the group. In larger societies where the membership and the complexity in organization is greater this solidarity and oneness is not so conspicuous and perhaps not so necessary in the struggle for existence but it is there nevertheless and at an adequate stimulus is ready to assert itself.

Therefore, whether an act shall be approved of or not depends upon the moral concepts and these again depend upon the lines along which a given society has developed. If the society has said that a certain kind of clothing is necessary in order to conform to the standards of modesty and morality, the casting off of that kind of apparel will be stigmatized as wrong and treated accordingly. The act may be harmless in itself but nevertheless cause disgust and disapproval and make the society inflict punishment upon the agent. The liking and disliking of the neighbours affect man easily, especially if he is of an emotional nature. Thus society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness, and the tribal customs are the earliest rulers of duty and can therefore not be regardlessly interfered with. This is seen in both primitive and modern society. The Greenlanders conceived of the idea of virtue as something pleasing to the Europeans when they tried to acquaint them with their own moral conceptions. And Westermarck (86) remarks: "The Bedouins of the Euphrates make no appeal to conscience or the will of the gods in their distinction between right and wrong but appeal only to custom." In the lower stages of civilization, especially, custom is a tyrant that binds man in adamantine fetters and threatens the transgressor with public disgrace and bodily suffering. "Custom," says Westermarck, "is fixed once for all and takes no notice of the preference of the individuals." Customs do change, to be sure, but by recognizing them I recognize their binding force and make myself one of their supporters. But since not all persons are alike there is sure to be some opposition in the individual against some custom which interferes with his feelings and personal interests. As a result these must be disregarded if the custom exerts the stronger influence, as is generally the case. The stronger the feelings and interests are and the more powerful the customs and traditions are the more intense will the conflict be that

takes place in the person's mind between the personal feelings and interests and the social customs and traditions, and the more far-reaching the results. And so powerful is the influence of moral approval or disapproval exerted by society in its customs and traditions that under ordinary circumstances the personal feelings and interests will have to give away without regard for the consequences. These may not even be taken into consideration at all. The whole process may be infra-conscious or only partly conscious, but even if the conflict is fully conscious and the struggle between the individual's emotions and the opinions of society is carried on with a full meaning of its import, the individual generally follows the ordinary course of events and regards customs and traditions the superior masters and the indignation and resentment felt by society toward such an act as he is inclined to commit too powerful to cope with. The import and far-reaching consequences of this conflict, from which we can infer the strength of both the individual emotion and the custom and opinion of society as well as the seriousness of the struggle, are seen in the torments of the conscientious soul who has yielded to his emotions and committed an act disapproved of by society. In extreme cases sanity is in the balance, life is not worth living, and not even death is a perfect consoler. The feeling of public resentment and disapproval is much more potent and conspicuous than that of approval. The latter is always taken as a matter of course and very seldom publicly recognized while the former occupies a very prominent place in every society. The individual merely disappears in the steadily flowing stream until he commits an act that obstructs the smooth flow and sets society aghast. Then he is at once noticed and the proper consequences follow.

The fact that a man who transgresses the customs and traditions of a given society is punished even to the extent of being excluded from the society or tribe and even put to death undoubtedly impressed itself upon the mind of the individual with all the might and rigour possible. Westermarck (86) and Steinmetz (quoted by Westermarck) have related many instances where expulsion was meted out to those who committed a sexual offence. Van Wrede (quoted by Westermarck) states that after a period of three days which was given the offender by the Bedouins of Hadhramaut in which to escape, any man could

kill him wherever he found him. Spencer and Gillen (73), and Frazer (25) tell the same story in regard to the Australians except in their cases a special board of executioners was generally appointed by the elders. And many cases are recorded in which the sense of duty and allegiance to the opinion of society was so strong that the offenders gave themselves up to justice and if sentenced to death but let go free till the day of execution on that day presented themselves ready to pay the penalty for the offence. That this would be impossible without a strong sense of guilt and an unshaken belief in the infallibility of the customs and traditions of the society is clear. Even those who, in a well-meant effort to raise society to a higher level and inject new ideas into the old forms, have disregarded public opinion, have often fallen prey for the same unlimited and never-to-be-forgotten or disregarded power. This shows the influence which society has had over the individual's life and thought, especially the more emotional ones who are always apt to take the customs and traditions more seriously than others. They adhere strictly to what is publicly regarded as right and avoid conscientiously everything regarded as wrong. But it is just these emotional beings who most frequently come into conflict with the standards of society. Their emotions are strong and therefore difficult to control and the channels approved of by society in which they can find an outlet very narrow. Moreover, those who have a strong emotional nature have also a strong imagination and these two supply them with impulses and ideas which not seldom come at variance with society. As a result they have to choose between either acting out their impulses contrary to the customs and traditions and take the consequences, or else suppress them. In the first case it might mean death, expulsion from society, or at best disgrace for life; in the second it might mean a cramped soul with all its consequences. It is needless to say that both courses have been taken; and it depends upon the individual and the circumstances at the moment which course will be chosen in each particular case. If the public disapproval and the moral consciousness of the individual are strongly developed and other circumstances favor it he chooses to inhibit his impulses, but if the public disapproval and the moral consciousness

are weak and other circumstances favor it he acts them out. The result in each case depends upon his own make-up as well as upon the circumstances under which the act was committed. As a rule, however, the impulses are not acted out but struggled with and suppressed, merely because it would cause greater pain to act them out. The whole question falls thus back upon the idea of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. In this way a great deal of our emotional and intellectual life is suppressed and never allowed to take form in our daily life. How much of our mental life shares this fate is of course impossible to say. It depends upon the individual himself and the society in which he lives. But what is thus suppressed soon leaves the field of consciousness. In course of time perhaps the struggle between the emotions and public standards, the process of suppression, becomes unconscious and takes place as a matter of course, on account of the continued allegiance to the prevailing custom. In most cases there may however remain a fleeting experience of something coming up in consciousness but as strange and unconventional is forthwith thrust back into the subconscious again and is soon forgotten. Freud and his school have repeatedly pointed out that we forget sooner a painful experience than a pleasant and this is corroborated by Peters (58) and others. Our daily life is full of the same thing. We try to expel from our consciousness all unconventional thoughts and unpleasant experiences and exhort others to do so too. If we otherwise mean anything by all this there must be something in it.

This process of expelling and forgetting the unpleasant and unconventional can also be explained on physiological and evolutionary grounds. A stimulus that has caused pleasant reactions tends to be repeated while one that has caused unpleasant tends to be avoided. This causes in the case of a pleasant reaction more and closer associations as well as easier passage along the lines laid out, while an unpleasant experience which does not tend to be repeated must necessarily cause fewer associations and have a more difficult passage along the nervous paths, and are consequently crowded out of consciousness faster and more easily than the pleasant ones. Moreover, the organism as a whole reacts more favorably to pleasant stimuli than to

unpleasant and therefore makes them predominant in consciousness. As a result they are more easily recalled. Jung (46) has shown that the reaction time of the unpleasant stimuli is either longer or wholly absent which shows the predominance of pleasant associations. This holds true both in regard to physical and moral unpleasantness because, as Ribot says, there is no difference between moral and physical pain as such, moral pain being

"the beginning of mental disorganization just as physical pain is the beginning of physical disorganization. . . . Everything that suppresses or impedes them (the needs, appetites, the physical or psychic tendencies) is translated into pain,"

and treated as such.

Prince (61) and Chase (13) seem to think that we associate the unpleasant feelings with something in order to drain them and so rid ourselves of them. If that were the case there could not be any question of suppression because they were drawn out and not suppressed. But this can hardly be so because we do not as a rule associate a painful experience or thought with anything for by so doing we strengthen the pain and not drain it. If we think of something else after a painful experience it is not because we want to connect the pain with it but because we want to crowd the painful experience out of our minds, of consciousness, suppress it, if you please, by more readily formed associations. Furthermore, the experiments by Aschaffenburg (3), Jung and Riklin (67) which seem to show that the closer we get to the margin of consciousness the more associations are there of form and less of content, show also that our association of the unpleasant with something else is the content kind and not of form, because we are never more conscious than when an unpleasant experience occurs to us. If therefore we tried to get rid of our unpleasant experiences by associating them with something else, that something would strengthen the same experiences and keep them longer in consciousness and more vividly as well as tend to call them up whenever this something occurred to consciousness again. That this happens is one thing and may be recognized but whether it is the general mode of procedure is another, and it certainly seems not to be.

3. The Freudian Conception of Consciousness.

The foregoing discussion will necessarily turn our attention to the Freudian conception of consciousness and especially to that part of it which is called the "subconscious" or "unconscious" which is, of course, not strictly a Freudian term. Freud includes in the mechanism of the subconscious 1, traces of past experiences which may be recalled to consciousness at will; 2, processes like the conscious but unconscious to the subject, and 3, complexes which have sunk so far below the threshold of consciousness as to be incapable of recall to consciousness at will. But instead of dividing the subconscious into three parts or layers Freud includes the first two under a common head, the Vorbewusste, the foreconscious, because consciousness in both of them is an exception and not a rule, but they are capable of being recalled, and gives the third the name Unbewusste, unconscious proper, or preconscious, as it is also called, because its contents have sunk beyond voluntary recall and are made up of complexes foreign to our immediate customs and habits of thinking.

The ideas and complexes of the preconscious or unconscious proper are the background of our mental life. They do not penetrate into consciousness, however strong they may become, but since they have a certain dynamic character, and grow active at the least provocation, they always exert their influence upon consciousness which manifests itself in various ways, as for instance in the execution at a prescribed time of a suggestion made in a hypnotic state, and the errors in memory and speech, forgetting names, etc., and hundreds of cases in abnormal and hysterical persons.

The foreconscious which is made up of recent pleasurable experiences in conformity with our customs and habits of thinking and in which most of our thinking goes on, serves as a censor upon the preconscious ideas and complexes and suppresses them as soon as they try to enter consciousness. The ideas contained in the foreconscious may become conscious either by voluntary recall or by adequate stimulation, but the foreconscious admits only that to consciousness which is in conformity with its contents. All the rest is thrown back into the preconscious from whence it came, that is to say, is suppressed. But the preconscious ideas are dynamic and hence active and

can not very readily be gotten rid of. They try to get into consciousness indirectly, take on another form, disguise themselves in some way or other in order to escape the censuring action of the foreconscious.

Freud thus looks at the psyche dynamically and postulates two systems of energy representing the preconscious and the foreconscious. The first system is sensory and is discharged by a sort of blind impulse which he calls wish and which is seen everywhere in the effort to seek pleasure and avoid pain. It tries to represent pleasure as vividly as possible and sometimes reaches the level of hallucinations by a retrograde process which tends to dramatize the complex. The second system of energy is quite different and develops slowly with the individual. It seeks satisfaction in motor discharges which function automatically in a simple situation but in a more complex develop thought as a substitute of activity. It takes account of both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli but an idea which would cause too much unpleasantness the foreconscious represses into the preconscious.

These two systems of energy which, as Freud thinks, constitute our real psyche, produce all psychic phenomena. The energy tends always to discharge and such ideas and complexes as possess a high degree of tension "tend to press through and become material for the perception of consciousness" (28). But since some ideas and impulses have been suppressed into the preconscious because they were accompanied by pain the foreconscious will not allow them to pass through or to discharge their energy for the same reason for which they were suppressed in the first place. They can not be suppressed continually, however, because they are dynamic. Their energy is therefore transferred to other ideas or complexes which in some way resemble them and which thus symbolize them without having their painful aspect. These are not recognized on their face value as carriers of the forbidden energy and escape therefore the foreconscious censor. In this act of Verschiebung the emphasis is laid on something quite different from that to which it really belongs. The emotional value is thus retained but the process takes time and the surrogate does not appear until some time afterwards.

In the effort to present the contents of the unconscious to

consciousness several ideas or traumas are condensed into one, the so-called act of *Verdichtung*, which is thereby "überdeterminiert." It may contain for instance in a dream one part of the body of one person and another part of another person, with the head of a third, the voice of the fourth, and the manners of a fifth, etc., until the necessary components of the picture are presented.

This theory holds necessarily to the conservation as well as summation of energy, and that no psychic process is ever lost in our neural mechanism. There are nervous stimuli which are too weak to overcome the synapses but still are able to cause same neural changes. These reinforced or allied to some stronger stimuli will ultimately cause some effects on the mental life. It makes consequently no difference how strong the foreconscious censor is the energy from the psychic effects stored up in the preconscious will in some way influence our mental life. In normal cases this is done by way of sublimation and diversion to all fields of mental activity. But in abnormal cases the energy breaks through more easily and therefore influences the mental life more directly. In neurotics whose bringing up has given them some ideas and conceptions which conform to the social status, the foreconscious objects so strongly to the preconscious energy that the whole mental make-up becomes unbalanced.

The Freudian conception of consciousness seems very mechanical and highly artificial but lays claims to be demonstrated every day, for who would write on a public blackboard all the "freisteigende Einfälle," all the thoughts and ideas, that come to consciousness a single day, and which are not allowed to remain there a single minute unless we are moral and intellectual imbeciles but are immediately suppressed? The partly conscious foreconscious got a glimpse of them but straightway they went down to the place from where they came unless we are degenerates in which case we harbor them and take pleasure in so doing, but then they cause no longer pain but pleasure.

4. The Influence and Expression of the Subconscious

The suppressed ideas, complexes, and emotions are not for ever inactive or dead. They are present in some form or other and always more or less active. Ideas which are apparently

forgotten and unconscious are for instance in the hysterics not unconscious in the sense of only disposably present—as everything which one does not think of—but they are only unadmitted. The hysterics are in regard to them in a peculiar position of knowing and not-knowing which in reality is only a more or less conscious not-want-to-know, as Freud puts it (T. 235), and the feeling of opposition between this knowing and not-want-to-know must be overcome. Their admittance into consciousness is sure to bring relief to the patient and restore his normal life. Sometimes these emotional ideas are so far down in the recesses of the psyche that it takes hard work and long searching to find them but they nevertheless influence the mental life and a decided relief is experienced as soon as they are let out. All psycho-analytic therapy shows this.

These suppressed feelings and emotions sometimes find their outlet in bodily symptoms into which the mental or psychic pain is transferred or converted.

The root of the neurosis, says Freud (30), is in the childhood when man is more emotional and plastic than at any other period. But if the affective life of the child is sublimated into other lines of activity, there is little danger that later experiences will have their emotional tone strengthened so as to cause injury. The energy is being used up for other purposes. This is what usually happens in all normal beings. When the emotions reappear in consciousness they have put on another garb and are used for other purposes than first intended for. This sublimation of the suppressed emotions and their application to other ends is a drainage upon their energy which is thus made useful in all walks of life, for it is impossible to say how much of our poetry, our fine and plastic arts, of our religious, sociological, philanthropical, and philosophical conceptions is due to these suppressed emotions. But it is a well-known fact that all poetic, literary, artistic, religious geniuses are of a more or less emotional nature. As a result their imaginary powers are strong and the preconscious has a greater chance to exert its influence because more provocation is likely to occur in them. Then, under certain conditions as in childhood, in sleep and reverie or in special emotional outbreaks, when the power of the foreconscious is lowered, the preconscious is able to discharge its energy more freely. In the

day-dreams and reveries the emotional tone is always present and colors the whole situation. The dream and the poem are in their external appearances very different but both conceal their real significance behind the manifest content. Goethe's "Heideröslein" and "Gefunden" show a very insignificant and harmless patent content, but in them, says Voigtländer (83), "have the two fundamental forms which a man's relation to a woman can assume, found expression most wonderfully precise." And the same author remarks that the real poems are diary pieces of feelings, reports from the subconscious, and remain on the transition between the expression and repression, nature and art; their anchorage in the latent experiences is mostly still too plain. The analysis of Goethe's latent experiences and the above mentioned poems would in all probability lead to his relations to Friederike and Christine.

But not only poetical expressions are stimulated by the subconscious. Nietzsche (56) remarks that "the conscious thought of a philosopher is secretly led and escorted by his instinct," by which he means nothing else than the influence of the subconscious. Leonardo da Vinci (34) shows plainly how the subconscious dominates his whole life. He is very unstable in his habits and complains over a lost life in which he had not accomplished what he ought to. The same is true of Giovano Segantini (2). Says Voigtländer (83):

"All flashes, all conceptions come from the subconscious,—the conscious is not creative, only arranging, sifting, presenting. The material for the thought comes from the unconscious, the wishes, instinct, experience. . . . Not what one says or writes is the essential—the logical connection is loose and only apparent—behind stand wishes, interests, the whole past, and generally the whole concrete personality of the individual,"

and these are the powerful factors in man's life. The laws of association which are so convenient and useful in explaining certain phenomena, are at bottom not able to explain anything. Beyond the ideas on the surface of consciousness there lies the all-determining past of human experience, feelings and emotions, stored up in the human soul. The energy behaves like itself wherever it is found. Nothing happens anywhere without a cause, and if the whole story were known from beginning to end, cause and effect would undoubtedly connect the procedure like links in a chain. The mental impressions will remain like splinters in the flesh until they are removed or made harmless.

Of special interest in this connection is the relation between dreams, day-dreams, and myths. Abraham's (1) assumption that myth is nothing but an overcome infantile soul-life and the collective dream of the race, was somewhat anticipated by Laistner (quoted by Havelock Ellis, 20) who said:

"If we bear in mind how intimately poetry and religion are connected with myth, we encounter the surprising fact that the first germ of these highly important vital manifestations is not to be found in any action of waking mind, but in sleep and that the chief and oldest teacher of productive imagination is not to be found in the experiences of life but in the phantasies of dreams."

And it is a well-known fact that the Greeks who were such excellent myth-makers wasted much time in waiting for dreams. Truly has Jewell (45) spoken when he said: "Dreams have had a great effect upon the history of the world."

The argument of the Freudian school that the laws of mythformation and of the formation of fairy tales are identical with those in accordance with which the dreams are formed, Havelock Ellis (20) interprets to mean "that the waking psychic life itself is capable of acting in a way resembling that of the sleeping psychic life and of evolving conceptions similar to dreams." Civilized man of to-day does not draw any inspiration from his dreams but primitive man and children do. Among them the laws of the waking life "are not yet sharply differentiated from the laws of the sleeping world and they often find illumination for the problems of one world in the phenomena of the other" (20). Gross (36) refers to cases in which children brought criminal charges which were apparently based on dreams. It is noteworthy that the day-dreams and reveries center around the time of puberty and may lead directly to literary activity. The celebrated day-dreams of George Sand developed around the central figure of Corombé, first seen in a real dream.

The so-called "continued story" shows the psychic material in the process of mythformation. Leoroyd (51) maintains that these stories may begin early in life, in the fourth year and continue for several years. They are most pronounced in early adolescence and especially in girls and may not be dropped until late in life. The characters are mostly from real life and often the author himself plays a very prominent part. Havelock Ellis (19) maintains that these stories are often tinged

strongly with sexual emotions which are frequently their real motive. This may, however, be so skillfully concealed that it may be difficult to detect it.

All these psychic phenomena are strictly private and intimate experiences which the subjects harbor for themselves. They are strongly emotional and contain a wish realized in them. They form an outlet for the suppressed wishes and emotions which have not been otherwise realized.

The hero-myths or sagas belong to the same class of mental phenomena. They are the fulfilment of wishes which for some reason or other could not be fulfilled in any other way. Thus the Oedipus saga is nothing but the fancy formation of an adolescent youth who in his childhood had been estranged from his father, because he separated him from his mother. His wishes developed into a fancy of the death of the father and the marriage of the mother. That the creator of the myth realizes that the whole thing is an outrageous wrong is seen in the later development of the saga. The whole affair is condemned by the hero himself and as punishment blinds himself. The only thing that is put up as an excuse is that in "dreams men often see themselves united to their mothers," but this is put in the mouth of somebody else.

May be there is a genetic significance in this. In ancient time, and in modern times too, it often happened that the father was a strange person, a despot in the family. He ruled over the family as a chief over his tribe and in many cases exercised his power in a not altogether friendly way. This may have aroused an unconscious wish, and perhaps even conscious, to remove him, and to take his position. This often happened. May not this attitude be transmitted and may it not have taken expression in some mental activity such as dreams, day-dreams, and reveries? That the children and primitive man do not consciously realize what death means is pointed out by Abraham (1) and seen in the behavior of every child. To them it means nothing but being away, or not present at the time being. Therefore when it is said that the child wishes his father dead he does not include in this idea the same thing as older people do. But the real cause for the wish is unknown. The child has no idea of the import of his immediate thought. Der kleine Hans often surprised his father by saying: "The thought

occurred to me," "I happened to think of," as if he himself had had nothing to do with the thought. And the Oedipus saga shows that when he realized the import of his dreamery, a wholly different mental procedure started.

Riklin (67) has called attention to the two different ways in which the wish structure appears in fairy tales, both of which have a more or less clear teleological significance. The first are those cases in which someone has lost a relative or friend whom he mourns bitterly and who, after days of sorrow and grief, appears to him and asks him not to weep any more, because his tears and mourning disturb him in his rest. This fanciful belief has become a psychic cure for the living although it was apparently meant for the dead.

The second and more common form of this kind of wish structure is the one in which the so-called "Ellenbogenkinder," or the slow, stupid, good-for-nothing children who are always treated with ridicule and made to do what nobody else wants to do, come out triumphant over their more favored associates. The fulfilment of a wish is so plain here that it is impossible to mistake it. It is the same psychic activity as we meet in the hero-myths in general. The poor boy or girl becomes the son or daughter of a rich and beautiful king in a very circumstantial way and afterwards marries into a rich family and becomes very famous to the great dismay of his former oppressors. That difficulties encounter them in their attempt to realize their wish in their fancy makes the whole situation more romantic and fascinating and shows that mind does not always run the straight and easy path to a desired goal but often indulges in the most trying and perplexing circumstances with an ease and unconcern that is almost appalling.

But in many cases the troubles which the heroes have to contend with start at birth and sometimes even before. As children they have been rejected and exposed but rescued and brought up by brutes or low people. We meet the same thing in the maxim "Nemo propheta in patria," which has no other meaning than that a man whose parents, brothers, sisters, games, etc., are well known, must renounce these at least for a time if he wishes to be recognized as great. This breaking away of the children from the parents is an evolutionary necessity but to be sure a painful experience.

In the development of the child there is a time when the parents are everything for him. His most intense wish is to become like them. But he soon learns to know other people who appear to him greater. Small events in his life call forth unsatisfactory feelings. The glory of other people and the disregard shown by his own parents give rise to the wish of belonging to them and perhaps he goes so far as to imagine himself child of other people. This idea comes out strongly in the psycho-nuerotics who have exaggerated the infantile fancies in a high degree from lack of any controlling elements. But the fictitious father of the hero has often the most pronounced characteristics of the real father and is therefore not a substitution but a transference for the purpose of fulfilling the wish. The whole thing is an expression of the longing for those happy days when the father was the noblest man and the mother the most lovely woman on earth.

The hero of the saga echoes in this way the egoistic feelings of the child, which are counteracted by other interests and so suppressed,

V. SUMMARY

Myth is the expression of primitive man's thoughts and feelings concerning himself and the external world and the gods. It has to be sure some connection with the changes of language, but it is more intimately bound up with the human psyche which tends to express itself in some way peculiarly its own. This accounts for the fact that the mythologizing idea has never left man but still lingers and finds expression in the folk-poetry and folk-tales of different people. The myth and poetry are very closely connected, and the more poetry resembles myth the more universal it becomes and loses its individual character.

Whether man has developed slowly, by sudden partial leaps, or by a sudden leap in toto, or whether he has originated from one pair in one place only or from several, does not make so much difference after all, for in either case the evolutional laws must have been the same that brought about the development which resulted in the being we now call man. But if the leap was in toto and too sudden the effect might have been detrimental because of the sudden separation from the preceding stage into the new environment which he was not accustomed to.

Mind has developed along similar lines according to similar laws everywhere which makes mind one and makes it possible for one man to understand another. They both have a human mind. In this development we find the reason for the similarity of so many myths which could not have been borrowed by one people from another. Moreover, the theory of borrowing does not explain anything and is in reality very superficial.

The myths may be divided into two large groups; Nature myths and Hero myths or Culture myths. The nature myths may again be divided into such that have sprung up around natural objects and such that have sprung up around natural phenomena. There is hardly any object or any phenomenon which has not at some time or other been subject for a myth. ✓ All groups of natural objects and all kinds of natural phenomena have attracted primitive man's attention and caused him to wonder and speculate. The tendency that has been current to exalt one object at the expense of another must be rejected. The moon for instance has exerted a greater influence upon man than the sun, although the sun has been regarded as superior. Superior it may be but not in its effect upon man's behavior. The reason for this may be found in the natural phenomenon itself as well as in the environment and mental attitude of man. At night man could look at and meditate upon the moon. He had leisure to do so, and the surroundings were more favorable for an emotional impression.

If any object has played a greater rôle in man's life than the other, it is the tree. World-trees are found all over the world, sacred trees are common, and trees and groves actually worshipped, found all over the world. A great tree-lore has sprung up around these which still exerts a profound influence. The reason for this has been sought in the intimate relationship which is thought to have existed between man and the tree. From the tree man is supposed to have gathered his food, in the tree he is supposed to have lived, and to the tree he is supposed to have fled in times of danger. The theory of his arboreal life has, however, lately been disputed. Be that as it may, one thing is sure, man and the tree have been very closely connected.

Man projected himself into the objects and phenomena; he personified them or perhaps better he elementarized himself.

He ascribed the same attributes and qualities which he possessed to the world around him. He used himself as a measure and explanation of all things. His gods were also formed in his own image because he was the object of his conceptions. They were the natural outgrowth of his inability to cope with a given situation, and of his feeling of dependency developed during his long infancy. Where man considered himself immortal his gods were also immortal. They shared the common fate of man. Among some people they were maintained in vigor and youth by a special prerogative which was denied man. In the other world gods and men are again going to live together in peace and harmony pursuing their various occupations. In a word, the gods were men more and more magnified, with human desires and human wants.

The hero myths are also the expression of the human psyche but in a different way from the nature myths. In them the emotions on the one hand and the customs and traditions on the other play the dominant part. The underlying factor is the question of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. The soul is a great center of psychic force which endeavors to express itself according to its own nature. Most primordial are the nutritive and sexual emotions which therefore play the greater rôle. Of these the sexual emotion is the strongest and lies at the bottom of shame, modesty, and morality. Even the child is not free from this emotion and his first sexual object is the parent of the opposite sex, according to Freud. When the emotions want to discharge the energy, or when the psyche wants to act out its impulses, it finds that society has established a certain standard according to which they are to be acted out. But this standard has not taken all the possibility into consideration and many of the emotional impulses are not provided for. They can not be provided for either, for the individual must be subordinate to the society in which he lives. As a result the emotional impulses find themselves at variance with the standards of society and must either disregard the custom and traditions and act them out or else suppress them. If they are suppressed, they can nevertheless not be gotten rid of, because they are dynamic. The energy can not be lost. Below the threshold of consciousness, in what Freud calls the subconscious, these emotional impulses are still active and in-

fluence the conscious life indirectly. They are waiting for an opportunity to express themselves. But since the organism has learned to seek pleasure and avoid pain, and since they were suppressed in the first place because they caused more pain than pleasure, they can not enter consciousness or express themselves in their real garb. Therefore they must find some way in which they can escape the censor which the customs and traditions have built up. This they find in transferring their energy to other objects which thus symbolize them but have not their painful character. The suppressed emotions and wishes find the easiest expression when the conscious life is lowered as in dreams, day-dreams, and reveries. The hero myths are the fancy-realisation of the suppressed emotions and wishes which could not be fulfilled in any other way. They are the dreams of the childhood of the race in which the individuals imagined themselves in the positions described in the sagas.

But not only the sagas are the expressions of these suppressed wishes and emotional impulses. Much of what is worth while in arts, literature, and religion, is an expression of the same psychic energy which was once forbidden. Traces of them are found everywhere in painting, sculpture, drama, and poetry. The energy of these suppressed emotions and wishes thus finds expression sublimated, on a higher plane, and colors the life of every being. Emotional individuals are affected more than other, but their imagination is also more creative and full of ideas.

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THE PROBLEMS AND PRESENT STATUS OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

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Religion represents a double paradox. In the first place the student of 'human nature' who approaches the study of religion is confronted with the problem of explaining the rise, somewhere in the dim past and the maintenance down into our own sophisticated age, of doctrines and beliefs which are not only underived from any experience possible to man, but which, like the belief in miracles, in transubstantiation, in virgin births and the like, are distinctly at variance with and even antagonistic to the experience of man and to the known laws of nature.

This is the problem which religion presents on its experiential side as a phase of human mentality.

On its sociological aspects, religion reveals a similar paradox. It shows the development of complex rituals, the establishment of costly monuments and luxurious edifices by people barely subsisting in misery and want while building these and supporting also a large and prosperous clergy. Indeed, the greatest architectural wonders of the East and of medieval Europe are the places of worship built by people who, for the greater part, enjoyed fewer material comforts than wild beasts share in the jungle.

That, then, is the paradox which religion presents on its sociological side: magnificent palaces built for the housing of clergy or of wooden gods and graven images and saintly relics by people living in huts or without even a roof over their heads! Gold and precious stones and jewels, everything of value, in fact, lavished upon altars by people in rags or practically naked! People, periodically the victims of famine and through their physical misery and their ignorance exposed to the ravages of epidemics, maintaining nevertheless costly churches and taxing themselves for the support of a large priesthood in comforts and in luxuries such as, even on ecclesiastic theory alone (aside of any ethical theories involved), had no right to exist!

The motivations for this paradoxical situation upon the sociologic field must be sought in the organization and processes

of the human mind. The persistent beliefs in the impossible which religion largely embodies, the adherence to notions unwarranted by the experience of man or natural law, is also a problem of mental structure and organization. Thus both problems, the individual as well as the sociological, belong ultimately to psychology.

But psychology is the youngest among the established sciences and the phenomena of religion have been subjected to a scientific analysis on the basis of a recognized scientific technique only recently so that the account which I propose to give herein of the status of religious psychology will be very simple.

Previous to the period of psychological inquiry in the midst of which we are living, the subject of religion was divided between metaphysics, philosophy and theology. Metaphysics speculates abstractly about the probable basis and function of religion; similar speculations make up also the province of the philosophy of religion. As to theology, it consists, broadly speaking, of a mass of doctrines, possessing some historic background but defended dogmatically. Theology does not inquire into the nature of religious experience. It accepts such experience without questioning either its source or its validity, and appeals to that experience for the verification of its particular doctrine and theories. Dogmatism is its ruling spirit.

To President G. Stanley Hall, of Clark University, belongs the credit of having inaugurated in this country, the psychological study of religion. His own studies on childhood and adolescence furnished the inspiration for the first scientific attempts in this field, notably the paper he published in 1891 on the moral and religious training of children.¹ Some revival preachers had previously gathered statistics concerning the age at which most conversions take place and strictly speaking, this may be said to represent the first attempt to obtain some scientific data upon a subject of religion; but the revivalists' interest in the matter was limited, of course, to practical ends. They desired merely to find out how they may increase their efficiency in the work of proselyting. They established no particular technique of inquiry nor were they interested in the broader implications of the data which they obtained. The first scien-

¹ *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. I, p. 196.

tific studies of broader import upon the field of religion on the basis of a well defined technique were carried out under President Hall's guidance and inspiration by several of his pupils, among them Starbuck and Leuba, who thereafter devoted themselves largely to the study of this subject.

The first work of Starbuck's and the monograph of Coe were among the first to appear devoted wholly to religious psychology. The method used by these and other psychologists is the questionnaire.

A number of objections, some of them quite serious, have been raised against the questionnaire method of psychological inquiry.

It has been pointed out, for instance, that in the absence of specific training for self-analysis the average person is unable to testify concerning those mental processes which constitute religious experience on its inner side.

As to the external incidents of religious growth, while persons of intelligence may be thought to be able to give an accurate account of them, experience and observation have shown that this is by no means always the case. Unintentional errors may creep into all sorts of statements concerning our past experience. It is a well established psychological fact that memory has peculiar ways of falsely representing our past.

Moreover in a psychological study of religious experience the external data are not the most significant; and when the inner history of one's religious development is in question information obtained at random through the questionnaire method is liable to be particularly vitiated by numerous self-deceptions. Without some means of checking the subjective sources of error the data obtained may prove entirely misleading.

But as those who have used the method were generally students trained in psychology and aware of these shortcomings of the questionnaire it is only reasonable to presume that they possessed the necessary foresight and psychological perspicacity to avoid its pitfalls.

Besides the necessity for caution against possible errors in the material obtainable through the questionnaire it is necessary that the serious student guard against errors of his own. Above all, the psychologist who presumes to subject religion to a critical investigation must clear his own mind from any preconceptions

about or undue emotional attachment to religion. At the outset the psychologist must make certain that his incentive to this work and his interest in its results are wholly those of the scientist willing to follow the drift of his facts no matter to what conclusion he may thus be led. Attention to this possible source of error is as important as counterchecking the subjective errors in the questionnaire testimony.

It so happens however, that neither Starbuck nor Coe were prompted by scientific interest alone. Both writers distinctly state that their investigations were inspired as much by religious interests and needs as by the psychologic interest. In a review of the present status of religious psychology it is necessary to point out this significant admission; the conclusions at which these writers have arrived and the scientific worth of their labors will be better appreciated in its light.

The practical nature and religious import of the motive which inspired the labors of Starbuck, Coe (and it may be added, of most of the other pioneer students in this line as will be shown later), is further illustrated by the particular problems in religious psychology which engaged their attention. They concerned themselves chiefly with the phenomena of conversion. As the making of converts is conceived by the Church to be its chief task, its supporters must become interested in any information concerning the process of conversion with a view to turning such information to practical account, in religious work. Ames, another student of the psychology of religion, states the matter as follows: "The question of method in religious work turns upon the psychology of religious experience. The relative value of revivalism, and of religious education, depends upon the comparative significance of the different types of conversion and upon the means by which they are occasioned. The demand of the Church, under an increasing realization of tension between it and many developments of modern society, has been for a more efficient method of winning its own children and securing recruits from the 'world.'"

As has been stated our writers appear to have had this demand of the church in view as much as the scientific interest which religions present to the psychologist.

For instance, E. D. Starbuck's "Psychology of Religion" endeavors to determine the conditions, including age, tempera-

ment and surroundings, most favorable to 'religious conversion.' These matters concern the Church because it endeavors to control the psychic processes of children and adults alike, for the purpose of turning them into channels that make finally, for adherence to its tenets and beliefs.

Starbuck deals wholly with such subjects as: age of conversion, experiences preceding and motives and forces leading to conversion; its conscious and subconscious elements.

Conversion is largely a phenomenon of adolescence; accordingly, Starbuck pays considerable attention to the psychic factors and processes characteristic of this period. But he does not inquire into the genetic relations of religious outbursts to the psychophysical phenomena of adolescence except in so far as the information may be useful to the religious teacher. The genetic aspects of this relationship is not his particular concern probably because his plainly evident emotional concern for the fate of religion obscures from his view the importance of the deeper genetic aspects of his problem.

Starbuck conceives religion to be "a deep rooted instinct" which he compares with hunger or the desire for exercise. He manifests his emotional attachment to religion in such statements as the following: "Psychology is to religion what the science of medicine is to health, or what the study of botany is to the appreciation of plants." This is not a statement of conditions and beliefs as found among men which he sets forth to examine critically: in these words Starbuck declares his own attitude.

He also finds that "it is in the interest of religion that it should not remain submerged in the sea of feeling; that in some degree it should be lifted up within the range of intellectual comprehension." This, he expects, psychology might do for religion, just as the seventeenth century deists in England and the eighteenth century deists in France hoped to 'save the cause' of religion by appeal to the 'design in nature' argument. Psychology is to be the new handmaid of religion.

The functions of religious psychology, according to Starbuck are to "lead toward greater wisdom in religious education;" and to increase "our power of appreciation of spiritual things." These are the leading thoughts which inspired this author's work and are emphasized by him with italics. He states fur-

ther: "The service of psychology to practical religion is to make possible a harvest of wiser means in moral and religious culture, and also to lift religion sufficiently out of the domain of feeling to make it appeal to the understanding, so that it may become possible, progressively, to appreciate its truth and apperceive its essential elements."

The religionist's old query: how may the church capture the allegiance of the more sharply critical element of the population is to be solved by the psychologist. This, according to Starbuck is to be the psychologist's service to practical religion.

The nature of Starbuck's conclusions may be foreseen in a general way, from the general character of his attitude towards the problem of religious psychology. Given his attitude as illustrated above, and his viewpoint that religion is of the nature of an instinct, like hunger, it could not be expected that he should inquire further into the origins and real meaning of this 'instinct.' Not only would such further inquiry serve no particular religious purpose, but it might even disturb his actual religious preconceptions. He might perchance find that religion is not an instinct after all, just as recent psychologic research has proven that many a so-called instinct like the killing of mice by cats or the pecking of chickens is entirely mythical. His studies of conversion lead to no conclusion of genetic import. He does not go beyond the surface of things in this work. He draws merely certain educational inferences. Religious education, he finds, should adopt itself to the needs and conditions of each person; only thus can the best results be obtained. The study of character groups might yield "certain standards by which to judge individual instances" and by which, to control individual growth without hastening unduly the various steps or stages. One acquires the impression that Starbuck's whole work is but an elaboration of the obvious.

On the nature of religion itself, of which conversion is a most striking phenomenon, its meaning, its function in human life, its origins, the study of Starbuck's, as already stated, throws no particular light. He does state that "Religion in its highest form may fairly be regarded as a radiation, an intermingling, a complication and a spiritualization of the impulses already present in human nature," but he does not attempt to explain the nature of that 'irradiation' nor does he

undertake to point out specifically what are those "impulses already present in human nature," of which religion is at once an irradiation and a spiritualized complication.

Prof. Coe's work on religious psychology is conceived in a similar spirit. The interest, the outlook revealed by his study of "Spiritual Life" is closely parallel to Starbuck's. He, too, employed the questionnaire method; he, too, of all the varied problems in religion, concerned himself chiefly with conversion and for a reason similar to Starbuck's.

"Every question arising in the psychology of religious experience," he states, "may be understood in this way: under what circumstances does the Divine Spirit work such or such a change in the minds of men? That the Holy Spirit does observe antecedents and wait for conditions to ripen; that he does not vouchsafe the same blessings to all individuals or to all ages of life; and that we have it in our power either to prepare the way for his revelations or to hinder them—all this is current belief among christians. Now, these are the very uniformities that need investigating. In fact, psychology can only render more precise and complete what is already recognized in a partial way in the practice of the religious life" (p. 17). Coe thus introduces a new concept into psychology, the Holy Spirit, which is not to be questioned or even examined but is only to be served by science. For Coe, psychology becomes the direct handmaid of the Holy Spirit and of the church in its proselyting efforts.

The chief value of religious psychology consists in the aids it may give to the teacher of religion; in the promise it holds out to enable the church to control the lives of the children and to reclaim "the great mass of persons who have cut loose from all forms of organized religion."

Like every other observer, even of the most superficial order, Coe was forced to recognize the strong bonds which exist between religious development and mental and physical growth, particularly the intimate relationship between the psychophysical changes of adolescence and the outbreak of religious emotions. "We could not if we would," states Coe, "disguise from ourselves how remarkably these religious feelings mirror the entire physical and mental condition during the middle years of adolescence" (p. 52). Forceful as this relationship presents

itself to his view, it fails to arouse in him the desire to follow the clue and investigate the real origin and meaning of religious emotions, possibly because he has in mind chiefly the religious educator whose interests could hardly be fostered by such an investigation. Instead of analyzing this matter to its last point he contents himself with giving the facts and figures showing the close relationship between religion and adolescence, and he draws out of them only general 'educational' inferences. "The mental condition during adolescence," he writes, "is particularly favorable to deep religious impressions. This is the time that the child becomes competent to make a deeply personal life choice; such a choice is now easier than either before or after; this, accordingly, is the time at which a wise church will expect to reap its chief harvest of members" (p. 54).

This attitude on the author's part may seem paradoxical inasmuch as the investigation is carried out apparently as a psychological problem. But even a psychologist may have his prejudices and preconceptions and the field of religion is the very last upon which man is willing to part with these. Paradoxical as the author's attitude towards his problems may seem, it is only the natural outcome of his preconceptions on the subject. According to Coe, "man is a religious animal just as surely as he is a social animal." This is not what he undertakes to prove in his work. This is what he starts with, this is what he takes for granted. Naturally he sees conversion and every other phenomenon illustrative of religious processes only in the light of this preconception. Only what squares with this notion of religion can be logical and true. All else is dross.

What a restraining force this preconception exercises upon Coe's work as a psychologist may be illustrated by the following: He finds that "three sets of factors favor the attainment of a striking religious transformation: the temperament factor, the factor of expectation, and the tendency to automatisms and passive suggestibility." Here is a suggestion that followed to the end might lead to significant results. But Coe is prevented from inquiring into the nature and meaning of conversion further by the very attitude he has assumed from the beginning towards the whole problem. Even conclusions apparently logical enough he upholds for reasons which seem unusual and strange to a mind accustomed to scientific methods and processes of

reasoning. For instance, he does not feel himself justified to conclude that conversion is an automatic performance, in spite of "the tendency to hallucinations and other automatisms" with which conversion is commonly associated. "Not" states he, "unless we first define conversion so as to ignore its profound relation to God and to the principles of a good life." Coe's God and his ethics stand above the realm of scientific analysis. They are the *nolle me tangere* region into which humble psychology may not venture to penetrate. "The substance of religious experiences as far transcends their emotional form," states Coe, "as a man transcends the clothes he wears." What may that mysterious substance be? Coe does not tell but hints mysteriously at the ethical import of religious beliefs as embodying the differential essence of religion,—a very old notion indeed! Religion sought refuge in ethics so long as the science of morals and human conduct was dominated by mysticism and fanciful transcendentalism but since ethics too, acquired a scientific foundation, and the science of human behavior became humanized and rationalized, religion has ceased to look to it for support. Prof. Coe prefers to ignore all this. His ethics is still mystical and transcendental, something above man's intellectual capacities, for he still believes that religion may take refuge and find safe harborage therein against the scrutinizing rays of science, and thus, preserve at least in part, its air of mystery and supernaturalism. On this point he declares: "The ultimate test of religious values . . . is nothing psychological, nothing definable in terms of the how it happens, but something ethical, definable only in terms of what is attained of loving trust toward God and brotherly kindness toward men." Without thus hitching up religion to something mysteriously supernatural, religion may incur the danger of being explained away wholly on psychologic and naturalistic grounds and Coe, even more markedly than Starbuck, is anxious throughout his work to preserve for religion some residuum, be it ever so slight, of transcendentalism. Whenever his facts seem to point to some broad generalisation antagonistic to the theory of supernaturalism in religion Coe stops short and wherever possible mends what doubts concerning such alleged supernaturalism the marshalling of some of his facts may have brought to alert minds by introducing *ex cathedra*, some such

dogmatic statement as the one quoted above concerning the ethical essence of religion and its transcendental nature.

Pratt's "Psychology of Religious Experience" differs in some important respects from that of his predecessors. For one thing, his conception of the psychological problem of religion is broader, perhaps because his psychologic interest therein is not overshadowed by any religious motives. He does not, like Coe, take God and the Holy Spirit and other transcendental concepts for granted but bluntly proposes to investigate "the nature of belief in a God or Gods and the basis or bases on which this belief really rests." His method, too was, partly, the questionnaire, but he also made use of the results of anthropology and the history of religion, taking up, as typical forms of early religious belief, the primitive animism of unsophisticated races, the religions of India and Israel and certain phases of Christian belief.

Pratt's analysis of these various forms of religious belief is mainly an amplification of the thesis which he establishes in a preliminary chapter, on the nature of belief. That chapter is concluded as follows: "Religious belief may be mere primitive credulity which accepts as truly divine whatever is presented to it as such; it may be based on reasoning of various sort; or it may be due to a need of the organism, or to an emotional experience or 'intuition'—an unreasoned idea springing from the background and bearing with it an irresistible force of emotional conviction."

These three phases or types of religious belief, called respectively the "Religion of Primitive Credulity," the "Religion of Thought or of the Understanding," and the "Religion of Feeling" form the central thought to Pratt's whole psychological scheme of religion. The potency of religion he ascribes to its dependence upon the broad emotional background of human experience which he calls the feeling mass and which "is wider than the other departments of psychic life, deeper than they, and more closely identified with the self."

This feeling mass is "made up of the indefinite, the indescribable, the peculiarly private mass of subjective experiences which, by their very nature, are not susceptible of communication and which, to be exactly described must be made over so as to lose their characteristic quality and cease to be what they

were," in contrast with "the definite, describable, communicable elements of consciousness; the rational, the cognitive, the representative; the material which may be made public property by means of scientific and exact description."

This emphasis upon the emotional experience as the foundation of religious belief is a doctrine which the author has absorbed from its most famous recent protagonist, William James. Like the latter, he would lift the feeling mass to a category of its own possessing a validity as great, if not greater than the intellectual in man. Just as science is the organ of the intellect so is religion the special organ of the undifferentiated feeling mass. "The feeling background," he states, ". . . the spokesman and the mouthpiece of the organism and its instincts. It has long been a recognized fact that the instinctive and unreasoned reactions of the organism are often more certain, more swift, more appropriate than actions which are the result of conscious choice. The same kind of appropriateness, the same kind of adaptability to a present situation, in short the same kind of wisdom, belongs to the instinctive beliefs, if we may so call them, in which the feeling background voices the demands of the organism. Such a belief is hardly to be eradicated by argument. Its roots go deeper into the organic and biological part of us than do those of most things whose flowers blossom in the daylight of consciousness" (p. 43).

Pratt's particular standpoint on the subject, the point, at least, upon which he places considerable emphasis, is his sharp division of the emotional background from intellect; a division which only recalls the old Aristotelian dual classification of mind into thought and desire. The three-fold aspects of religious belief, or the division into three stages as mentioned above is a theory which he regards as his particular contribution to the subject.

His analysis of the development of religious belief in youth and in mature life is mainly, if not wholly, descriptive. He, too, makes no attempt at correlating organically religious emotions with the psychophysical changes of the period during which they are most common and with which they appear so intimately associated.

In fact, it may be said that Pratt believes he has sufficiently explained the origin of religious belief when he has

traced it to the broad emotional background of human life. What particular set of emotions are concerned in religion and, specifically, what their somatic background may be is left undecided. Perhaps the reason therefore is akin to the reason, not plainly discernible, for which he lapses at times into a defence of religion, as if the fate of religion were logically the psychologist's concern. For while it is plainly evident that Pratt has endeavored to keep himself free from any bias and has succeeded in a very great measure, there are here and there, traces of an emotional attachment to religion which cannot but prove detrimental to an investigator. He declares, for instance, in substance, that the invasion of the religious field by psychology is bound to prove beneficial to the former because it needs any help it can obtain from the sphere of the intellect to protect itself against pure intellectualism which threatens to destroy its essence (an essence that must remain emotional), and also against beliefs avowedly anti-religious. And he adds that "it is not only against external foes that religion needs protection; it must be safeguarded as well against the inherent diseases to which it is specially liable, against the deadening influence of traditional and stagnant creeds which have long since outgrown their significance and usefulness."

Offhand a person of scientific training and disposition would conceive that it is the business of reason to penetrate into religion and dispel its mysteries, just as it has successfully dispelled the misty veil which religion had held over the laws of physical nature. It is surprising therefore to find Dr. Pratt ascribe reason a minor rôle in connection with the subjective phase of religion. He states (p. 288): "In thus formulating and reformulating the conception of religion in conformity with the progress of human knowledge and reflection, reason will ever find a most useful sphere in the service of religion." Here we encounter again an echo of the seventeenth and eighteenth century deistic hope. Once more reason is to be made the handmaid and not the penetrating tool of religion.

Jas. H. Leuba's doctorate thesis at Clark University, published in 1896, was a study of christian conversion. Since then he has published over a score of papers dealing with various problems in religious psychology, some of which he has gathered together in a book recently published under the title, "A Psy-

chological Study of Religion, its Origin, Function and Future." In spite of his incessant activity and varied writings it is not easy to discern Leuba's standpoint. He discusses different phases of religion in a manner which shows a close familiarity with the literature of the subject but rarely attempts to apply a new light to any of the problems. His statements are too general to be quoted. His is mainly a descriptive psychology of religion and even when he discusses some genetic or dynamic aspects he preserves generally the eclectic attitude of the 'raconteur.' Though he discusses such interesting subjects as the mental requirements of the appearance of magic and religion, the origin of the idea of impersonal powers, the making of Gods, the origin of magical and of religious practices, it would be difficult to point out his special contribution to any of them, if we are to except from mention vague or commonplace generalisations. The great disproportion between the labor bestowed and the results derived by this author is so very striking that some fundamental cause must be responsible for it, and the present writer makes bold to assert that the cause is to be sought in Leuba's dual attitude towards religion.

In the Preface to the last mentioned work he states bluntly: "Although in the preparation of this book I have been moved by scientific interests, it would be idle for me to pretend that my concern has been purely scientific. Religion is too vital a matter to leave even the theoretically minded person altogether indifferent to its destiny. It needs as much as any other practical activity the kind of purification and guidance that science provides." However, the needed guidance and purification is not provided for religion in this work. For one thing, Dr. Leuba has been for a time a pupil of Pres. G. Stanley Hall's, whose standpoint is consistently scientific, whose grasp of the subject is broad, encyclopedic, thorough. The example of the master must have slackened the pupil's emotional zeal to the point of disabling him from saving religion from science, even if it did not inspire him with that thorough confidence in the scientific method, unalloyed with concern for the destiny of religion, which might have led to greater results. It takes faith to save religion from any dangers that may threaten it, not scientific interest, and certainly not psychology.

Irving King preconizes largely the view made famous by

Prof. Harald Höffding, the Danish philosopher and psychologist, who in his "Philosophy of Religion," contends that religious feeling is "the feeling which is determined by the fate of values in the struggle for existence." King is virtually in agreement with Höffding's famous declaration that "the fundamental axiom of religion, that which expresses the innermost tendency of all religions, is the axiom of the conservation of value." But he recognizes that there are "many values that are not religious, and there are consequently many value attitudes that have no religious significance."

Accordingly, in his "Development of Religion," King sets out to determine, so far as possible, the conditions which give rise to the religious attitude as differentiated from other, non-religious attitudes distinctly valuational in their import. He finds that the values specifically religious are those to which the adjective 'greatest' is applicable: the greatest good, the greatest happiness, in a word the superlative, is the religious value.

But this theory establishes between religious and other socially conceived values only a difference of degree. We are still far from any differential criterion of religion. The social group furnishes the matrix—as King expresses it, for all values, religious and non-religious alike. Here again, we find no differential essence for the one category of values as distinguished from the other. Dynamically and genetically, religious values look very much like any other kind of values, though King appreciates that some distinguishing mark must exist between them. His reference to the social medium for the origin of values while sufficiently justified is confusing because it contains but half a truth and also because the social consciousness or social mind is a concept in the midst of which, because of the present unsatisfactory status of social psychology, one is almost certain to lose one's way.

In spite of the rather amorphous state of social psychology at the present time, there is a growing tendency among students of religion to trace the religious experiences and states of individuals back to the social substratum and to conceive this to be the whole task of religious genetics. 'Social' and 'individual' being but two aspects of the same psychic processes, it is of course, easy enough to refer either one to the other; it is

even desirable to do this at frequent intervals so as to counter-check the results obtained upon one field with the data and testimony of the other. But all this instead of being the end should only serve as preparation for the genetic study of the various psychic processes and manifestations.

Pratt's three fold division of belief, for instance, is an attempt to classify genetically an essential phase of religion, but his subsuming everything under the category of 'social' leaves much to be done in the way of particularizing the origins of the various phases of belief described by him.

Edward Scribner Ames is a psychologist who seems to appreciate clearly the genetic and dynamic aspects of religious manifestations but he, too, becomes lost in the maze of the 'social' even more hopelessly than Pratt. His emphasis of the social amounts almost to a bias. The individual acquires all his religious characteristics in his quality as 'socius.' Religion itself is "the consciousness of the highest social values." The determining impulses in primitive religion must be somehow related to the objects of greatest interest to individual and society alike,—food and sex. Having adopted the genetic viewpoint Ames appreciates this very clearly. He recognizes too, that woman, through her sexually determined manner of life, becomes the center of the social group and the chief incentive to man's awakening social consciousness; as to religious consciousness, it "is a most intimate phase of the group consciousness" (p. 49).

Accordingly his psychological investigations of early customs and taboos, ceremonials and magic, spirits, sacrifice, prayer, and mythology emphasize almost exclusively the social aspect of their origin and development. He finds that the origin of all sorts of religious practices and beliefs is to be sought in the origin of social consciousness itself, of which religious consciousness is, as stated, a most intimate phase. The essence of the latter, as with King and Höffding, is valuational: "the religious consciousness is identified," he states, "with the highest values of life." Ames finds practically that man is a religious animal because he is a social animal, and because he has a sense of social values. He does not attempt however, as King endeavored, to point out what distinguishes the religious from other social values. As a matter of fact, Ames nowhere dis-

tinguishes between ordinary social values and values specifically religious, any more than he distinguishes between social consciousness as a whole and the specifically religious. One merges into the other. With the blooming forth of social consciousness at adolescence, the individual, becomes *ipse facto*, religious. It would follow that the irreligious person lacks social consciousness. This would seem a veritable *reductio ad absurdum* but it is exactly what Ames maintains in all soberness. Lack of social consciousness is what Ames finds the trouble to be with non-religious persons. The non-religious are "those who fail to enter vitally into a world of social activities and feelings. They remain unresponsive to the obligations and the incentives of the social order. They are lacking in the sense of ideal values which constitutes the social conscience."

Ames does not hesitate to follow this corollary of his concept of religious as synonymous with social consciousness, down to its wildest and most ridiculous extremes. Thus, for instance, because the defective and delinquent classes "lack the mentality or the organization of impulses necessary to enable them to share in the appreciation and effective pursuits of ideals," he sees in them "one of two or three classes of non-religious persons." And he adds very soberly: "Idiots, imbeciles, the insane, many paupers and persons suffering from hysteria and certain other diseases are of this type." Another category of non-religious is formed by the criminal classes, "whose chief psychologic characteristic is that they conceive other persons and society in such ways as to subordinate all other interests to some one or few desires which are low and narrow." The third, the only class of non-religious persons not defective or diseased, is formed of those "whose mental life is not organized in accordance with the scale of values which is recognized by the morally mature and efficient persons of the community. These are the irresponsible, inconsequential individuals who live in the present, largely controlled by their sensuous impulses, without comprehensive purposes or standards."

Lack of religion must mean absence of social consciousness, because according to his view the two are practically identical. Nowhere does he distinguish between them; nowhere does he attempt to find a differential essence by which religious consciousness may be distinguished. He leaves unexplained why

religious consciousness should give rise to beliefs paradoxical and unwarranted by, even contrary to the ordinary experience of man. He has not a word of explanation to offer concerning the numerous religious dogmas that have evolved antagonistic to man's interests,—dogmas and beliefs which threatened man's very survival chance in the past and which owe their relative, inocuity only to man's unwillingness, in spite of his supposed 'innate' religiosity, to carry out literally all 'religious' commands.

Starbuck's significant acknowledgment that "in a certain sense the religious life is an irradiation of the reproductive instinct" is waved aside by Ames with the remark that "it is the social character of the sexual nature which makes it so important in religion."

What has been said thus far may serve to illustrate the condition of religious psychology as a branch of research in the United States and the status of its problems at the present time. We have seen that, thus far, either some utilitarian attitude or some emotional concern for the destiny of religion itself, manifest or implied, placed immense stumbling blocks in the path of scientific research. On the other hand, the picture must not be considered too sordid. The outlook is far from discouraging. We must bear in mind that religion is the very last subject which man will learn to approach dispassionately. It is difficult to consider religious problems dispassionately when religion has been for so long and so persistently, the most prolific source of emotional dissension and partisanship and in a very large measure still continues to be so.

To the psychologists mentioned in this sketch belongs the undoubted merit of having pointed out at least the directions along which further research is necessary. They have cleared some ground, they have shown us, by their preconceptions and the error of their ways how to avoid similar errors, and handicaps. Others without the emotional concern for the destiny of religion of a Starbuck, a Coe or Ames, and disregarding totally, as beyond the interest of psychologists as such, the proselyting business of the church, may accomplish results of greater scientific value by the application of similar and other methods.

Already we are in a position to note some promising signs in this direction. In the first place, the Freudian school of

psychological analysis has turned a flood of light upon the most varied problems of individual and racial psychology. In due time the subject of religion will receive its share of attention since psychoanalytical methods are spreading rapidly unto every field of psychology.

Freud himself has contributed a brief paper to the first number of the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie* (1908, *Zwangshandlungen und Religionsübung*, pp. 4-12) by way of opening the path. In this contribution he draws a highly suggestive parallel between ordinary religious practices and the compulsory acts of neurotic individuals. Both forms of conduct are paradoxical, meaningless even to the subject, and yet, imperative; both rest, as Freud points out, on some suppressed erotic complexes. Moreover, the imperativeness of religious acts is of the same order as that which attaches to the uncontrollable acts in compulsion neuroses. Their emotional background is the same and subjectively they are described in terms very similar so that, Freud suggests, "compulsion neurosis may be conceived as a pathological obverse of the formation of religion, the neurosis may be described as an individual religion and religion as a universal compulsion neurosis."

Independently of the Freudian school, Theodore Schroeder has contributed some studies on religion the distinguishing feature of which, aside of their striking fundamental thesis, is that, like Freud's paper just quoted, they manifest an attitude of complete detachment from any emotional interest in the destiny of religion or church.

While studying Mormon religious documents Schroeder found that all the significant strands therein lead back to the physiology and psychopathology of sex. Important as this observation was, yet in so far as it merely implied some connection between eroticism and a particular religious system it was neither original, nor very conclusive. But by the investigation of numerous other documents Schroeder was surprised to find that a similar intimate relationship obtains between sexuality and the most varied forms of religion, ancient and modern.

Every individual religious experience if genuinely religious, appears to be associated with the sexual centers more intimately than with any other. That this has not been sufficiently emphasized heretofore, in spite of the great mass of documentary

evidence relating to phallic worship in the past will not be surprising when we consider the attitude of reserve, of concern for religion, even on the part of those who have attempted to deal with the problem scientifically. Then, too, the subject of sex is one which religious and non-religious persons alike show themselves unwilling to consider with the same indifference and thoroughness with which other subjects are treated. The surprise is, under the circumstances, that Mr. Schroeder should have been able to unearth such a vast amount of testimony clearing showing this relationship. Clergymen, physicians, psychiatrists, revivalists and lay writers have had opportunity to draw our attention to the intimate connection between religion and sex. They thought they were dealing with sporadic instances. Where the mass of evidence was too overwhelmingly in favor of the conclusion that such relationship is actually genetic attempts have been made to minimize its significance by some such dogmatic statement as that with which we have seen Ames endeavor to explain away this relationship.

But, as a scientific student of the problem, Schroeder did not find himself called upon to defend religion from any inference or conclusion that logically suggests itself. Nor did he think that the social character of sexuality is sufficient to explain the 'irradiation' of the numerous religious phenomena out of it. The matter instead of being solved by this observation only opens up new questions that need be settled. Why not carry the inquiry further! What particular features in sexuality correspond to the mystical, the transcendental in religion? How does religion, in the process of its 'irradiation' from sex, its admitted source, acquire its most characteristic features, and in what do the latter consist?

In other words, what is the nature of this process of 'irradiation' from sex, of which Starbuck speaks, which William James felt compelled to recognize, and which Ames thinks he has sufficiently explained away by pointing out the obvious truth that both, religion and sex make for social congress, relationship, union?

Next to freedom from bias, which on the subject of religion is still exceptional, Schroeder's work shows a thorough appreciation of the genetic aspect of religious problems. To know a religious manifestation of any kind we must understand its mode

of origin and exact source, both in the individual and in the race, and the functions it fulfills therein. To understand religion we must acquire a definite mental picture of the psychic processes responsible for its rise both socially and as an individual experience.

At the very outset Schroeder formulated a definition of religion. The definition is tentative; its details remain to be modified and improved by subsequent investigations. It differs from most other definitions in that it is not merely descriptive. His definition does not concern itself with the objective manifestations nor is it inspired by any desire to distinguish 'true' from 'false' religion. The purpose of the definition is to formulate some differential criterion by which the essentially religious, true and false alike, may be readily distinguished from the non-religious; that is, a criterion that shall differentiate between religion as such, no matter what its form may be, and mere dogmas, or even scientific convictions about a religious subject matter. Not everything is religion that is called thus; on the other hand a great deal of what is called 'false' religion has as much claim to such designation as the dogmatic body of doctrines evolved by church officialdom.

Mr. Schroeder's definition is an attempt to draw the line of distinction where it actually belongs. He finds that religion is a subjective experience, ecstatic in its nature, ascribed to the so-called 'transcendental' and interpreted as certifying to the inerrancy of some doctrine or ceremonial which through 'super-human' means serves personal ends the latter also supposed to be, wholly or in part, of a superphysical order.

By distinguishing thus, the strictly religious from the non-religious Schroeder delineates the proper field of psychologic research. Such phrases as 'the religion of science' or 'the religion of humanity' become void of logical content. One may as well claim the multiplication table as a possible foundation for and source of religion. The ultimate essence of religion is subjective,—it is a feeling experience entering consciousness by what is called the transcendental path,—variously interpreted as 'inspiration' or 'revelation' and testifying to the presence with the ego of some portion of the 'infinite' or 'divine' through which man supposedly becomes linked up to the whole universe.

Mr. Schroeder thinks that the energy at work in religious manifestations and believed by the subjects to be extraneous, mysterious, superphysical, is in reality nothing more than their corporeally determined erotic emotions and feeling complex. The 'love' or some other prevailing emotion generated by the 'love state' in accordance with the bodily conditions at puberty and other periods in life, becomes attached to some established set of ceremonials and doctrines and because of the strong, overwhelming, imperative and intimate character of the emotion back of them, the ceremonials and doctrines in question are assumed to be equally strong, overwhelming, imperative and therefore mysterious, superphysical, divine. The latter symbolize the fundamental feeling with which they have become linked up, a fact well recognized for instance, in such symbolic ceremonials as the christian Agapé and Eucharist. The more important religious doctrines and particularly the religious ceremonials answer vicariously to the psycho-physiological urge for bodily union. In spite of its fundamental nature or, perhaps, because of it, this psycho-physiological craving of sex is misunderstood, hence deemed mysterious, transcendental and from it religion derives its characteristic atmosphere of mystery and transcendentalism.

The processes by which Schroeder arrived at these significant conclusions are indicated in an essay in which he has formulated the requirements of the scientific method as applied to religious psychology.²

Mr. Schroeder has also endeavored to establish a working hypothesis on the basis of which the psychogenesis of religion may be uncovered.

We have seen that the two features of religion on which Mr. Schroeder lays particular stress are its subjectivity and its

² In this connection it should be mentioned that in this paper outlining the scientific methods of approach to the problem of religion, Schroeder has omitted to mention laboratory psychology. For some unaccountable reason, the experimental method, thus far, has been neglected entirely by nearly every student of the subject in spite of the fact that it holds out enticing prospects. See paper by George A. Dawson in AMER. JOUR. OF RELIG. PSYCHOL., 1913, vol. VI., pp. 50-58, entitled: *Suggestions towards an Inductive Study of Religious Consciousness*, for highly interesting suggestions along this line. Of course what is needed is a laboratory properly equipped for the study of religious phenomena.

erotogenesis. The two are intimately connected. Its subjectivity granted, there remains but little to be done to expose the erotogenetic character of religion. That in its essence religion is wholly subjective is a scientific conclusion on which all classes of writers are coming nowadays to agree. This is one reason why all attempts to establish some criterion of religion on the basis of its objective manifestations alone have proven futile. The working basis was faulty, and could lead to no lasting results. For the elements of unification underlying the diversity of religious manifestations we must look back to their experiential, inner, psychic aspect, in a word to their subjectivity. It is its essentially subjective character that makes religion a problem primarily of the mind and the concern, chiefly, of psychology.

But while the subjective character of religion is fairly well recognized its erotogenesis is not. Not that the connection between religion and sex is a novel observation. As has been already mentioned, the connection between some form of religion and sex has been long known and recognized. Phallic worship as an early form of religion has been studied extensively. Dulaure's classic work on this subject, for instance, antedates by more than a half century psychologic interest in religion and Knight's 'Worship of Priapus' was published over a century ago. But whereas this connection has been recognized in the case of isolated, unpopular, religions, or of certain early stages of religion, Schroeder was sufficiently detached from any personal interest in, or concern for present religions to be able to see this connection holding true in all religion. He found that the universality of religion is due to the universality of sexual emotions, of which it is admittedly, an 'irradiation'; its mysticism is due to the old mystery and sacredness which still attaches to sex; its sacredness, to the sacredness of procreation as the fountain or source of the only kind of immortality with which man was acquainted in his earlier stages.

Religious conversion is largely a phenomenon of adolescence for obvious reasons. The sexual urge blooms forth during adolescence in all its mysteriousness and imperativeness. The innateness and imperativeness of religious feelings and emotions, to which all so-called religious convictions are reducible, is derived from the subjective and immediate character, the com-

plete mastery over mind and body of the fundamental sex urge particularly as it breaks forth during certain periods of life. The sexual feelings are the levers which control religious emotion and so-called religious convictions are but a cryptic, mystical, dogmatized elaboration of them. "The religious person knows because he feels and is firmly convinced because strongly agitated."

That man in the long past has ascribed to the generative powers in him a spiritual entity and a designing intelligence of its own is well known. That the attributes of his early divinities are those, fancied or real, actual or desired of his sexual powers; that his sex life represented at once his most intense pleasures, the chief incentive (alongside the food urge), to his activities and struggles, the inspiration for his fancies of paradise and life everlasting, is also beyond question. In view of the well-known psychobiotic law of the persistence of fundamental types, would it be too much to suspect that in its differential essence, in that which represents its survival value, religion must have remained the same throughout? Are we not justified in holding that at its very core, religion to-day is exactly what it was in the very beginning,—sex mysticism?

The underlying sameness of all religion in spite of its phenomenal diversity may be sufficiently explained on this basis. In the erotogenetic theory for the first time we possess a working hypothesis sufficiently broad and fundamental to give a genetic account of all manifestations that may be justly classified as religious. Undoubtedly much of the controversy in religious psychology in the future will be concerned with the erotogenetic theory of religion.

CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEAS OF GODS

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Two definitions of gods or of God are given by such authorities as Webster's International Dictionary. 1, A being conceived as possessing supernatural powers, who is to be propitiated by sacrifice and worship; a divinity. 2, The Supreme Being; the Eternal and Infinite Spirit; the Creator and Sovereign of the universe. Now the group of definitions under 1, though evidently intended to define only gods of the lower religions, really overlap definition 2. They are not, however, definite or complete definitions. We remark, also, that to liberal minds, definition 2 would include the Supreme Being as conceived in all the higher religions, from Ahura-Mazda to Allah. Max Müller defines religion as a "Mental faculty by which independent of, nay in spite of sense and reason, we apprehend the Infinite under different names and in varying guises," which results in a "love of God." This virtually, though not explicitly defines God. Réville, in defining religion as the recognition by our minds of a "Mysterious Mind" in the universe essentially, though vaguely, defines God. Tiele's definition of religion as having to do with the "Infinite, as unconsciously, partially perceived by us," in effect furnishes a definition, though very general, of God. The definitions of Müller, Réville and Tiele all come properly under the second definition given above.

The present article will be limited to a psychological consideration of the origin of ideas of gods of the first class herein defined, and in the sense of gods of the lower religions. We shall not deal with the origin of ideas of a God of the second class. That is not, the writer believes, within the province of the psychology of religion or of the history of religion with their present limitations and present results. Probably in large measure it never will be. As Du Bois Raymond expressed it in another connection, we must in this matter, inscribe ignoramus on our banner, and, considered as a subject for positive science to investigate, quite possibly ignorabimus.

We shall also observe a limitation in the matter of the factors involved in the genesis of god-ideas. Psychological investigation can deal only with the ordinary faculties and powers of mind included in the scope of that science; such as sensation, perception, memory, imagination, conception, judgment and reason, with the ordinary feelings¹ and somewhat with the will. It cannot deal with such conceptions as the religious consciousness and similar religious concepts. Now that there is a Divine Power in the world nearly all of the countless millions of men in all ages have believed, felt as they have thought. Even the cold reasoning skeptical scientists have, in crises of their lives, perhaps, felt that such a power exists, or could have so felt, had they had such crises. The "plain man" would regard all this as strong evidence of the existence of such a Power. Again, nearly all men have felt that man has in his make-up, a divine spark, a religious consciousness, or some kind of a relationship with a Divine Being or Beings. It would perhaps even make the cold, skeptical, scientist angry if we should deny the presence of such a divine spark, or whatever it may be, in him. Now, if we must perforce believe in this divine spark in civilized man, we should also believe that primitive man possessed it. He was human, with mental and moral powers much like our own, though not so highly developed. Then, if the "plain man" is correct in the belief that all men, including primitive man, have had that divine spark, would not that divine spark be a factor in his conception of ideas of gods? Would it not impel him to seek for and to propitiate those powers? Though most men must feel that such is the case, positive psychology cannot deal with it. It is beyond the province of the science. We therefore waive the question of this element being a factor in the genesis of god-ideas, and seek to study only the mental faculties involved with which psychology can deal, as factors in such genesis.

With the two limitations noted, we shall, rather briefly, attempt to maintain the following propositions: 1, Ideas of gods of the first class defined above have arisen not from the contemplation of any one class of phenomena alone, as has been

¹ Psychology may, of course analyse somewhat religious feelings. As Prof. James shows, religious feelings such as fear and love, are similar to the ordinary feelings of fear and love, but directed to a Divine Being or beings.

held by some writers, *e. g.*, from the personification of natural objects and natural forces, as the Sun and the thunder; from the personification of abstractions; from totemism; from the deification of great men; from the deification of ancestors; from Great Makers; but in the different instances from all of these sources. 2, The principal factors in the genesis of these conceptions of gods which psychology reveals have been: imagination, primitive reason and primitive credulity. 3, There has been a progressive evolution of god-ideas. 4, There has not been a universal degeneration of these ideas. 5, There has been a centralization, unifying of god-ideas and of gods.

PERSONIFICATION OF NATURAL OBJECTS AND NATURAL FORCES

As to the fact that such gods have been widely believed in, there can be no question. The Babylonians, the Egyptians, the Aryan peoples, the Greeks and other peoples worshipped the Sun, the Moon, etc. They sought to propitiate the thunder and other objects and forces. The only question is as to whether these personified natural phenomena were the sources of the ideas. The present writer fully believes that the psychology of the primitive mind supports the view that they were the sources. Now we can easily conceive that when primitive man looked out with awe upon the forked lightning and the deafening thunder, he with his childlike imagination, and employing a modicum of reason, would pronounce it a god. Primitive credulity would also be a contributing factor in his mental process.² He would observe the beneficent heat and light of the Sun, and in a similar manner conceive it as a supernatural being, a god.

In thus conceiving the Sun or the thunder as a god, the mind of primitive man operated in a like manner to the mind of a scientist, of a Newton. When Newton saw an apple fall from the tree, his creative, scientific imagination suggested to him the hypothesis that the fall of the apple from the tree was due to a universal attraction of gravitation. The mind of primitive man by his creative imagination formed his hypothesis that the conception of a god was a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon of thunder. The chief difference between the hypo-

² In the conception of god-ideas from this source and some of the following, doubtless feelings such as fear, etc., were impelling factors also to such conceptions.

theses of primitive man and of the scientist is, that while the latter goes on to verify his hypothesis suggested by the creative imagination, primitive man, lacking the critical spirit of the scientist, did not in his primitive credulity, go on so to verify his hypothesis.

PERSONIFICATION OF ABSTRACTIONS

The fact of the worship of such supposed deities as Fortune, Abundance, etc., is admitted. The Greeks, the Romans and many other peoples celebrated rites to them. Here again, the factors in the genesis of such god-ideas were imagination, perhaps a grain of reason, reinforced by primitive credulity. Primitive man observed such phenomena as abundance, fortune, etc., and in his childlike simplicity of mind pronounced them gods or goddesses to be propitiated. Here also, the creative imagination, like in the mental process of the scientific investigator, of a Newton, was employed. But the Newtonian testing of the hypothesis was not made.

TOTEMISM, OR THE WORSHIP OF ANIMALS AND PLANTS

Anthropology amply establishes the fact of the worship of animal and vegetable gods. A notable example is furnished by the religion of the Druids. The Druids venerated the spirit of the oak. Among the ancient Egyptians, the ancient Germans and among many other peoples totemism has prevailed. We may here again, as it seems to the writer, see that in imagination, including perhaps a trace of reason, with all the credulity of primitive man, we may account pretty fully for the origin of the idea. In the hunting stage, man would and did, as we may readily believe, elevate an animal to the rank of a deity. Quite possibly, the usefulness to his tribe of the particular animal deified, or some one of its striking characteristics was concerned in the mental process involved. In such instances again, as in the personification of natural objects and forces, and in the personification of abstractions we see creative imagination at work; but here also we note the lack of verification of the explanation.

DEIFIED MEN

No one will question the fact of belief in such a class of deities, demi-gods, or near-gods. Mythology and the history of religions furnish many examples of them. Among the Romans,

in the deification of the Cæsars, we see gods in the making. In many such cases the psychological process was probably something like the following: A great chief, or hero, who by his deeds had won especial renown died. The fame of his deeds in the course of time became progressively exaggerated, until finally, to the primitive credulity of the masses, the hero became a god. The important factors herein involved were imagination and credulity. Veneration for great men and for great deeds was also a factor in the process.

ANCESTOR-GODS

Ancestor worship was in many instances only reverence and worship of inferior spirits, those of dead ancestors. Yet among different peoples, ancestor spirits have been held to be gods; in some cases as Great, or Creator-Gods. The Mingoes, the Dog-Ribs, the Mandans of North America, the Zulus in South Africa and other tribes have each worshipped an ancestor as a god. Among the ancient Egyptians, the Chinese and the Japanese, though ancestor worship has prevailed, their gods have been so complicated with the different natural, totemistic and ancestor elements that the question as to whether ancestors have really been worshipped as gods is rather hazy. In the worship of ancestor-gods again, primitive imagination and primitive credulity appear to have been the principal factors in the genesis of the idea. Filial respect and love have also in these instances probably been factors in the process of conception.

GREAT MAKER-GODS

Belief in this class of gods has been of wide prevalence. We find it even among the native tribes of Australia, Melanesia, among the Negritos of Africa, as well as among many, or most, more advanced peoples. Here primitive reason was probably the principal factor in the genesis of the idea. Primitive man has seen that the tools he uses had makers, that his house had a maker, etc. On a more general observation of the phenomena of the world around him, he would naturally infer that there must be a maker of the world. Imagination also, by representing the Great Maker to him in a particular form, was, we may see, a factor. In the latter phase of the mental process, primitive credulity would also necessarily have a share.

Man in the primitive state is intellectually only a child of larger growth. He does not possess either the knowledge or the scientific discipline which would enable him critically to examine and to explain the phenomena of the world. So, like the child, his imagination and untutored reason, by perfectly normal processes, explain satisfactorily the phenomena he observes to his childlike credulity.

Child psychology furnishes analogical evidence along this line. We are informed that Helen Keller, when about ten years old, inquired "Who made the land and the seas?" Students of child psychology tell us that children from five to ten years of age begin to inquire for a maker of the world, *i. e.*, to reason about the matter. We also know how wide is the scope which the child imagination takes; we know how unbounded is child credulity. The mind of primitive man operated in quite a similar manner.

EVOLUTION OF CONCEPTIONS OF GODS

We may safely say that there has been some degree of progressive development of god-ideas. With the increasing intelligence and with elevation of the moral ideas of a people, their conceptions of their gods would necessarily be developed, elevated. No one now doubts that there has been a process of evolution in the animal and in the vegetable worlds; in the sociological and other fields. Though not yet so much investigated or so well established, it would be unreasonable for the scientific mind to deny that there has been some corresponding evolution of religious conceptions, including ideas of gods. On such a view as the latter, the law of continuity would be broken. This is unthinkable. Ideas of deities in a people, as in an individual depend, in great measure, upon their degree of culture.

The religions of the world have been composed of two principal elements. 1, Of a philosophy of the phenomena of the world. 2, Of a system of ethical regulations and taboos. Now we know that with increasing knowledge of the physical laws of the world and with the increasing of the critical spirit in man, the former would necessarily develop, evolve. We know that such has been the case. We also know that there has been an evolution of the latter, or ethical element. As an unquestionable example of moral evolution; savage peoples believe

in revenge and torture of captives, and practice torture of their victims; civilized peoples do not. This is clearly a matter of evolution. Here is evolution of the ideas of morals and of religion. It naturally involves evolution of ideas of gods, which are the central factors of religion. Many more conclusive examples of such evolution could be given.

DEGENERATION OF GOD-IDEAS

This view of Andrew Lang, not to touch upon that deducible from the tenet of an original revelation, is inconsistent with that of an intellectual and moral evolution in the race, and so cannot be regarded as a correct one. It is, moreover, repugnant to reason and to common sense, to the scientific attitude, to the latest results of researches in anthropology. We cannot admit that man, when probably just emerged from animaldom, could possess or conceive higher ideas of gods, or of any other objects, than can peoples with culture and some degree of science. Nor is it necessary to suppose that there was an original, universal idea of a Great-Maker among all the people of the world, as such a view would imply. This class of gods, for which Lang contends, as such, have had their rise among different peoples simply by similar mental processes. Each people and each man have had similar mental powers of reason and imagination, have perceived similar phenomena in the world, and so have naturally inferred similarly from it; similar mental reactions have resulted in their minds. That is the reasonable explanation of the matter. Such would nearly as certainly result as that similar chemical reactions should result from the employment of like reagents in a like manner. However, there has probably been a measure of degeneration of ideas of deities as they have been understood by the masses of men, from the original conceptions of those deities by religious geniuses and prophets. This is more or less true of all religions.

We may also understand in another way how there could be, and doubtless has been, in some instances, a degeneration of god-ideas. If a nation of a low order of culture, and so with a low religion, conquered a nation of a higher order of culture, and so with higher religious conceptions, we can see that the former could impose their religion on the latter; and so, in the course of time, cause a degeneration of the religion of the latter,

and thereby of their ideas of gods. But a theory of universal degeneration, for the foregoing reasons, would seem inadmissible.

CENTRALIZATION OF GOD-IDEAS AND OF GODS

In the Babylonian religion, when Hammurabi placed Marduk at the head of their pantheon, we see an example of such centralization. Ammon Ra, made the supreme god of the Egyptians by Amenophis IV, the expansionist of that country, is another instance. Many other examples could be cited. We could expect, we could expect nothing else, but that with national or kingly expansion of dominion, partly as a matter of statecraft, such centralization of religion, and of religious objects, at least in some instances, should take place. No fact or result in history would seem more natural. The annals of different countries and of different peoples abundantly furnish such facts.

To sum up this paper, all too brief in dealing with a subject not very susceptible of exact scientific treatment, or scientific statement, we conclude: 1, That ideas of gods of the class herein considered were of several origins, namely; from (a) personified natural objects and forces, (b) from personification of abstractions, (c) of totemistic origin, (d) from heroes deified, (e) from deification of ancestors, (f) as Great-Makers. 2, The principal factors in the genesis of these ideas, so far as an empirical psychology can analyse them were, imagination, primitive reason and primitive credulity. 3, That the mind of primitive man is much like that of the child; that the child conceives such phenomena by the foregoing mental processes, and so did primitive man. 4, There has been a progressive evolution of god-ideas. 5, There has not been, therefore, a universal degeneration of such ideas. 6, There can be noted a centralization, fusion of gods and of god-ideas.

THE DISPOSITION OF THE DEAD IN OLD JAPAN

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In the care of the dead a people express the highest sentiments of their religious life. The sacrifice of the dead for the food supply indicates that the primitive man's first and most important want is bread. The quick disposition of the body among primitive Japanese shows forth their fear of contamination. The Buddhist in his cremation sets forth his belief in the loss of self in the Buddha. The Christian by his careful preparation of the body shows forth a faith in the physical resurrection. Believing that a study of every like subject throws light on the present customs of a people, and hoping that the investigations brought to light may help many to understand and respect the Japanese, the writer has put down in order the observations he has made from a daily mingling with the people, and from a limited research in their *Encyclopedia* and other books of reference.

The word for burial in Japanese is "hoomuru" and literally translated means "throw away." Because of the fear of contamination from contact with dead bodies, the early Japanese sought every means to dispose of the bodies of the dead as soon as possible. In the far away early days of old Japan the custom was to bury the very same day, and secretly. In most cases it was done the first evening following death, just after dark. A relic of the burial at night is seen in the lamps and lanterns used in the funerals of the present time. Among the higher classes after a time the bodies were held over for a few days and gradually then it settled into the custom of keeping the body until the third day. The upper classes then began to postpone burial for a certain longer time, the higher the official the longer his body was laid in state. In each case the aristocracy or the effort to develop respect for the aristocracy broke the old custom and started the new. In the case of the upper classes the corpse was temporarily buried in the yard and covered with earth or trees for a short time, this after grew into three years when the real burial was performed. All the time the body was thus temporarily buried it was in state.

The temporary burial may have been, at least now is, interpreted to mean the time for the preparation of the grave or mausoleum. But its original purpose was to honor the dead. The time of mourning for the death of an Emperor, according to history varies. The law now has it one year. This was strictly adhered to in the mourning of the late Emperor.

The "throwing away," as it was called in old Japan, was of five kinds, the oldest being *suiso* (*sui* meaning water and *so* meaning burial)—sea burial. Mention of this is found in the old books of Japan. In *Keiganji Engi*, the History of the Keigan Temple, we read of a priest by the name of *Shin-ami* who lived in this temple. He died July 2nd, 1440, A. D. and was buried in the lake near *Shimotoba*. His dying words were "Please give my body to the fish for food." This took place far from the sea at Kyoto. In the seaside communities we find the sea-burial long before and long after this time. At the sea-burial the words of the bearers were "Become a *tai* and lead other fish to us." *Tai* is the most eatable fish in Japan. The fishermen were buried in the sea to become food for the fish so that the catch of fish might be greater for the living. The Japanese *Encyclopedia* says that this was continued until the Tokugawa period, that is within the last three hundred years. The inmost idea was that the dead eventually became food for the gods of the temple to which were given always the best of the catch, that is, by the way of the gods the supply was increased.

The next oldest form of burial was *rinsō* or forest-burial. This form of burial was kept up during the Ashikaga period, that is, until about 800 years ago. While not as old as the sea-burial, it did not last as long. During the period when the *rinsō* arose, the wild animals played havoc with the people and kept the natives in mortal terror all the time. The dead bodies were given to the gods of the forest to stop the wild animals, or to appease the gods who had sent the wild animals to avenge the people's neglect of the gods. The main point in this burial to me is not the disposition of the dead so much as to make life more worth while, more peaceful. This casting of the dead bodies into the forest for the wild animals developed into casting the dead anywhere, thus getting rid of the bodies in a very rude and undignified way. During the Ashikaga

period this was prohibited by law. This law makes it plain that the bodies were thrown into the fields, the woods, the plains and other open places for the dogs and wolves to eat. One of Japan's great men arose at this crisis and went about burying the dead. The law shows also that people *about to die* were thrown away for fear of contamination after death. The casting of the old women from high places, as is known to most travelers in Japan, *Obasute Yama*, the mountain for throwing away old women is a good illustration. The history of the Hospitals in Japan shows that the first hospital was founded by the Emperor Nimmei, about 863 A. D. at Dazaifu, Kyushu, and was called "*Zokumei in*," *Zoku* meaning holding together, *mei* meaning life and *in*=institution. The purpose is to save and protest against the manner of throwing away those about to die. The record says the Emperor rescued many lives who otherwise would have been prematurely thrown away. In 893 A. D. Uda Tenno established one at Yamato (Nara) called *Seiyaku in*=giving medicine Institution. Daigo Tenno established one in 1003 A. D. called *Hidenin*=suffering field Institution. The record says that all these were protests against the casting of those about to die into the fields.

The origin of this casting of the dead and those about to die was not merely the idea of getting rid of the bodies but to keep within the bounds of religion and the customs of the community. It all had its religious significance at the time and must not be judged by the standard of the present day.

The next form of burial according to age is the *doso*. This is really the oldest and at the same time the longest continued form. The origin of this in Japan can not be easily traced as it is thought to come from China. *Doso*, or earth-burial, and the ceremonies connected with it point to the effort to appease the earth god. In China there is an earth god for the cultivation of the rice fields. In Japan the rice god is not an earth god, so that the form was introduced without the original meaning. This earth god or burial in the earth for the increase of the food supply is found in other countries also. The difference between this and the forest or open fields is the fact that this took place near the people's home and in the cultivated fields. Our present day form of burial is no doubt the outgrowth of this effort to appease the earth god to increase the supply of

food, at least the form is the same even if the content is different.

Kaso or cremation is the most used method of the disposition of the dead in Japan, at the present day. It is purely Buddhist. An interesting point is the fact that it took one hundred and fifty years to get the first Japanese priest to be willing to be cremated. The Buddhists came to Japan in 552 and the first cremation took place according to the *History of Cremation in Japan*, March, 702 A. D., at Kurihara. The following year the Emperor, who was a very zealous and earnest Buddhist, was cremated at Asukaoka. Following this noble example many Emperors and many of the common people were cremated. Cremation came to be an affirmation of the faith in the Buddhist doctrine of the annihilation of the self for the purpose of becoming absorbed into the godhead. It was thought to be a complete victory over the flesh.

During the reign of the Emperor Gokyo myo, the Imperial family set the precedent of burying in the earth and disapproved of cremation. It was a sort of victory of Shintoism over Buddhism. This was in 1655 A. D. The Shintoists and even some very earnest Buddhist consented to cremation because it permitted an old Japanese custom to be easily carried out, that is the dividing of the bones of the dead out among the relatives and friends. The Japanese *Encyclopedia* merely mentions this matter as one reason why the Japanese consented to cremation. The earnest Shintoist kept themselves free from the Buddhist custom of cremation and continued to bury the body in the horizontal position as they had done from time immemorial and just as is done in the West to the present day. The Buddhists aimed to put the body in the birth position or meditation position, following out the ideas of rebirth; the praying position of man was thought to be the position of the gods or of sainted men.

On the introduction of Christianity in 1868, the Shintoist's opposition to cremation was strengthened, and in 1873, the Japanese Government prohibited cremation altogether. But in 1875, two years later, the Buddhists again prevailed and cremation was permitted by law. The greater economy of cremation appealed to the people and of course, it was done as it is to-day to a great extent from that standpoint. The crea-

tion services cost is small in comparison. A coffin is not needed, a basket being used in most cases. The size of the grave for the urn when it is attended to is practically nothing in comparison with the cost of the long grave for the horizontal body. Cremation is the cheapest form of burial, hence the popularity.

To-day in Japan there are over 35,800 crematories. Ever since 1897 the Japanese Government has cremated all who die of contagious diseases.

The fifth form of burial is known as *ikiume*, living burial or burial of the living. This can be seen in all the other forms of burial above mentioned with this distinction, that it has a social and religious significance. Besides the burial of the family of the chief or his followers there has been the following other kinds of *ikiume*. In the book called *Zoku Bummei Ki*, it is stated that near Nigata the fisherman of a certain village would select an eldest son and offer him to the gods of the sea, at the time of a storm. It was thought that the sea god was angry, hence the storm. The sacrifice of an eldest son alone would appease him and encourage him to grant a good supply of fish in the catch. Sometimes, the record says, a virgin was selected and cast into the sea for the same purpose.

There is a story that in prehistoric times the Japanese went to the Northeast to overthrow the enemies of the land. The sea was rough and so the wife of the leader asked to be cast into the sea to appease the gods and insure a smooth sea and a safe and prosperous journey of the warriors. This example has been followed by many women in seaside communities during the history of Japan from that day to this. The story is also told to women about to be married to encourage faithfulness and willingness to sacrifice herself for her husband. This *suiikiume* shows the willingness of the maritime community to sacrifice and to accept the sacrifice of the eldest son, the virgin, the wife, or the faithful servant for the good of the community.

In the *rinsō* or forest-burial, the same is true. The god of the forest was thought to be angry and would thus send the lions, wolves and other wild animals to destroy the people. To appease him, the virgins of the village were from time to time selected to be offered to the gods of the forest. The young woman was placed in a box, used by the Japanese ordinarily

for clothes, about 6 feet long and 2 by 2 on the ends. Carried in this box after dark she would be left before the shrine in the midst of the forest. The men of the village would go the next morning to see if she were alive. In all cases she had disappeared. Out of this custom have grown the saviors of the villages. Strong, fearless men would volunteer to take the place of the innocent girls and would go dressed for war so as to kill the demons, animals, etc., and if the gods appeared, to find out what would appease them in place of the virgins. Thus these men would free the village from the fear of the gods, demons and wild animals, and the community would have peace and prosperity.

In the earth-burial also is found this sacrificial element. A priest or a virgin would be buried in the walls of the shrine or in the yard in front of the shrine. The offering of a living sacrifice was thought necessary to gain the favor of the gods who would otherwise destroy buildings.

In the building or rebuilding of bridges which because of the swift stream or heavy rains had been thrown down, live men were buried under the pier to give their strength to the bridge or to appease the god of the bridges and waters. This was true in the building of the Temma Bashi in Osaka. The *Encyclopedia* says that this was kept up until the opening of the country to foreign trade in 1868.

In a book called *Higuchi Buyuden*, "Brave wars of Higuchi," about 430 years ago, it is said that the Asahi river in Okayama Prefecture would frequently overthrow and cause much damage to the towns and bridges. The men of the village went to the shrine and drew straws to see who would be selected by the gods to sacrifice himself for the good of the village and the strength of the bridge. The man selected was put in a box with some food and then buried under the pier on the village side of the stream. The man on dying for the good of the village becomes the god of the village and people worship him as long as the bridge lasts.

About eighty years ago in the building of another Osaka bridge, an old woman, the wife of the head man in the village, offered to give her life and strength for the new bridge. The desire to serve the community and give it peace and prosperity so aroused her that she overcame the objections of the family

and the community and was buried with food under the pier of the bridge. From her box the record says that a tube of bamboo was placed so as to allow the free passage of air. Whether this was true in the other cases or not I can not verify. At first after her burial nothing but the sound of her prayers could be heard, but on the third day the cries were heart-rending. The people of the time interpreting these sounds to be the entering of her spirit into the bridge, the worse the sounds the stronger the bridge would be. There are not only these two instances but many such throughout Japan. The willingness to die for the good of the community was thought to be the real god spirit and was looked upon with reverence.¹

On the banks of the Edo River in Osaka there is a monument to a village head who died for the peace of the community and the safety of the dike along the river bank. The rivers had swollen and broken the dike and damaged the town so many times that the people were put to the last extremity, namely the human sacrifice. The head man called the elders of the town together and told them his desire. No one volunteered to die so that lots were to be cast to get the divine selection. The chief, in place of lots, asked that the men, himself included, should all throw their coats into the river and the owner of last one to sink should be the one to be buried for the good of the dike. This was agreed to by all and each proceeded to throw his coat into the river. One sunk after another and only one was left. Each looked in fear and trembling to see whose it was. It was soon discovered to be the chief of the village. In the good old samurai way he prepared himself for death and was buried under the dike. The monument is still standing and can be seen by passersby.

¹ From this study of the burial customs in Japan one is constrained to agree with those writers who contend that the two impulses of life are the food and sex desires. The offering of the dead for the peace and prosperity of the community, the willingness of the people to die a living death for the good of the village, the willingness to be fish to lead other fish to the fisherman, the offering of the eldest son to the waves and fishes so that the sea would give of her bounties to man,—all show the importance of the food supply of the community.

The offering of the virgins and the eldest sons to the gods reveals a willingness to give one's best, one's purest, one's greatest joy to the gods of the land and seas. Nothing could more clearly indicate the importance of the sexual life and the desire for offspring to the primitive man.

DURKHEIM'S VIEW OF RELIGION

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The contributions of the leader and founder of *L'Année Sociologique* school, certainly the most important sociological contributions yet made by any 'school,' may be said to have their climax in the author's last book, *Les Formes Élementaires de la Vie Religieuse. Le Système Totémique en Australie.* (Paris, 1912.) The book may be said to aim at two things as of predominant importance: First, a definition of and insight into religion in general, irrespective of culture and clime; second, an analysis of religion as found in aboriginal Australia. Our concern will be primarily with method and interpretation, inasmuch as these seem the fundamental aspects of the author's treatment, and in this sense basic.

The author begins his treatment with a brief reference to the revolt usually shown by religious people as soon as an attempt is made to study their religion as a social phenomenon. So far as the author dwells on this point it is merely to bring this truth home. The attitude itself is presented merely as a social phenomenon, as an existing attitude. To us the fact raises the problem: Why this attitude of revolt when accompanying it there may be recognition of the truth of the undesired description?

If after stating with great care and concern the points one by one in an argument of great moment to myself, my opponent meets it by remarking that I have used two hundred and fifty words, sixty sentences, three questions and two exclamations, I am more or less mildly disgusted, not because he has failed to state the truth about my argument, but because he has disregarded its purpose and purport expressing a truth about what is for me a non-essential, a merely accidental attribute not inherently a part of my meaning. When the religious man makes the revolt at sociological interpretations it is not because of any absence of truth in the interpretation—at least it may be present where there is no question of the truth the correctness of the characterization merely deepening the irritation—it is because he feels a disregard of the purpose subserved by

the religious life and of the meaning which its form and perpetuation have for its devotees. He is only human in asking that the meaning of his purposes and the estimate of his life-values as incorporated in his own ideals and activity be not disregarded. The sociologist himself might, if you take him unawares and forego the familiar discourse of sociology, resent a characterization of him as merely a product of social influences, a social precipitate rather than a personal dynamic.

The author's real task begins with the interpretation of religion. Briefly his argument is as follows:

Advanced religions are so diverse in content that it is very difficult by studying them to arrive at the essential nature of religion. Its essence is much more easily determined in a simple elementary religion like that of Australia; primitive society as compared to advanced society is uniform, simple, undifferentiated. Thus, an understanding of the religion of the simplest society gives a key to the most advanced religions.

Religion is, first of all, a social phenomenon. We are just beginning to appreciate the extent to which individual psychology, so-called, is but an exhibition in the small of a more inclusive and determining social psychology. The individual is but a social microcosm. Society or the social is a reality *sui generis*, the individual deriving his reality from the social order to which he belongs. It would be folly to attempt to derive the social from the individual since this would be deriving the whole from a part, the complex from the simple. Social concepts are the outcome of an extensive and prolonged co-operation, massive both spatially and temporally. They make up the whole world of reality of which the individual is but a poor and partial reflection.

Coming now to the question of the specific nature of religion, we must rule out supernaturalism as a proper definition of the object of religion, since the supernatural itself becomes part of the natural order as society deals with this concept. Neither can we define it as having to do with the divine, since we have, as for example, in Buddhism, religions without a god. There are many religious rites the function of which is not that of uniting the worshipper with the god. Animism, again, is insufficient since religion can exist without the concept of god or

of spirit and must not be defined as characterized solely by its spiritual nature.

So much for negative criticism by way of clearing away traditional misconceptions. We come now to the positive contribution, the finding of religion in essence as it is, religion pure and undefiled.

The world is divided into two parts having nothing in common, the sacred and the profane. This division is absolute, not relative, as are distinctions between good and bad, for example, the classification in the latter case being after all but a matter of degree. Religion is concerned with what pertains to the sacred, and is expressed in the form of rites and rituals. The sacred as indeed any important phase of the sacred is the center of an organisation about which are grouped the beliefs and rites of some particular cult. Nor can that be called religion, however unified it be, that does not recognize a plurality in the sacred. Even the most idealistic and monotheistic religions exhibit this trait—in Romanism the saints, regalia, churches, etc. Religion, then, may be defined as "a solid system of beliefs and practices having to do with the sacred, that is to say, the separated, the prohibited, the beliefs and practices which are bound up in a moral community called the Church, and all that appertains thereto."

Durkheim recognizes that magic has, like religion, its rites, traditions and dogmas, the distinction between magic and religion being in practice often difficult to make. Magic may, however, be distinguished in this way: it is opposed to religion often making the sacred profane, frequently reversing the religious forms in its own rites. Similarly, religion is opposed to magic. The essential difference between them lies in the fact that magic may be but is not necessarily social in expression, that is does not call for the co-operation of individuals, such co-operation being essential to religion; that it has no church and is not national. Magic differs from religion in being essentially a phenomenon of isolation performed by an individual as such without church or co-operating assistants.

If animism is ruled out on the ground of being merely systematised hallucination, and naturalism on the ground that religion, if it were but the expression of natural forces could not persist since it is an erroneous expression of them, and it cannot explain the distinction between the sacred and the profane,

totemism is whole-heartedly accepted. Rather is it thrust forward as *the elementary religion*. For the elucidation of elementary religion, then, Australian totemism must be reckoned valuable above all others, its primitiveness being an attribute derived from the primitiveness of Australian culture. After discussing the sacredness of the totemic name, emblems, the sacred character of the totem animal and the taboos associated with it, the mystic relationship involved between the totem and the totemite, the author concludes the account of totemic beliefs with an exposé of the totemic orientation of native life as shown, for example, in the clans, phratries and classes of various tribes, sometimes including marriage relations. Everything belonging to the totem group partakes of the nature of the totem and of its sanctity. This includes the whole of nature even the stars, sun and moon. The individual totem is rather summarily disposed of by saying that it has the same relation to the clan totem as the surname has to the cognomen, although there is a prolonged attempt to prove that in origin it must be younger than clan totemism, having arisen only after the latter came as prototype. The basic principle in totemism, namely, the concept of a mysterious pervading force and power is found in practically every culture: in Australia, *Arunkulta*; in Melanesia, *Mana*; among the Sioux, *Wakan*; with the Iroquois, *Orenda*, etc. This concept of impersonal pervading power or force is older than the different mythological personalities and basic in the concepts entertained of them by the group. More than this: the concept of a religious power is the prototype, the forerunner and generator of the concept of power in general.

Such, in brief, is the argument adduced by Durkheim. It makes certain claims and involves some presuppositions which cannot be lightly passed by with a mere challenge.

The reasons which the author gives for selecting primitive society as the fruitful soil of uncontaminated religion are not so convincing as may seem at first glance. For, whereas the material and social aspects of the life may be primitive, the religious life may be far advanced; or *vice versa*. His conception of society is, so his presuppositions show, of the order of that of Frazer as exhibited in his *Golden Bough* and of Lang as shown in his *Magic and Religion*, viz., that primitive society is constructed after the manner of a large machine so that a part of it cannot move without everything in the interconnected

system moving ahead at the same time and in the same proportionate if not absolute advance. None of them conceive of it as, like a living organism, capable of advancing in one respect without a corresponding development in other respects—much less the development of some parts at the expense of others. While Durkheim does not state any such principle nor does Lang or Frazer, it is inherent in their treatment to this extent: their arguments are meaningless unless some such principle be supposed. Its expression is not found, but the result of its directive influence is apparent. For the present we do not wish to argue the opposite of their unexpressed thesis but merely to show the gloved hand and to insist that this principle remains to be proved not assumed.

With regard to the undifferentiated, monotonous aspect of native life as described by Durkheim we are even more insistent that he has profoundly misunderstood it. The culture turns out to be highly differentiated from their point of view if not from our own, and if not from our own, this is merely because we are interested in different features of the life and content to group in a few categories what is often for the native entirely different standpoints and values. Even granting the uniformity of the culture, it does not follow that the individual psychologies of the component members are of such uniformity. To dream that this is so is merely to shut our eyes to the importance of interest as a determining factor in regard to values and activities. A fly may seriously disturb our enjoyment of a landscape if it cross the focus of vision; just so a trivial matter is heightened in proportion to the extent to which it comes within the focus of our more persistent and profound purposes. Illustrations of this applicable to any culture must be sufficiently obvious to waive amplification.

Exception might be taken to the whole view of evolutionary development in religion as represented by the author seeing that we have no guiding principle in inferring origins. Why not a dozen different lines of development rather than one uniform line of progress? Moreover, what is the real justification for preferring one type of development to another unless the principle of evolution itself? which principle is the thing to be proved not to be taken as proved in classifying the facts.

Possibly more important than any of the foregoing, however, is the spirit of the attempt, the motive principle of the method

of interpretation rather than its formal aspect. This method is throughout striving to be purely analytical and inductive. It is the best example we have of a theoretical treatment of native life of that kind. Such of its successes and failures as are peculiar to this attempt alone are of minor importance; such as are inherent in the method used irrespective of its application to this or that problem by one writer or another are of predominant importance. If, then, the possibility of success in such an attempt as Durkheim makes to be purely analytic and inductive in his treatment turns out to be false and empty we may learn not to look here for future success but to launch enterprise in other channels. In ethnological achievement it is not so important to know where you are as in what direction you are moving (not that the two are really separable). Durkheim's attempt leads one to suppose that he looks upon deductive attempts askance, in the spirit of the man who compared 'mere principles' to sign-posts that stand at the cross-roads and always point the same direction without ever getting anywhere themselves. The sitter in the seat of the scornful who made this comparison might well have reflected that it would be as silly for sign-posts to act like travelers as for travelers to act like sign-posts. If the latter went wandering off in the direction whither they point—they wouldn't be sign-posts, and fewer men would be the wiser. If sign-posts are of use only because directive and not themselves productive they are therein justified of their existence. If the analytic inductive principle is just and true and sufficient it ought to remain conspicuous; if it is none of these but in the end only as misleading as seductive it ought to be replaced by a more fitting one. We suspect that in the end it merely brings one back to the starting point, though the circuit need not be a profitless journey.

It is difficult to comprehend how any so-called purely analytic and inductive method can be really such or such in any sense productive of results so far as we deal with cultural phenomena. In the first place material must be selected for such analytic and inductive study; such material must, moreover, be selected in the light of certain criteria or of a criterion. It is foolish to suppose that we are not applying any test not creating by definition at the start the meaning which we later extract inductively. Either we take as x what everybody or somebody has called x , in which case we adopt their connotation if they have

one, or we discriminate in our material. Goldenweiser's analytic study of totemism exemplifies this in full detail. At the very beginning of that work he quotes Frazer's definition of totemism as first published, adding, that in the light of discoveries in further ethnological investigation during the half century after that definition was formulated it could be regarded as little less than prophetic. Nothing less, indeed. There is nothing mystic in the way Frazer anticipated the findings of later field workers. But isn't that looking at the thing from the wrong end? What happened was this: Frazer gave the name totemism to certain kinds of phenomena; when subsequent field-workers found similar phenomena they adopted the term in common ethnological parlance and called such phenomena totemism. Frazer's applying the term totemism to certain kind of phenomena and thereby anticipating the findings of later field workers is neither more nor less prophetic than my parents hitting upon the name by which all my fellows would call me. If the latter seems prophetic it is only because we approach it from the wrong point of view. We suddenly stand an historical development on its head and wonder how such a substantial base could ever have been built and balanced on such a slender apex!

"History," wrote Francis Bacon, "is of actions in nature as they are;" and again: "For it is the true office of history to represent the events themselves together with the counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment." (The Advancement of Learning.) But such history never has been and never can be written simply because it must have a psychological background in order to exist at all and this background or recording agency will always be selective, and selective from certain points of view whether or not the historian be conscious of the view-points he is applying. History as it is means always history as it is observed and, in a sense, made. It is the unconscious standard that plays us the most subtle tricks and sometimes the most treacherous just because we are unaware of its operation and so without a corrective. Of the most unbiased historian it may be said as of other mortals that

Deep in the breast of the Average Man
The passions of ages are swirled,
And the loves and the hates of the Average Man
Are old as the heart of the world.

When, therefore, Durkheim offers us purely analytic, inductive investigation of religion I find myself sceptical and inclined to challenge him with a pertinent question: Why do you bring forward for investigation these phenomena rather than some others for your analysis, and how do you know that these rather than some others are really religious phenomena? In answering this the author might hedge, but in the end he would have to say that the only way he could know the facts on which this induction is based really pertain to religion is by having his definition of religion ready at hand when they are selected. They must be selected in the light of an already formed conception, otherwise dim religions fade off into dark deeds and cannot be distinguished in the twilight where concepts of religion and of dark deeds are not yet realised. It is, after all, not by induction that Durkheim finds totemism to be religion, but by first creating a definition of religion which turns out to apply to totemism. This is not a criticism of the outcome but merely an attempt to point out that he really gets out of his inductive analytic data only so much meaning as he has put into them in making the selection. It is the only thing an earthly mortal can do when dealing with sociological phenomena: we create the concept, select our material on this basis and see what it yields. Human nature is human, however, and prone to draw out at the last with great gusto conclusions which are there only because they have been quietly and somewhat surreptitiously inserted in the beginning as part and parcel of the 'raw facts' themselves. From Durkheim's point of view he has a perfect right to call totemism religion if he can show that it possesses those attributes which he assigns religion. Giving to religion the meaning which he gives he may be said to have made a good case as regards some religious aspects of Central Australian totemism. Further, deponent saith not. The author might have profited from Lang's reiterated assertions that primitive peoples are after all the product of a long evolution with a history back of them as ancient as our own (see for example Lang's *Myth, Ritual and Religion*) and from Van Gennep's insistence that primitive Australian society is not uniform, monotonous and undifferentiated. (See his answer to Durkheim's earlier studies of Australian social life in the Introduction to *Mythes et Legends d'Australie*.) He might certainly have profited much more from Goldenweiser's study of *Totemism*, where the various content of totemism as we go from

area to area—the difference underlying the similarity—is well brought out.

NOTE.—Durkheim's view of the origin of totemism is about as follows: The attempt to derive clan totemism from individual totemism must fail because we get the latter only in the more advanced cultures—pre-eminently in North-West North America, while practically all of primitive Australia has only clan totemism. [*Non sequitur.*] All of these, however, are but applications by the individual of some concept fundamental to the group. This is proved by the fact that we find individual totems only in those regions where clan totems have developed. The individual totem presupposes the clan totem as the species presupposes its genus. [In the nature of the case a false parallel.] For the individual totem is but a partial aspect of the clan totem. [The argument throughout takes for granted the very point which it attempts to prove. It uses its only conclusion as its hypothesis.] For these reasons the conceptional idea as the source of totemism put forth by Frazer will not suffice. Moreover, a localized totemism is not, as Frazer believed, the primitive form even in Arunta society where the descent is really through the mother. The theory of Lang that totemism is but the outcome of a name-giving to the group of outsiders, which appellation is later accepted by themselves, leaves the religious character of totemic practices unexplained and inexplicable. In short, all of the theories put forward, those of Tylor, Hill, Tout, Frazer and Lang presuppose religious concepts as existing prior to the totemic system. [Do they?]

The argument of Goldenweiser's totemism might have been considered. It must not be counted too severely against one if good thoughts are allowed to go into what is "*ne pas qu' une dissertation de la doctorat.*"

It remains, then, to ask how successful Durkheim has been in this definition of religion which is after all a concept invented by himself and used as a test in the selection of his data—however much he may insist that it is purely analytic and inductive.

In the first place we find the sacred and profane, the co-operation of individuals, the church and ritualistic phases, the plurality of the sacred, true characteristics of the traditional historical religions. In this field he has given incisive interpretations and brought prominently to the fore features which have not been commonly recognized by students of religion and has shown their importance in a true light. Herein is a valuable and positive achievement. While these aspects are truly characteristic, however, we do not believe they are entitled to be called differentia of religion since Durkheim would scarcely include as religious those fraternal and masonic orders which answer all the requirements of the sacred and profane, the church, ritual and co-operation of individuals. In a

word the description while eminently applicable is not limited to religion but is equally fitting in other fields where similar distinctions hold. Durkheim could, to be sure, include these others as also genuine religions but he shows no tendency to make the denotation so elastic.

Whether religion shall be called as he called it, both in his earlier study of it (*L'An. Soc. II.*) and in his *La Vie Religieuse*, simply a social phenomenon of a certain character depends ultimately solely upon the point of view. As the author's point of view seems to be always and ever that of a sociologist it is difficult to see how he could have defined religion as anything other than a social phenomenon. From his earlier writings one could have anticipated this with as much assurance as he can find it fundamental in all of his last treatment. A sociologist must find social phenomena as a physicist must find physical phenomena; he must be carried beyond the realm of individual psychology or give up his task if he hopes to continue in the pose of a sociologist. It is as true as the fact that an argument is stated in a given number of words is true, but it is truth from a point of view not *the* point of view. It may be more profitable than some other point or points of views—this remains to be shown. The author attempts no such justification. In fact, he seems not to appreciate that however productive of results, it is after all but one way of viewing the facts.

If one happens to be interested in psychological considerations or for that matter in almost any other consideration, the social aspect of religion may appear in a new light, as accidental rather than inherent; a mode of expression, just as thoughts are conveyed in words but after all are only a vehicle of expression, not the intent and purpose; the manifestation but not the life.

Good examples of this principle will be found among the new or so-called messianic religions of North America and other areas where the religious life has its inception in a given individual who transmits it to a group (his tribe). Here the concepts of the religious life as entertained by the individual are the larger sphere from which the tribe borrows. His is the larger mind, the social is the smaller mind so far as religious concepts are concerned. Yet, for Durkheim this is not religion until it has passed from the individual to the group, to use his terminology, has been imposed by the individual upon the group.

In this transition nothing may happen except that a larger number of individuals than hitherto share the concept. They will invent and entertain some that were not his, likewise they may fail to grasp and incorporate some that were his; while different, the social concepts may be no 'larger' than the prior individual ones. What is the real justification for calling the social concept religion and denying it to the individual concept? None, unless you premise that it is really only social phenomena with which you are concerned.

To this Durkheim might reply that the so-called individual concept turns out after all to be really social since the inspiration, even when coming from without his own tribe, was social in origin not evolved wholly from individual experience, the so-called individual initiative turning out to be really but a link in the chain of social influences the transmitter from one order of culture to another. It must be realized that such an objection is not valid for it means that the sociologist has really given up his problem. As regards the relations applying between the group and the individual there is no approach to the problem except by regarding the group as a closed system of concepts and influences. If in this case the individual creation is merely transmitting a social influence it is owing to the fact that he belongs to a different social order from that of his group. But did this social influence originate in the group from which he derived it? By no means; it had its origin in some other social influence which in turn came from a past social influence and so *ad infinitum* to the beginning of social and individual life. Having once started the infinite regress there is no justifiable motive for stopping this side of the beginning of history. If the individual is not a complete system of influences not more so is the group. It, too, has its history, its roots lie in other cultures, it carries us back ultimately into an unending history of developments. Whatever standards are applied to the group must be applied as liberally and as vigorously to the individual. If you apply them so liberally as to include all that has gone toward making them severally what they are there is beginning and progress but no end to the problem; if you apply them with such rigor as to make of both individual and his group self-complete and closed systems (although, of course, no one would maintain they are really such, that is, have no historical background representing a genetic develop-

ment of their present selves) the problem has meaning and approach.

Viewed in this light, as we believe it must be viewed, the social is not always the sole and self-complete intellectual life, the larger sphere of concepts of which individual psychology is after all only one manifestation. It is such if you posit that point of view, but why not posit the other also?

In the case of these messianic religions we find that the individual point of view plus the social point of view leads to a better comprehension of the phenomena in their entirety than either point of view taken in (unnecessary) exclusion of the other. We get a deeper insight into things, we can more consistently and prophetically account for them by considering the individual as a self-complete system of concepts and purposes acting upon another complete system, the social order, and being in turn influenced by the social, than by considering him as but an element of the social order.

It is in the success with which our points of view produce results, their value as interpretations and predictions that their ultimate justification consists. In the nature of the case neither Durkheim's nor our own are open to demonstration; for this reason: the evidence can never be had in sufficient abundance and surety to fill the gap. That is to say, you can never find in the *actual* social influence upon the individual all that is necessary to account for his being as he is. You may find most of them somewhere in the social order and adumbrations of more in his social neighborhood; but you will never be able to show that each and all of what there existed in some form did actually enter whether consciously or not, directly or indirectly into the individual's mentality. If you take the social point of view as the be-all and end-all of individual human life you can bring forward a great many relevant facts in support of your thesis, but you will never be able to supply all the data necessary for the demonstration of the argument. If, on the other hand, you insist that the individual is in small or in large part *not* the result of social influences you will again have a thesis in which you can make a case but even as to the most trivial things you can scarcely hope to demonstrate that he has not responded therein to some social influence intruded all unknown to himself. It is again a matter of how you wish to marshal your evidence and the justification for one or the other will

be in the use you make of your assumptions. The greater profundity of the problem has usually been confused with its greater obscurity.

Because of the profitable point of view which, for descriptive purposes, regards the individual as a self-complete unit capable of influencing the group and imparting to it concepts and purposes which were hitherto shared only by the individual messiah, we are not disposed to admit with Durkheim that religion is and must and can be only social. On the contrary, it may gain nothing by being incorporated in a number rather than in but one individual, or lose as much and often loses more than it gains by such transmission. The transmission is after all accidental just as gravitation is accidental to one's purposes. The social are not more persistent than physical forces—they merely condition individual capacity in another dimension. The social dimension does not include, it merely focuses on individual psychology.

There is another respect in which the definition of religion as social does not satisfy: it characterizes, from Durkheim's point of view, everything. Education, politics, everything is likewise social, so that this is not the differentia of religion. Moreover, it leaves the universality of religion unaccounted for. Why should there be in every age and clime the religious consciousness at all? A mere purposeless survival of an unmeaning organization and ceremonial is unthinkable when its distribution and long history is considered. If we cannot hope to get at remote prehistoric beginnings we may at least ask what keeps it going, to what element of our natures does it appeal? Durkheim's detailed treatment leaves out of the account the central problem where if anywhere investigation should be profitable.

We have held that the meaning given to religion must, after all, be a matter of choice, a creative definition presupposed by any selection of material on which analytic inductive results are to be based. This is in no sense of the word a matter of trivial terminology, for it does not much matter what name we use so long as we employ it consistently, it is a question of method and procedure in the use of cultural phenomena where we endeavor really to get ahead in our treatment. It does not mean, however, that our choice of definition can be arbitrary. It ought so far as possible conform to the hints of discussion

as assigned in the history of the theory of religion and to follow the lines of inquiry already laid down. It should, moreover, keep so far as possible the older denotation while reading into it a new connotation. The history of science and of the progress of liberal thought is largely an example of the creation of new connotation by the reading of new concepts into the old order of things whose denotation is seldom radically changed. History, then, should guide our choice of meaning, though in the end we find it only when we make it.

In choosing our concept of religion we should have in mind the extent to which religious feeling has been manifest in mankind practically everywhere and at all times as one of the features to be accounted for; as it appears in the individual as well as in the group we must find to what demand of his nature it answers. Finally, the proofs which are adduced by the religious consciousness and, more important still, the kind of evidence which generates religious feeling and is the bulwark of cults must be taken into consideration.

As this article makes no attempt to offer a constructive definition of religion we do not propose to treat that important question here. Suffice it to say, however, that these demands seem to be most sufficiently met by the concept of the supernatural or supernormal. It has been well expressed by Gilbert Murray in his *Four Stages of Greek Religion*. The world may be divided into two parts, the world of experience and knowledge and the realm of the untraversed. It is in the latter that religion lies whatever corner of it it may occupy. The phenomena of death where we are brought face to face with the world beyond experience is, when apprehended in this way, usually productive of the religious attitude. Nor is it accidental that practically every cult rises to an acme of activity and ritual when one of its members has been overtaken by death. If we look for evidences accepted by the cults themselves we find it usually consisting in evidences of the miraculous interposition of personalities and forces not of the world traversed by human experience. Whatever is interpreted as such phenomena is usually regarded with emotions similar to those engendered by the contemplation of the traditional miraculous evidences of the divine; if we give a psychological interpretation of religion it matters not whether they operate in individual or in social psychology. If we wish to define religion as social,

then we need merely qualify this by saying that when a group is actuated by this emotional apprehension of the supernatural, there we have religion.

That the application of this concept will lead to the classifying of many things as religious which are not currently so regarded, and the leaving out of many currently so regarded is inevitable. It would mean that certain social, ritualized functions no longer characterized by the emotional apprehension that gave them birth and potency are not properly religious but mere social perfunctory rites. They might be religious as performed by this individual, non-religious as performed by another; and so on. It follows, too, that this concept varies with the culture of the group and of the individual. Hence, the supernatural as above defined is relative to the experience and intellectual achievement of the group or individual in question. It will, indeed, be found that the extent to which a religious nature answers to the evidences of the supernatural, even though habit and social compulsion exercise a distracting influence, is largely dependent upon his intellectual grasp of the whole situation adduced in proof of such supernatural interposition. What appeals to a Blackfoot Indian fits into a different intellectual perspective when apprehended by the white man (*what white man is a very important matter*) and has an appeal depending upon its orientation there, while the evidences of divinity adduced by a Christian may or may not make a similar appeal to the Blackfoot. Presumably there are individuals who recognize no such clear-cut division of the world as above suggested. For such individuals there is no religious experience.

We believe that investigation along this line will be fruitful of results—such are the promises of tentative exploration. We are interested in what is fundamental in human nature. We obtain deepest insight into human experience by ascertaining the channels through which it finds expression, and the purposes thereby subserved. For this reason we prefer a point of view with regard to religion that cross-sections individual and social psychology, not ruling out either, but using them as mutually supplementary. We prefer to regard the individual as a self-complete entity conditioned, of course, by a thousand external influences of which the social is most intimate but is after all but another dimension comparable to gravitation and other

physical forces. We would at the same time regard the group as a self-complete entity made up of psychically interacting individuals functioning in mutual co-operation and held together by one dominant purpose that transcends purely individual purposes. The two points of view are better than either one in co-ordinating the facts of individual and social life. Any interpretation of their relative truth is, after all, merely an attempt to justify the chosen point of view on the ground that it does co-ordinate the facts and facilitates interpretations.

LITERATURE: BOOKS, ETC.

The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead. By J. G. FRAZER.
Vol. I. New York, Macmillan, 1913. Pp. xxi, 495.

This volume is the first part of another great work by the Professor of Social Anthropology in the University of Liverpool, who has given us, besides many other books, the seven volumes of "The Golden Bough" and the four volumes of "Totemism and Exogamy." The contents of the present work consist in the main of the Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 1911 and 1912. The author offers the work as a study in natural theology, which is the subject of the lectures on Lord Gifford's foundation. By "natural theology" he understands "that reasoned knowledge of a God or gods which man may be supposed, whether rightly or wrongly, capable of attaining to by the exercise of his natural faculties alone." (p. 1.) He distinguishes three methods of treatment of the subject—first, the dogmatic, which consists in stating the dogmas of natural theology which appear to the particular author to be true; secondly, the philosophical, examining the validity of the grounds on which these dogmas have been or may be maintained; and lastly, the historical method, which is that followed in the present work, namely, describing the various views which have been held on the subject and tracing their origin and evolution in history. He remarks that while the results of such an investigation "may shake the confidence with which traditional beliefs have been held," yet logically "an historical enquiry into the evolution of religion prejudices neither the question of the ethical value of religious practice nor the question of the truth or falsehood of religious belief." (p. 3.) "It is perfectly possible that a belief may be true, though the reasons alleged in favour of it are false or absurd; indeed we may affirm with great probability that a multitude of human beliefs, true in themselves, have been accepted and defended by millions of people on grounds which cannot bear exact investigation for a moment." (p. 4.) A similar view of the relation of superstitious belief to social institutions is presented in another of Dr. Frazer's books, entitled "Psyche's Task."

Belief in immortality, or, more correctly, "the continued existence of conscious human personality after death," our author finds to be general among mankind, although there are dissenters even among savages. The belief, according to Dr. Frazer, is "acquired by a process of reasoning from experience," both inward experience like dreams and outward experience such as the observation of the resemblance of children to deceased kinsfolks (this being a germ of the belief in reincarnation). We are told that as a rule savages do not believe in what we call natural death. Many peoples believe that "they would never die if their lives were not cut short by sorcery." (p. 33.) Sometimes death is attributed to demons, acting on their own accord; this the author regards a moral and intellectual advance over belief in witchcraft. Some

savages have gone even further, and admit the possibility of natural death in certain cases. Attention is called to the similarity of the primitive belief in the original absence of death with the views of some eminent modern biologists, for instance, the view of A. Weismann that death is not a natural necessity, but an adaptation acquired in the course of evolution for the advantage of the race. A similar view was held by A. R. Wallace. (p. 84.) While primitive peoples generally hold that death is not "natural," they are forced by the fact of its universality to "reconcile their theory of immortality with the practice of mortality." (p. 59.) In this way arise the myths of the origin of death. Usually death is believed to have come into the world through some disastrous blunder or crime. Several types of stories detailing such events are presented. The reviewer is of the opinion that the exceptions to this prevailing conception might have been more emphasized. There are myths who account for death as on the whole a beneficent phenomenon, on decidedly Malthusian principles.

In this work Dr. Frazer used the descriptive method applied to a few peoples in a limited area, thus approaching to the method of regional study of cultures emphasized by several leading ethnologists. This is worth noting, since the "comparative" method, based on the collection of data on certain topics from all parts of the world, has formerly been used by our author to such an extent that it is sometimes called the Frazerian method. Here we are told that while the comparative method is unquestionably more attractive, it cannot be adopted without a good deal of more or less conscious theorising, since every comparison implicitly involves a theory." (p. 30.) The present work, to judge from the first volume, bids fair to be a most valuable contribution to the history of religion, worthy of the great authority to whose pen we are indebted for so many important studies of primitive culture. It may be mentioned that Dr. Frazer has recently been knighted for his services to science and letters.

A. N. GILBERTSON.

Amerika und die Religion der Zukunft. Von ADOLF HARPF. Graz, Leuschner und Lubensky, 1914. 175 p.

Harpf urges that the mixture of races, religious and sects in this country has kept religious interests alive to a remarkable degree, that it has compelled much thinking as to what is common from the different points of view, and therefore has helped to orient thoughtful people with regard to what was essential and what was unessential for the religious consciousness. He therefore believes that one of the chief missions of this country is to evolve a new religion which shall recognize the stress that modern religious psychology lays upon morals, making conduct the essential thing, which shall also represent the tendencies toward social welfare which is represented in all kinds of unions and coöperations, as distinct from competition, that shall be on the one side as hearty and on the other as practical as the Salvation Army, that shall not stress creed or dogma but life, etc. He finds some indication of a movement in this direction here.

The Layman Revato. By EDWARD P. BUFFET. New York, Douglas C. McMurtrie, 1914. 102 p.

This is a study of a restless mind in Buddhist India at the time of Greek influence. Revato had one of those morbidly desperate minds which cannot be bonded by any imposing philosophy. The ideas ascribed to him may be outgrowths from the Buddhism of his day, or it may be grafted thereon. In justice to Christianity it must be admitted that the author may have credited to an earlier day some moral prescriptions which are peculiarly its own. It certainly shows an interesting interplay between Buddhism and Hellenism like that which left a trace on the Punjab monument in the Ganges valley still earlier. The meeting of the East and West through Alexander's invasion is generally known as a rather glittering generality although archaeological research is making our knowledge in this field more definite. This writer was the Amiel representing the meeting of these two cultures. The character Revato is created by the author as a lay figure, and even the monastery in which he is represented to have lived is not historical, but generic. It is an interesting study of the human soul earnestly seeking light, uncertain where to find it, and torn between two systems. It gives the reader an admirable insight into the philosophies of two Weltanschauungen. The chapters dealing with the great renunciation, the vision of death and of life, are the most interesting. The author has here made a fascinating contribution to religious psychology, true at once to history, the philosophy of religion, and the eternal psychology of the soul in its quest for truth of life whether in ancient or modern times.

The Miracles of Jesus. A Study of the Evidence. Being the Davies Lecture for the Year 1913. By E. O. DAVIES. London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1913. 232 p.

The scope of this book can best be characterized by the chapter headings, which are: the alleged facts, face value of the narratives, the evidence for the alleged facts, the gospels, dates, writers and authorities, critical estimation of the narratives, the evidence, other miracles, theories about the facts, viz., physical impossibility, moral impossibility and possibility, antecedent probability, evidence of impossibility. The author's standpoint on these different topics is all independent and all his own. From the reviewer's standpoint he is on the whole too conservative and distrustful, and lacks psychological insight.

Comment and Criticism. A Cambridge Quarterly Paper for the Discussion of Current Religious and Theological Questions. London, Longman's Green & Co. Vol. II, No. 1. May, 1914.

In wishing this new journal, just beginning its second volume, well, THE JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY ventures to express the hope that the reviews feature of Comment and Criticism be not suffered to grow less, but rather more. Articles, correspondence, etc., are well in their place, but the greatest need of scholarship in the religious field is a kind of *Centralblatt* that shall name and characterize the important new publications. From what point of view the publications are regarded makes less difference.

Mind and Spirit. A Study in Psychology. By THOMAS KIRBY DAVIS.
Boston, Sherman, French & Co., 1914. 115 p.

This work deals with personal reminiscences, revelation, the true psychology, the second birth and the new life, and the holy spirit of promise. Subjects like these awaken a lively curiosity on the part of the psychologist of religion to know whether on these great themes this author has seen any new light, but alas, there is no intimation that he has done so. His views are conventional, orthodox, and uninspiring. When will the orthodox clergy awaken to the great new life and light which modern psychology has found and which the world, and particularly young people, so need?

Marching men; or phases and problems of childhood, pulpit and pew. By LEONIDAS ROBINSON. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1913. 243 p.

This work is not intended to treat of psychology as a science but of some of its practical applications to religious and moral work. The author has had a large experience as lecturer, professor and pastor in the South, and puts things very effectively. He discusses habit, character, attention, childhood, dogma, religion, evolution, gates to the Old and New Testament, etc. Perhaps the best thing in his book is a lively sense of the religious needs of young people.

The psychic uplift, or the new mind cure. By MAZETTA LAIRY. London, B. F. Stevens & Brown, 4 Trafalgar Sq. (c. 1914). 283 p.

A mind cure, we are told, implies the re-education of the unconscious mind. To cure a mental sufferer the physician must turn educator and spend hours to bring his patient back to a normal attitude. This book is meant to be a guide to those who practise mental medicine. It should be noted that the mind-curists in this country have not in a single case known to the writer of this note availed themselves of the more advanced and more effective methods of Dejerine, who for many years in his hospital has appealed to the emotions with great success, nor of Dubois, who has developed what might be called a reason cure, which consists in making the patient conscious of his own right relations to others and to the world, of Marcinowski, whose appeal is to ambition to do, be something in the world and to avoid *Mindertigkeit*, nor even have the occupation cures had any adequate presentation.

The miracles of Jesus. By E. O. DAVIES. London, Hodder & Son, 1913. 240 p.

These lectures are given on the Davies Foundation made by Thomas Davies to perpetuate his father's name and whose chief interest was in the Welsh Calvinistic Methodists. The lecturer must be an ordained minister, the topic, religion. The thesis here is that miracles must be assumed to be extraordinary which on their face value do not happen in the course of nature. The argument is from analogy. No imminent cause or nexus could account for Jesus' miracles so that Hume is annihilated.

Religiöses Recht. Von Dr. MORDECHÉ W. RAPAPORT. Separatabdruck aus den Blättern für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre. X. Jahrgang, Heft 1, 2, 3. Berlin, R. v. Decker's Verlag, 1914.

This author urges that religion is a stabilizing element in society and that it works against special interests and moods, and therefore also against disharmonies and disunions. It knits up every soul into a more compact whole. Religion ought to furnish norms for citizenship, if not for science, jurisprudence, economics, etc.

Some loose stones; being a consideration of certain tendencies in modern theology illustrated by reference to the book called "Foundations." By R. A. KNOX. New York, Longmans, Green, 1913. 233 p.

The problem of Christianity; lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston, and at Manchester College, Oxford. By JOSIAH ROYCE. Volume 1. The Christian Doctrine of Life. Volume 2. The Real World and the Christian Ideas. New York, Macmillan, 1913.

The religious instinct. By THOMAS J. HARDY. New York, Longmans, Green, 1913. 300 p.

Directory of American Psychological Periodicals

American Journal of Psychology—Worcester, Mass.: Florence Chandler.
Subscription \$5. 600 pages annually. Edited by G. Stanley Hall.
Quarterly. General and experimental psychology. Founded 1888.

Pedagogical Seminary—Worcester, Mass.: Florence Chandler.
Subscription \$5. 575 pages annually. Edited by G. Stanley Hall.
Quarterly. Pedagogy and educational psychology. Founded 1891.

Psychological Review—Princeton, N. J.: Psychological Review Company.
Subscription (with Psychological Bulletin) \$5. 480 pages annually.
Bi-monthly. General. Founded 1894. Edited by John B. Watson.

Psychological Bulletin—Princeton, N. J.: Psychological Review Company.
Subscription \$2.75. 480 pages annually. Psychological literature.
Monthly. Founded 1904. Edited by Arthur H. Pierce.

Psychological Monographs—Princeton, N. J.: Psychological Review Company.
Subscription \$4. 500 pp. per vol. Founded 1895. Edited by James R. Angell.
Published without fixed dates, each issue one or more researches.

Psychological Index—Princeton, N. J.: Psychological Review Company.
Subscription \$1. 200 pages. Founded 1895. Edited by Howard C. Warren.
An annual bibliography of psychological literature.

Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods—New York:
Science Press. Bi-weekly. 728 pages per volume. Founded 1904.
Subscription \$3. Edited by F. J. E. Woodbridge and Wendell T. Bush.

Archives of Psychology—Substation 84, New York: Archives of Psychology.
Subscription \$5. 600 pp. annually. Founded 1906. Edited by R. S. Woodworth.
Published without fixed dates, each number a single experimental study.

Journal of Abnormal Psychology—Boston; Richard G. Badger. Subscription
\$4. 480 pages annually. Ed. by Morton Prince. Bi-monthly. Founded 1906.
Entire field of abnormal psychology.

Psychological Clinic—Philadelphia: Psychological Clinic Press.
Subscription \$1.50. 280 pages annually. Edited by Lightner Witmer.
Monthly (9 numbers). Orthogenics, psychology, hygiene. Founded 1907.

Training School Bulletin—Vineland, N. J.: The Training School.
Subscription \$1. 160 pages annually. Monthly (10 numbers).
Founded 1908. Edited by H. H. Goddard. Abnormal child psychology.

Journal of Religious Psychology—Worcester, Mass.: Louis N. Wilson.
Subscription \$3. 480 pages annually. Published irregularly. Founded 1904.
Edited by G. Stanley Hall.

Journal of Race Development—Worcester, Mass.: Louis N. Wilson.
Subscription \$2. 460 pages annually. Quarterly. Founded 1910.
Edited by George H. Blakeslee and G. Stanley Hall.

Journal of Educational Psychology—Baltimore: Warwick & York.
Subscription \$2.50. 600 pages annually. Founded 1910.
Monthly (10 numbers). Managing Editor, J. Carleton Bell.
(Educational Psychology Monographs. Edited by Guy M. Whipple.
Published separately at varying prices. Same publishers.)

Journal of Animal Behavior—Cambridge, Mass.: Emerson Hall.
Subscription \$3. 450 pages annually. Bi-monthly. Founded 1911.
Edited by Robert M. Yerkes.

The Behavior Monographs—Cambridge, Mass.: Emerson Hall.
Subscription \$3. 450 pages per volume. Edited by John B. Watson.
Published without fixed dates, each number a single research.

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